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Explanations
Responsibility for aged care policy transferred from DHFS to DHAC following
restructuring of Commonwealth government departments on 21 October 1998. In
this report, references to the ‘department’ (in the context of the Commonwealth
department responsible for aged care policy) should be taken to refer to either
DHFS or DHAC as appropriate.SUMMARY XI
Summary
Around 140 000 Australians are currently in residential aged care. The
Commonwealth Government meets most of the cost of that care, paying an
estimated $2.9  billion in subsidies to nursing homes and hostels in 1997-98.
Since October 1997, the Aged Care Structural Reform Package has introduced
major changes to the subsidy regime and to the regulation of residential aged care.
Funding distinctions between nursing homes and hostels have been minimised, with
the introduction of a common classification of care needs — the ‘Resident
Classification Scale’ (RCS) — and an alignment of subsidies across nursing homes
and hostels for residents having the same care needs.
The structure of nursing home subsidies has also changed significantly. Under the
previous arrangements, these subsidies were paid in several components with the
largest, the care aggregated module, varying across the States and Territories. This
was essentially in recognition of historical differences between jurisdictions in rates
of pay for nurses and personal carers. In contrast, subsidies for hostel residents
varied only according to care needs, not across jurisdictions.
Under the new arrangements, the previous nursing home subsidy components have
essentially been rolled into a single basic subsidy for each care category. At present,
the basic subsidies for ‘high care’ residents (classifications 1 to 4 on the RCS)
continue to differ between jurisdictions. However, it was intended that these
subsidies move to nationally uniform rates over a period of seven years. The first
move towards this coalescence was made in July 1998. Uniform subsidy rates
continue to be set for ‘low care’ residents (now classifications 5 to 8 on the RCS).
This report responds to a request from the Treasurer that the Commission review
one aspect of the Reform Package — the proposal to ‘coalesce’ subsidy rates for
high care residents. Specifically, the Treasurer has asked the Commission to report
on whether coalescence should proceed and, if not, what would be an appropriate
funding methodology.
In this report, the Commission argues that equity of access to quality aged care must
be the main criterion for assessing alternative subsidy regimes. The need toXII NURSING HOME
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encourage efficient and responsive service provision, to avoid unnecessary
administrative costs and to promote transparency are also important considerations.
The equity criterion establishes certain design features for any aged care subsidy
regime. In particular, available government funds should support a uniform quality
of care across Australia.
This does not mean that all residents should be equally subsidised irrespective of
their ability to pay. Indeed, the recent introduction of income tested fees recognises
that the targeting of available funding to those people least able to pay for
themselves is more equitable than distributing funds equally among all residents.
Nevertheless, equity does mean that the underlying costs of provision need to be
taken into account. Thus, if those costs vary significantly across regions then,
assuming no significant difference between regions in the financial means of
residents, this would require higher subsidies for services in high cost locations.
Such an approach does not automatically rule out nationally uniform basic
subsidies. If the dispersion in costs between regions is relatively small, then it may
well be more efficient to address the needs of the relatively few high cost services
through a special needs supplement. On the other hand, if there are widespread
differences in costs, then variable basic subsidies may be a more appropriate
approach.
In comparing costs across regions, there is a need to net out the effects of
inefficiencies in service provision and differences in the quality of service. In the
Commission’s view, the subsidy regime should not provide ongoing support for
inefficiency or quality differences.
Cost comparisons provided by some of the peak industry bodies and major
providers netted out such effects. The study based on the widest range of
comparisons suggests differences in standardised labour costs across States and
Territories of 4 to 6 per cent, or 2 to 3 per cent either side of the national average.
While the standardised labour cost comparisons did not examine the variations
within jurisdictions, there is some evidence to suggest that, apart from some smaller
rural and remote area services, and homes providing services to some particular
social or cultural groups, the variations are not large. Also, although non-labour
costs vary across and within jurisdictions, these costs are a relatively small
component of total costs.
On the basis of the available evidence, the Commission has concluded that the
current variation in standardised costs between jurisdictions is relatively small. ForSUMMARY XIII
this reason, the current case for continuing to differentiate basic subsidies is not
compelling. However, future cost trends are uncertain, and cost differentials
between jurisdictions need to be monitored.
On balance, the Commission considers that an approach based on nationally
uniform basic subsidies should be adopted provided that:
• there is adequate special needs funding to ensure equitable access to services in
some particular circumstances — for example, in those rural and remote regions
where costs are significantly higher than average; and
• the dispersion in regional cost differences is monitored to ensure that uniform
basic subsidies continue to remain appropriate in the future.
However, the Commission does not endorse the current coalescence proposal. The
national subsidy rates that would emerge from the proposal are the average of the
current state based subsidies. Instead, the Commission recommends a subsidy
regime which provides a clear link to the standard of care which the Commonwealth
is seeking, while not being prescriptive of the actual inputs required to achieve that
level of care. Further, the indexing arrangements should be related to movements in
the industry’s underlying costs. Finally, the arrangements for providing special
needs support should be improved.
Such a regime, which could apply to low care as well high care residents, would:
• support a uniform quality of care across Australia at a specified benchmark level;
• establish greater transparency in the link to the cost of providing care to meet
those standards;
• address current funding anomalies across jurisdictions;
• improve the resources available to homes catering for special needs, for example
those in rural and remote regions;
• provide incentives for improvements in the efficiency of residential aged care
service provision; and
• encourage the development of services which are more responsive to the needs
of residents.
The Commission is also proposing some interim changes to address anomalies in
the current subsidy regime.
The Commission’s recommendations are set out below, together with a table which
summarises the main features of its recommended subsidy regime using the currentXIV NURSING HOME
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arrangements as a reference point. Details of the proposed methodology are set out
in chapter 7.
On the basis of the evidence available for this inquiry, the Commission supports
nationally uniform basic subsidies. However, if a subsequent assessment of the cost
base were to reveal a case for regionally differentiated subsidies, all of the
Commission’s recommendations except for the first would remain relevant.
The Commission has taken the opportunity, in chapter 8, to outline some broader
issues deserving of further public debate.SUMMARY XV
Recommendations
1. The Commonwealth Government should adopt nationally uniform basic
subsidies (that is, a separate nationally uniform basic subsidy for each RCS
category) for high care residents, as part of a package of changes to address
deficiencies in the current subsidy arrangements.
2. The Government should specify its intended outcomes in terms of a standard
of care benchmark. The purchase price of care outputs from providers by way
of subsidy funding, in combination with funding from residents, should be
adequate to meet the cost of providing that benchmark standard of care.
3. As a basis for setting the output purchase price, the Government should
arrange for a five yearly assessment of the jurisdictional and national average
input costs of providing the benchmark level of care using a standardised
input mix averaged across a range of efficient facilities (with, say, 40 to 60
beds). These assessments should be set in a broad context taking into account
any changes in the residential aged care benchmark and in care expectations,
and re-examining the case for nationally uniform basic subsidies. The reviews
should be conducted transparently and independently of Government.
4. Basic subsidy rates should reflect nursing wage rates and conditions
applicable in the aged care sector, but only to the extent that these do not
exceed the rates and conditions applying in the acute care sector.
5. Basic subsidy rates should be adjusted annually according to indices which
clearly reflect the changes in the average cost of the standardised input mix,
less a discount to reflect changes in productivity. Revised indexation
arrangements should be introduced as soon as possible.
6. The pensioner, oxygen, enteral feeding, respite and hardship supplements
should be retained in their current form at this stage. The rates should be
suitably indexed. The appropriateness and adequacy of these existing
supplements, and the justification for any additional supplements, should be
re-examined in each five yearly assessment of costs.
7. The concessional supplement should be set at a single uniform daily rate.
8. The current payroll tax supplement should be replaced by a system of cost
reimbursement for payroll tax paid by providers for their employees and for
contract nursing and personal care staff.XVI NURSING HOME
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9. The assessment of costs should include a component to reflect the average
workers compensation premiums (base tariff plus experience adjustments)
incurred by residential aged care providers. This component should be
adjusted between the five yearly assessments if indexation of basic subsidy
rates fails to cover significant changes in average workers compensation
costs.
In addition, supplementary funding should be made available for individual
providers which incur higher workers compensation costs than the amount
allowed for in the average cost base, on the condition that those providers
bear an excess equal to 30 per cent of that amount.
10. Superannuation charges should be included in the assessment of costs, at
rates appropriate for each RCS classification.
11. The current subsidy reduction for government-run homes and those
transferred to the non-government sector should be phased out over a five
year period.
12. Additional funding support for higher cost homes in special circumstances,
such as smaller higher cost nursing homes in rural and remote areas, should
come from a special needs funding pool. The Government should add to
current outlays to meet this purpose, separate from, and additional to, the
funding of the basic subsidy. The new special needs arrangements should be
developed and costed in consultation with providers, resident groups and
State and Territory Governments.
13. There should be no requirement for providers to acquit subsidy payments.
14. Residential aged care subsidies should continue to be paid to providers rather
than to residents.
15. There should be greater opportunity for the provision of extra services to
residents who wish to meet the relevant costs. In this regard:
• an extra service should be any facility or service that exceeds standard
care as defined under the benchmark level of care required to be provided
to all residents irrespective of financial means;
• the controls on where in a facility extra services are provided, and the
price charged for such services, should be abolished;
• the current reduction in the basic subsidy for residents receiving extra
service should be abolished; andSUMMARY XVII
• the current strict quota on extra service places should be replaced with a
lighter-handed approach and a monitoring system aimed at identifying any
cases where extra service provision is reducing access to standard care.
The Government should also look at the scope to simplify the regional
matrix of concessional resident ratios.
16. The Government should work closely with providers and other stakeholders
to resolve quickly all outstanding concerns in relation to program
administration and transparency of information.
17. The Residential Aged Care Review should undertake the first assessment of
average costs as part of its examination of the adequacy of subsidies for
residential aged care (as required by its terms of reference). This should be
carried out in accordance with the subsidy methodology set out by the
Commission in its recommendations and in the body of this report.
18. Subject to any recommendation from the Residential Aged Care Review in
relation to the adequacy of funding provided by the Government for
residential aged care, funds earmarked for indexing current subsidies should
be redirected to progressively increase the basic rates for the low subsidy
States until a coalescence (or, if nationally uniform basic subsidies are not
adopted, until a revised set of jurisdictional subsidies) is achieved.
[A summary table is given overleaf.]XVIII NURSING HOME
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Summary of the Commission’s subsidy proposals
Current arrangements Commission’s proposal
The standard of care No explicit link between
funding rates and required
outcomes
Funding for a uniform quality
of care
Cost basis for subsidies Historical costs of provision Standardised costs that net





Based on state and territory
borders, but to coalesce to
nationally uniform rates
Nationally uniform rates
Relating subsidies to the
dependency of residents
Resident Classification Scale Resident Classification Scale
Indexation of basic subsidy Use of COPO index — not
specifically linked to
movements in industry costs
Subsidy rates adjusted on the
basis of increases in input
prices, less a productivity
discount
Supplementary funding Range of supplements to
cater for specific cost
circumstances not readily
handled through the basic
subsidy regime
Special funding for small
remote and rural homes
through the viability
supplement
Continue system but with
some changes to individual
supplements
An augmented and extended
special needs funding pool to
address these requirements
Deductions Basic subsidy reduced for
government-run homes
Phase out differentiation of




Not required Not required
To whom are subsidies paid? Providers Providers
Extra service places Number of places subject to a
quota. Also controls on nature
and price of extra services
Reductions in the basic
subsidy for residents in extra
service places
Provide greater opportunity
for the provision of extra
services to residents who




The Commonwealth Government provided almost $2.9 billion in 1997-98 to
subsidise residential aged care. Of this, about $2.3 billion supported high level care,
and nearly $0.6 billion low level care. Nursing homes provide most high level care,
and more than 75 per cent of their total costs are covered by the subsidy. Low level
care is generally provided in hostels, with the subsidy covering a substantially lower
proportion of costs.
This inquiry is mainly concerned with the way in which the Commonwealth
Government’s subsidy for high level care should be distributed. This issue has
important equity and efficiency implications.
Box 1.1 summarises background information about high level nursing home care,
the people who use it, and the role of government. Much of the information about
the role of government also applies to the hostel sector. Chapters 2 and 3 set out
more detailed background information.
1.1 Background to the reference
In the past, a number of different funding methodologies have been used to
distribute residential aged care subsidies, with important distinctions between the
nursing home and hostel sectors.
The Aged Care Structural Reform Package, announced in the Commonwealth’s
August 1996 Budget, maintained different levels of subsidy for residents with
different care needs, but sought to remove the funding distinctions between the
sectors by providing for:
• a common classification of care needs for all residents (called the Resident
Classification Scale — RCS), to replace the different classifications which had
applied to nursing homes and hostels;
• an alignment of subsidies across nursing homes and hostels for residents having
the same care needs; and
• a process of ‘coalescence’, under which individual state based subsidy rates for
high care residents would gradually move to nationally uniform rates over a2 NURSING HOME
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period of seven years, commencing from 1 July 1998. (Nationally uniform
subsidy rates for low care (hostel) residents were already in place.)
In jurisdictions with above average high care subsidy rates, providers raised
concerns with the Government that coalescence would adversely affect the
availability and quality of nursing home care — indeed, even existing rates were
considered insufficient. In contrast, providers in jurisdictions with below average
subsidies made representations that the seven year phase-in of uniform subsidies
would unduly delay improvements in care in those regions.
Box 1.1 Nursing home care
Supply
• 1500 nursing homes provide around 75 000 beds:
– about 36 000 by private for-profit providers;
– 28 000 by the charitable and religious sector;
– 11 000 by governments or on behalf of government.
• The proportion of beds provided by the three sectors differs significantly between
jurisdictions:
– private for-profit: from 56 per cent in NSW to 17 per cent in Tasmania;
– charitable and religious: from 70 per cent in the NT to 25 per cent in Victoria;
– government: from 28 per cent in Victoria to 5 per cent in SA.
• About half the nursing homes have 40 beds or less:
– in Victoria and the NT, 70 per cent of homes have 40 beds or less.
• On average, about 70 per cent of homes are located in metropolitan areas:
– but three-quarters of homes with 20 beds or less are non-metropolitan.
• About 100 000 persons are employed in nursing homes:
– the majority are nursing and personal care staff;
– about three-quarters are part time;
– over 14 000 volunteers work an average of 11 hours each per month.
Demand
• More than 70 per cent of residents are female.
• About 95 per cent of nursing home residents have high care needs (RCS
classifications 1 to 4, with classification 1 representing the highest need):
– but about 10 per cent of those with high care needs are residents of hostels;
– this proportion may grow with ‘ageing in place’.
• Respite care has grown markedly in recent years, accounting for more than 25 per
cent of admissions. But it still makes up less than 1 per cent of total bed days.
• About half of residents stay for one year or less, with about 13 per cent staying for
5 years or more.
• Average waiting time between approval for entry to care and actual entry is about
31 days.
(continued on next page)INTRODUCTION 3
Box 1.1 (continued)
Residential care subsidy
• The Commonwealth Government provides a basic subsidy to care providers,
currently varying from $49 to $110 per resident per day, depending on:
– the RCS classification of the resident;
– the State or Territory where the home is located; and
– whether the care provided is respite or permanent.
• A number of supplements and deductions are made. These include:
– supplements for concessional residents (those who cannot afford to pay an
accommodation bond or charge), a transitional supplement (in respect of those
who are exempt from consideration for an accommodation bond or charge),
and respite care, oxygen, enteral feeding and payroll tax supplements;
– deductions for government (or former government) facilities, where a resident
receives extra services, or where a home receives a resident’s third party or
workers compensation payment;
– a reduction in respect of income tested fees applying to residents who entered
residential care on or after 1 March 1998;
– a pensioner supplement, a viability supplement to support smaller remote
facilities and a supplement in respect of residents in financial hardship.
Care fees and accommodation payments from residents
• A number of care fees can apply:
– pensioners pay a standard resident contribution of $22 per day;
– non-pensioners pay a higher standard contribution of $27 per day;
– in addition, new residents entering care from 1 March 1998 may be required to
pay an income tested additional fee of up to $38 per day.
• An asset tested accommodation charge of up to $12 per day can also apply to
residents entering care from 1 October 1997.
Regulatory arrangements
• The number of subsidised bed places is controlled by the Commonwealth, with a
target of 40 high care beds (generally in nursing homes) and 50 low care beds
(generally in hostels) for each 1000 of the population aged 70 years and over:
– a minimum of 27 per cent of places on average need to be allocated to
concessional residents. Special needs groups are also provided for;
– extra service places (for those prepared to pay for a higher standard of
accommodation, food and services) are available, but their number is
controlled.
• To continue to receive funding after January 2001, services must obtain
accreditation as meeting all residential care standards.
• To require residents to pay accommodation charges, a home must obtain
certification as meeting specified building and care standards.
• States and Territories may prescribe staff/resident ratios, regulate the dispensing
of medication and/or certain medical procedures, occupational health and safety,
workers compensation requirements, building standards, fire prevention and fire
fighting measures, etc.
• Staff wages and conditions are generally set by jurisdictional based awards.
• Local government by-laws may also apply (eg waste disposal rules).
Sources: DHFS (1997a); AIHW (1998b); Steering Committee (1998) and submissions.4 NURSING HOME
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1.2 Terms of reference
The terms of reference require the Commission to examine current and alternative
methodologies for setting nursing home subsidy rates, to report whether the
proposed coalescence should proceed and to make recommendations on an
appropriate funding methodology. It was also asked to report on:
• differences in costs across States and Territories in providing nursing home care,
particularly wage costs for nursing and personal care staff;
• future trends in wage costs;
• whether subsidies should vary by State and Territory and, if so, to what extent;
and
• if there is a case for differential subsidies, possible methodologies for
maintaining appropriate relativities over time.
The terms of reference are set out in full in appendix A. The Commission was asked
to submit its final report by 13 January 1999.
1.3 Scope of the inquiry
A narrow interpretation of the reference would imply focusing solely on the
distribution of available funding. However, there are important relationships
between funding methodology, the overall quantum of funds, the institutional and
regulatory framework, and the share of costs paid for by the Government and by
residents. For example, it is difficult to develop an appropriate funding methodology
without explicitly recognising quality of care objectives. In turn, this leads to
consideration of overall funding levels and the shares to be met by the Government
and residents.
Thus, the Commission has taken account of wider issues, insofar as they are
relevant to the subsidy regime. It notes that broader issues, not directly covered by
its inquiry, are being considered by an independent review of the residential care
reforms. This review, chaired by Professor Len Gray, is being undertaken over a
two-year period with reports to be provided progressively (box 1.2).
Consistent with its terms of reference, the Commission has not limited itself to
comparing the existing state based regime with the proposed nationally uniform
subsidy arrangement. It has also considered other forms of subsidy which mightINTRODUCTION 5
give a better outcome for the community. For example, it has considered whether
regionally based subsidies might be justified. Further, although the focus of the
inquiry is on high level care, the Commission has recognised that an appropriate
methodology could encompass funding for low level care. The Commission has also
recognised linkages between funding for capital and for recurrent purposes.
Finally, while the coalescence process relates to subsidies for residents with high
care needs irrespective of whether they live in nursing homes or hostels, for ease of
exposition, this paper generally uses the term nursing home subsidies/services as a
proxy for high care subsidies/services. Similarly, the paper uses the term ‘residential
aged care’, even though a small proportion of high care residents are not older
people.
Box 1.2 Independent review of residential aged care reforms — terms
of reference
To assess and report on the extent to which the Aged Care Act 1997 is achieving its
objects and addressing acknowledged deficiencies in the aged care system, including
in relation to:
1. Access, including equity for different groups within the residential care client group,
equity across regions and the balance of care services available within regions;
2. Affordability, including ranges of accommodation payments charged and impact on
demand for services from residents in different financial situations;
3. Quality, including quality of care, having regard to staffing levels, accommodation
and user rights;
4. Efficiency, including administrative costs and savings for industry and government
associated with the new regulatory, funding, classification and income testing
arrangements;
5. Industry viability, including adequacy of subsidies and the impact of the new fees
and capital funding arrangements;
6. State and territory programs including usage of acute hospital, housing, community
care, assessment and guardianship services;
7. Choice and appropriateness, including facilitation of ageing in place; and
8. Other considerations, including for example dementia care.
The review will be undertaken over a two-year period, with reports to be provided on a
six monthly basis, and a final report on completion.
Source: Information supplied by the Department of Health and Family Services.6 NURSING HOME
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1.4 Consultation
The Commission has endeavoured to facilitate participation in the inquiry and to
allow the maximum degree of public scrutiny in the six months specified by the
Treasurer. Specifically, the Commission:
• held an initial round of informal discussions in all States and Territories with
about 50 organisations and individuals with a range of interests and perspectives;
• released an issues paper to assist those wishing to make formal submissions;
• invited written submissions — over 120 submissions were received from
providers, peak provider groups, Governments, unions, residents and carers
groups;
• released a position paper in October 1998 setting out the Commission’s
preliminary proposals;
• released a descriptive paper in November 1998 giving an overview of the
residential aged care sector and of its funding and regulatory arrangements; and
• conducted public hearings in November 1998 in Hobart, Brisbane, Melbourne,
Perth (by video) and Tamworth to receive feedback on the position paper and
descriptive material.
Appendix B lists those who have participated in the inquiry.
The Commission expresses its appreciation to all those who provided written
submissions to fairly tight deadlines, participated in the public hearings, and/or gave
freely of their time to discuss inquiry issues.
1.5 Report structure
Chapters 2 and 3 set out detailed background information about the residential aged
care sector, and its funding and regulatory arrangements.
Chapter 4 sets out assessment criteria relevant to the choice of an appropriate
funding methodology, and a framework for deciding whether a nationally uniform
subsidy regime is appropriate. It concludes that the extent of variability in costs
between regions, and the reasons for observed cost differences, are central factors in
deciding between uniform and regionally based subsidies.
Chapter 5 looks at available cost information and establishes that the variation in
costs between jurisdictions is much less than the variation in current subsidies.INTRODUCTION 7
Drawing on this cost information, chapter 6 concludes that a nationally uniform
basic subsidy regime should be adopted. However, it also concludes that the
previously announced coalescence process is deficient in other ways and should not
proceed.
Chapter 7 presents a subsidy regime which the Commission considers would better
meet the Government’s objectives in supporting residential aged care.
Finally, chapter 8 canvasses some longer term issues which, if addressed, might
improve outcomes for residents and for the community generally without detracting
from equity in the provision of aged care.RESIDENTIAL AGED
CARE
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2 Overview of the residential aged care
sector
2.1 Aged care environment
The majority of older people care for themselves, or are cared for, in their homes by
family members, relatives, friends, charities and benevolent individuals and through
government programs such as Home and Community Care. However, a significant
number are cared for in residential aged care facilities. At any one time, around 9
per cent of Australians aged 70 years or over live in these facilities, with a much
higher proportion doing so at some stage during their lifetimes.
There are two main types of residential aged care facility — nursing homes and
hostels. Both provide accommodation and associated support services, such as
domestic services (laundry, cleaning) and help with performing daily tasks (moving
around, dressing, personal hygiene, eating). Traditionally, the main difference
between the two has been that nursing homes have catered for those who have also
required ongoing access to nursing care — so-called ‘high care’ residents. Subsidies
for high care residents (classifications 1 to 4 on the Resident Classification Scale)
are the focus of this inquiry.
The distinction between nursing homes and hostels is becoming less clear. Nearly
10 per cent of high care residents now live in hostels. Moreover, this figure is likely
to increase in the future as a result of changes to government policy which will
allow ‘ageing in place’ (that is, removing the necessity for residents to move from a
hostel to a nursing home as their care needs increase). An increasing proportion of
new facilities are catering for both high care and low care residents.
While the majority of nursing home and hostel services are provided by non-
government operators, government plays an important wider role in the sector. For
example:
• the Commonwealth establishes policy directions and provides significant funding
and program administration support. It is also responsible for defining outcomes
and monitoring the performance of service providers against those outcomes
(current funding and regulatory arrangements are discussed in chapter 3);10 NURSING HOME
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• State and Territory Governments monitor compliance with a range of staffing,
building, fire, safety and occupational health and safety requirements. They also
operate some nursing homes and hostels.
Governments also support a range of non-residential care services for frail older
people. Notable amongst these is the Home and Community Care (HACC) Program
— a joint program between the Commonwealth and State and Territory
Governments — which provides a range of community-based support services,
including home help, personal care, home nursing, meals and transport. While the
program provides services to younger people with disabilities and their carers, the
majority of its clients are 65 years or over. The Commonwealth also provides
funding for community aged care packages which support people who prefer to
remain at home, but who require care equivalent to that provided in hostels. The
continuum of aged care services is illustrated in figure 2.1.
Significantly, this care continuum is evolving over time. For example, over the last
decade or so, the Commonwealth has tightened access to subsidised residential aged
care places (see chapter 3). This has partly reflected a shift in emphasis towards
home based care which has also constrained Commonwealth outlays. One outcome
of these changes has been that those entering nursing homes, in particular, are
becoming older and more frail. The rationing of residential aged care places has
increased demands for community-based services funded by State, Territory and
Local Governments.
There has also been a move to rebalance residential care beds between the nursing
home and hostel sectors. Until the mid-1980s, nursing homes catered for a wide
range of residents, from those requiring intensive nursing care to those needing only
minimal supervision. As a result, nursing homes provided the large majority of
available residential aged care places. However, over the last decade or so, most of
the growth in approved Commonwealth residential care places has been in the
hostel sector. As a result, there are now nearly as many hostel beds (65 000) as
nursing home beds (75 000). Commonwealth policy is to stabilise this shift to 40
nursing home places, 50 hostel places and 10 community aged care packages per
1000 of the population 70 years and over.
These sorts of changes in the residential aged care sector have had implications for
other government supported health and community services which assist the aged.
For example, some nursing home patients are treated in acute care hospitals. In this
regard the Queensland Government stated that:
up to 700 beds are occupied at any time in Queensland public hospitals by patients who
would qualify for nursing home admission if places were available. (Sub. 10, p. 5)RESIDENTIAL AGED
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Figure 2.1 Hierarchy of the balance of care in Australia
Source: OECD (1996).
2.2 Supply of residential care services
Nursing homes
There are currently around 1500 nursing homes in Australia providing around
75 000 beds. Around 70 per cent of these homes are located in capital cities or
major urban centres. However, the majority of very small homes — less than 20
beds — are located in smaller rural and remote areas (see below).12 NURSING HOME
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Ownership
Private for-profit providers supply nearly half (48 per cent) of all nursing home
beds, with another 38 per cent provided by religious and charitable organisations (ie
private not-for-profit). The remaining 14 per cent of beds are in nursing homes run
by, or on behalf of, State or Local Governments (see table 2.1).








NSW 16 139 10 623 2 097 28 859
Vic 8 227 4 439 4 856 17 522
Qld 4 675 5 778 1 736 12 189
WA 2 921 2 080 832 5 833
SA 2 989 3 645 294 6 928
Tas 370 1 397 406 2 173
ACT 214 219 86 519
NT 40 146 24 210
Australia 35 575 28 327 10 331 74 233
Australia, 30 June
1993
35 148 26 593 12 724 74 465
a Adjusted fees nursing homes are operated by or on behalf of a State or Territory Government and receive
a modified level of recurrent funding from the Commonwealth.
Source: AIHW (1998b).
While the overall share of private sector beds has changed little over the last five
years, the charitable and religious sector has increased its share by taking over many
of the beds released by State Governments. This trend is expected to continue. As
the Victorian Government stated:
the State intends to divest approximately 1200 residential care beds by 2001 to the
private/voluntary sector. (Sub. 60, p. 1)
At the jurisdictional and regional level, the pattern of ownership varies markedly:
• The proportion of beds in private for-profit facilities is highest in New South
Wales (56 per cent) and Western Australia (50 per cent) and lowest in Tasmania
(17 per cent) and the Northern Territory (19 per cent).
• The proportion of places in religious or charitable institutions is highest in the
Northern Territory (70 per cent) and Tasmania (64 per cent) and lowest in
Victoria (25 per cent) and Western Australia (36 per cent).
• The proportion of places in facilities operated by, or on behalf of, governments
is highest in Victoria (28 per cent) and lowest in South Australia (4 per cent).RESIDENTIAL AGED
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• While private for-profit nursing homes provide well over half the nursing home
beds in capital cities and metropolitan areas, charitable and religious
organisations provide most of the beds in rural and remote areas.
Size
The nursing home sector contains a mix of larger chains and many small,
independently run, facilities. Across Australia, half of all nursing homes have 40
beds or less (table 2.2). Only a quarter have 60 beds or more — the size regarded by
many as the minimum efficient scale of operation. Southern Cross Homes stated
that ‘41 beds is not viable in achieving any surplus in income. Around 60 beds is, at
present, a viable business proposition’ (sub. 18, p. 4). Six per cent of nursing homes
have more than 100 beds.
Table 2.2 Number of nursing homes, by size, 30 June 1997
Bed size
State 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 101-120 121+ Total
NSW 8 129 154 96 46 24 17 474
Vic 65 256 89 17 5 3 9 444
Qld 6 87 50 32 17 11 8 211
WA 2 44 40 10 5 4 5 110
SA 2 89 52 9 3 2 2 159
Tas 9 25 14 4 2 0 1 55
ACT 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 6
NT 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 7
Australia 95 632 403 169 79 45 43 1466
Source: AIHW (1998b).
The proportion of smaller homes is highest in rural and remote areas, where the
level of demand is often insufficient to support larger facilities. Over three-quarters
of homes with 20 beds or less are located in these areas (AIHW 1998b).
At the jurisdictional level, the concentration of smaller homes is most pronounced in
Victoria and the Northern Territory, where over 70 per cent of facilities have less
than 40 beds. Tasmania also has a high proportion of smaller homes.
In recent years there has been some rationalisation of smaller homes, particularly in
urban areas. AIHW data indicate that, over the last four years, the proportion of
facilities with less than 40 beds has declined in all States and Territories other than
Queensland and Victoria. Similarly, Aged Care Australia provided data showing
that, over the past five years, the proportion of facilities with less than 25 beds has
declined by over 40 per cent, with these reductions occurring fairly uniformly14 NURSING HOME
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across jurisdictions (sub. 26, appendix 1, p. 2). However, there has also been a
decline in the number of facilities of over 100 beds over the same period in a
number of States and the ACT. Thus, the average size of nursing homes has
remained largely unchanged over the last four years at 50 beds with the median size
unchanged at 40 beds. In addition, there has been increasing integration of nursing
homes with hostels and assisted living units in order to improve productivity
through spreading overheads and administrative costs.
Employment and wage fixing arrangements
A little over 100 000 people are employed in nursing homes (see table 2.3 — but
note that this may exclude a significant proportion of employees of government-
owned nursing homes). Most are involved in providing nursing and personal care
services.
Table 2.3 Employees in nursing homes
a
For-profit Not-for-profitb Total
Number of employees at
end June 1996
   Direct service provision 38 300 34 100 72 300
   Other
c 10 400 16 200 26 600
   Contract staff 2 700 1 400 4 100
Total employees 51 400 51 600 103 000
Volunteers for June 1996
   Direct service provision 600 6 600 7 200
   Other
c 600 7 800 8 400
Total volunteers 1 200 14 400 15 600
Average hrs. of volunteers
during June 1996
8.6 11.4 11.2
Employees at end June
1996 (exc. contract staff)
   Full time 9 900 12 100 22 000
   Part time 38 800 38 100 76 900
   Total 48 700 50 200 98 900
Note: May not add due to rounding.
a Employment in ANZSIC class 8613, defined as services mainly engaged in providing nursing home or
convalescent home facilities (including the provision of nursing or medical care as a basic part of the
service). b According to the ABS, this excludes government-owned nursing homes classified as
‘government organisations’, but is likely to include government-owned nursing homes established as
separate businesses. c Other employees include managerial and administrative support staff (for example,
managers, bookkeepers, receptionists, policy and research staff) and others (such as cooks, maintenance
workers and cleaners).
Source: ABS (Community Services, Australia 1995-96, Cat. no. 8696.0).RESIDENTIAL AGED
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Around three-quarters of paid employees work part time and about 90 per cent are
female. Contract staff account for about 4 per cent of the paid workforce. There is
also some outsourcing of such functions as meal preparation and laundry.
The table shows some significant differences between the employment structures in
the for-profit and the not-for-profit sectors. For example, compared with the not-for-
profit sector, the for-profit sector:
• utilises a higher proportion of its employees in direct service provision and a
lower proportion in administrative and support roles;
• has a higher proportion of contract staff; and
• a lower proportion of full time staff.
There is also a significant volunteer workforce, primarily in the religious and
charitable sector. In June 1996, there were almost 14 400 volunteers working an
average of 11 hours each.
Wages and conditions for nursing home staff are mainly set by jurisdictional
awards. Awards for nursing staff, in particular, are influenced by wages and
conditions negotiated in the public hospital sector in the same jurisdiction. In this
regard ANHECA said:
The non-government aged care sector represents only 15 per cent of the wider health
care field. As such it is not a price setter and in most cases is forced to follow the lead of
the public sector. (Sub. 24, p. 42)
In government-run homes in most States, aged care nurses receive wage parity with
nurses in the public hospital sector. However, as noted in chapter 5, there are
significant differences between nurses wages in the private nursing home sector and
the acute sector.
The Commission understands that over-award payments are not common in the
nursing home sector. For instance, the Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce
and Industry quoted a survey which found that fewer than 1 per cent of Division I
and II nurses in Victorian aged care facilities which responded to the survey
received over-award payments (sub. D71, p. 2). However, enterprise bargains
incorporating over-award payments, and tailored to the specific requirements of
individual nursing homes, are replacing awards in some cases. For example, TriCare
— one of the largest providers in Queensland — has negotiated an agreement with
its nurses. In Western Australia, there are enterprise agreements applying to
registered nurses in around 10 per cent of nursing homes (Chamber of Commerce
and Industry Western Australia, sub. 49, p. 2).16 NURSING HOME
SUBSIDIES
Other residential aged care services
There are currently around 65 000 hostel beds across Australia, catering mainly for
low dependency residents. The charitable and religious sector dominates the
provision of hostel places in all States and Territories. The highest proportions of
places in government and private facilities are 12 per cent and 9 per cent
respectively in Victoria.
In addition, there are around 30 multipurpose services operating in small rural
communities lacking the population to support stand-alone facilities. They provide a
range of aged care services, including nursing home and hostel care, palliative care,
community nursing, home care and meals on wheels. Under the Multipurpose
Services Program — a joint Commonwealth-State initiative — funding for
residential care is pooled with funding for a range of other programs. In its 1998-99
Budget, the Commonwealth made provision for an extra $24 million over 4 years to
extend the coverage of multipurpose services. Thirty new multipurpose services will
be established with 800 new residential aged care places being made available.
2.3 Demand for residential aged care
At the end of June 1997, there were around 72 500 people in nursing homes. There
were a further 60 000 people in hostels (table 2.4). The data suggest a vacancy rate
of approximately 7 per cent for hostels compared with only 2 per cent for nursing
homes. The ratio of nursing home residents to hostel residents was highest in New
South Wales, Tasmania and the Northern Territory. In Queensland and the ACT,
there were more hostel residents than nursing home residents.
Table 2.4 Residents in nursing homes and hostels by State/Territory, 30
June 1997
Nursing homes Hostels
State Residents % Residents %
NSW 28 400 39 18 900 32
Vic 16 800 23 15 000 25
Qld 12 000 17 12 100 20
WA 5 600 8 5 500 9
SA 6 800 9 6 100 10
Tas 2 100 3 1 500 3
ACT 500 1 800 1
NT 200 <1 100 <1
Australia 72 500 100 60 000 100
Note: May not add due to rounding.
Sources: AIHW (1998a, 1998b).RESIDENTIAL AGED
CARE
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Access and admission arrangements
The Commonwealth prescribes target ratios of 40 nursing home and 50 hostel beds
per 1000 persons aged 70 or more. Entry to facilities is controlled through the
Commonwealth Aged Care Assessment Teams (ACATs). These teams assess
whether people require residential care and, if so, whether their care needs are likely
to be high care or low care. In 1996-97, the average waiting period between
approval and entry into care was 18 days for nursing homes and 58 days for hostels
(DHFS 1997b). In 1997-98 this had increased to 31 and 108 days respectively
(DHFS 1998a).
The majority of new entrants to nursing homes apply for admission from acute
hospitals. While most admissions are for permanent care, respite care admission is
growing. Of the nearly 45 000 admissions to nursing homes in 1996-97, over one-
quarter were for short term respite. This compared with a figure of 8 per cent in
1991-92. The quadrupling of respite care admissions over this period contrasted
with a decline in admissions for permanent care of 16 per cent (table 2.5). That said,
respite residents still account for only 1 per cent of total bed days in nursing homes
(AIHW 1998b).
Table 2.5 Nursing home admissions by type of care, 1991-92 and 1996-97
1991-92 1996-97
Type of care No. % of total No. % of total
Permanent care admissions 38 397 92 32 252 72
Respite care admissions 3 191 8 12 612 28
Total admissions 41 588 100 44 864 100
Sources: AIHW (1997, 1998b).
There is a general yearly limit of 63 days of respite care for each individual.
However, ACATs can grant extra days depending on such factors as carer stress, the
severity of the resident’s condition, or the absence of a carer.
Characteristics of residents
Sex and age
More than 70 per cent of nursing home residents are female (table 2.6). This is
mainly because females tend to live longer than males and are less likely to have a
partner to act as a carer. Female residents are older on average than male residents
and tend to stay longer. Over half of female residents are 85 years or older,
compared with 30 per cent of male residents.18 NURSING HOME
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Table 2.6 Nursing home residents by age and sex, 30 June 1997
Females Males Persons
Age No. % No. % No. %
<70 3 300 6 3 400 16 6 700 9
70-85 21 500 42 11 200 54 32 600 45
85+ 27 000 52 6 300 30 33 200 46
Total 51 800 100 20 800 100 72 500 100
Note: May not add due to rounding.
Source: AIHW (1998b).
Dependency
As noted, most high care residents live in nursing homes. However, with ageing in
place there is likely to be an increasing proportion of high care residents in hostels.
For subsidy purposes, high level care is classified as categories 1 to 4 on the 8 level
Resident Classification Scale (RCS). These classifications take into account a wide
range of factors and involve a detailed scoring system (see chapter 3). Of the 76 000
or so high care residents across Australia, the majority are classified as categories 2
and 3 on the RCS. The highest proportions of RCS 1 and 2 residents are in Victoria
and the Northern Territory, while the highest proportion of all high care residents
are in the Northern Territory and New South Wales (table 2.7).
Table 2.7 Estimated May 1998 RCS distribution by State and Territory,
number of residents
High care Low care
State RCS 1 2 3 4 5-8 Total
NSW 3 541 11 882 10 260 2 814 19 266 47 763
Vic 2 712 8 230 5 671 1 285 14 245 32 143
Qld 1 904 5 678 4 532 1 408 10 764 24 286
WA 416 2 567 2 162 595 5 481 11 221
SA 668 3 076 2 826 699 5 862 13 131
Tas 191 790 867 267 1 547 3 662
ACT 105 229 206 108 661 1 309
NT 12 124 82 20 107 345
Total 9 549 32 576 26 606 7 196 57 933 133 860
Source: DHFS (1998b).
A simpler perspective on dependency is provided by an AIHW survey of residents’
care needs over the period 1994 to 1996. This revealed that virtually all nursing
home residents required at least some help with washing and dressing (90 per cent
required total help), 90 per cent required at least some help with eating (one-thirdRESIDENTIAL AGED
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needed total help) and 95 per cent at least some help with mobility and transfers (63
per cent total help) (AIHW 1997). The AIHW (1998b) also notes that the
dependency level of newly admitted permanent residents during 1996-97 was, on
average, higher than for current residents. Similarly, new residents entering
residential care since October 1997 are, on average, more dependent than people
already living in care (table 2.8).
Further, recent research commissioned by the Department of Health and Family
Services indicates that around 60 per cent of nursing home residents and 28 per cent
of hostel residents have dementia.
Table 2.8 Distribution of RCS scores of all residents of aged care
facilities and of new residents, October 1997 to June 1998
per cent
RCS1 RCS2 RCS3 RCS4 RCS5 RCS6 RCS7 RCS8
All residents 6.6 23.1 18.0 4.9 8.3 11.1 22.7 5.3
New residents 8.3 26.0 23.6 5.8 7.6 9.0 17.1 2.6
Source: DHFS (1998a).
Pension status
Full pensioners comprise around 65 per cent of residents, part-pensioners comprise
around 25 per cent of residents while the remaining 10 per cent of residents are non-
pensioners (DHFS 1997a, p. 7-5).
Greater encouragement of self-provision in retirement through occupational
superannuation, particularly in the last decade, may see these pension dependency
rates decline in future years. Larger numbers of self-funded retirees may also have
implications for the demand for extra service places.
Length of stay
Estimates of the length of stay of residents indicate that, in 1995-96, one in six
permanent admissions left in the first month and over half within the first year (table
2.9). A small proportion (13 per cent) stayed for 5 years or more. Despite the
increasing dependency of residents, permanent admissions per bed have dropped
from 0.52 in 1991-1992 to 0.43 in 1996-97.20 NURSING HOME
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Separations
The vast majority of separations from permanent nursing home care were due to
death (table 2.10). In 1996-97, only 5 per cent of those leaving returned to the
community, with a further 2 per cent moving to a hospital. In contrast, nearly 60 per
cent of residents leaving respite care returned to the community.
Table 2.9 Cumulative expected length of stay distribution of
permanent nursing home admissions, 1995-96












Source: Steering Committee (1998).
Table 2.10 Separations of permanent and respite nursing home residents,
1996-97
Permanent residents Respite residents
No. % No. %
Death 28 529 88 686 5
Return to community 1 570 5 7 265 57
To hospital 651 2 657 5
To hostel 504 2 258 2
To other nursing home 564 2 2 050 16
Other 443 1 1 775 14
Total separations 32 261 100 12 691 100
Source: AIHW (1998b).
Future demand
Projecting future demand for residential aged care services is far from simple. Prima
facie, the ageing of Australia’s population suggests that there will be a significant
increase in demand for these services. Current projections indicate that, over the
next 50 years, the proportion of Australians aged 70 and over will more than double,
while the proportion of those aged 80 years and over will triple. Based on 1993 ageRESIDENTIAL AGED
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and sex-specific usage of residential care, the AIHW examined the impact of these
demographic changes on future demand for nursing home and hostel beds. It
projected, for example, that even if nursing homes were to cater only for the most
dependent residents (RCS levels 1 to 3), an extra 12 500 beds would be required by
2011 (reported in Gibson 1998, p. 60).
However, such projections must be qualified in the light of other factors that will
influence future demand for residential care services. For example, the increases in
life expectancy that partly explain the projected ageing of Australia’s population are
likely to be accompanied by later onset of frailty. Similarly, the availability of a
wider range of community care options is likely to further offset the impact of the
ageing of the population on demand for residential care. Social changes will also
have an impact on future demand. For instance, the increased rate of female work-
force participation in recent years, higher rates of divorce and the increase in single-
person households will affect both the structure and functioning of informal support




3 Funding and regulatory arrangements
The residential aged care sector is heavily controlled by governments. Nursing
home providers depend on a government subsidy for the majority of their income,
recurrent and capital contributions from residents are regulated, the supply of
available (subsidised) places is controlled, eligibility for residential care is
restricted, there are controls over staffing, minimum ratios are set for concessional
residents together with differential subsidy incentives, extra service places and extra
service fees are controlled, and there are regulated care and accommodation
standards. Much of this control stems from the Commonwealth Government, but the
States and Territories, and local government authorities, are also involved.
This chapter provides background information about the funding and regulatory
environment for residential aged care and about recent changes to those
arrangements. It focuses on the provision of high level care (RCS 1 to 4,
predominantly in nursing homes), but relevant information about the provision of
low level care is also given.
3.1 Subsidies
The Commonwealth Government accepts responsibility for the subsidisation of
residential aged care in both nursing homes and hostels. The department advised
that, on average, the Commonwealth provides about 78 per cent of nursing home
income and a somewhat lesser proportion of hostel income. Residents provide most
of the remainder, with some income from charitable sources and from donations.
State and Territory Governments financially support the facilities they operate, as
these homes receive lower Commonwealth subsidies than other nursing homes.
They also provide support for some charitable facilities, particularly those operating
in rural and remote regions. Table 3.1 shows total Commonwealth expenditure on
residential aged care services from 1991-92 to 1997-98, while table 3.2 shows the
average annual subsidy per resident from 1994-95 to 1996-97, by State.24 NURSING HOME
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Nursing homes
A number of subsidy arrangements for nursing homes have applied since recurrent
subsidy payments commenced in 1963. Box 3.1 sets out a brief history. The more
recent arrangements are described in the following sections.
To control the cost escalation occurring under the previous subsidy arrangements,
the basis of funding was changed in stages from 1987, to provide nursing homes
with a fee paid per resident/day, comprising:
• a standard aggregated module (SAM) common to all nursing homes to reflect
costs such as food, laundry, cleaning, electricity, building maintenance, non-care
staff salaries, and a return on investment. SAM funding was coalesced to a single
national rate over the five years to 1992;
Table 3.1 Commonwealth expenditure on residential aged care, 1991-92
to 1997-98
$ million in 1996-97 dollars
Year Nursing homes Hostels Total
1991-92 1 748 255 2 003
1992-93 1 806 295 2 101
1993-94 1 812 332 2 144
1994-95 1 900 382 2 282
1995-96 2 048 427 2 475
1996-97 2 171 474 2 645
1997-98
a 2 280 584 2 864
a Figure for 1997-98 is nominal expenditure.
Source: Steering Committee (1998), Commonwealth of Australia (1988), DHFS (Sub. 52).
Table 3.2 Average annual Commonwealth subsidies per utilised place —
nursing homes, 1994-95 to 1997-98a
$
State 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
New South Wales 24 482 27 994 31 047 30 093
Victoria 28 410 29 335 30 922 30 334
Queensland 20 654 23 480 26 413 27 208
South Australia 25 358 27 775 28 828 29 931
Western Australia 23 998 27 774 29 101 28 916
Tasmania 27 088 29 962 31 838 32 522
Northern Territory 28 802 31 071 31 442 28 793
Australian Capital Territory 27 164 25 911 30 102 33 866
Australia 24 896 27 580 29 917 29 648
a Differences in average annual subsidies between States reflect differences in subsidy rates between
jurisdictions as well as differences in dependency of residents.




• a care aggregated module (CAM) for nursing and personal care staff costs. Each
resident was classified into one of five care levels. Each level attracted a
specified number of nursing and personal care hours, and a ‘standard hourly
rate’ specific to each State. These rates were based on a notional mix of staff
categories (for each level of care), and the award rates for those categories in
each State. In contrast with SAM, any unspent funds below a 1 per cent
tolerance were recovered by the Government following an acquittal process.
Conversely, if a nursing home spent more on direct care than the amount funded,
beyond a 1.5 per cent tolerance, it had to meet the extra cost; and
Box 3.1 Brief history of nursing home subsidies from 1954 to 1987
The Commonwealth Government first became directly involved in supporting
residential aged care in 1954, when it began providing subsidies to charitable and
religious bodies toward the cost of constructing homes for the aged. In 1963, in an
attempt to free up hospital beds for acute care patients, the Government began
paying ‘nursing home benefits’ to nursing home residents in approved nursing homes.
The subsidies resulted in rapid growth of the number of nursing homes and nursing
home beds.
In 1970, a review found that almost 25 per cent of nursing home residents did not
need to be there on medical grounds. In an attempt to stem the expansion of nursing
home beds, the Government introduced growth and admission controls, and fee
control arrangements (the Participating Nursing Home Scheme). The construction of
hostels for aged people who needed personal care rather than medical care was also
encouraged. The new measures proved to be effective in curbing the excessive
growth of nursing home beds.
In 1975, the Government introduced the Deficit Financed Nursing Home Scheme.
This scheme provided recurrent funding for nursing homes operated by non-profit
religious, charitable or benevolent organisations.
Both the Participating Nursing Home Scheme and the Deficit Financed Nursing Home
Scheme remained in place until 1987. However, problems remained, as both
schemes were based essentially on cost reimbursement, providing little incentive for
proprietors to seek efficiencies. As long as the nursing homes could show that their
expenses had risen, the Commonwealth contribution was increased to cover the
additional cost. There were also problems in respect of: quality of care; lack of
uniformity in staffing, funding and care; and administrative intrusiveness.
Source: Based on DHFS (sub. 52).26 NURSING HOME
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• other cost reimbursed expenditure (OCRE) applied to staff overhead costs such
as long service leave, superannuation for nursing and personal care staff, payroll
tax and workers compensation. OCRE was originally fully cost-reimbursed, but
funding for the workers compensation cost component was later amended in an
effort to encourage owners to provide a safer working environment for staff.
From 1995-96, nursing homes were paid an amount equal to the state average
workers compensation cost percentage of payroll (with transitional arrangements
for the highest cost homes).
The actual Commonwealth subsidy paid was equal to the sum of these three
components, less a standard contribution made by the resident, equivalent to 87.5
per cent of the single pension plus rent assistance.
Eligible nursing homes also received one or more of the following extra assistance
payments:
• 24-hour-top-up funding, a form of ‘floor funding’ designed to prevent
government support from dropping below the minimum level deemed necessary
to ensure 24-hour nursing cover;
• designated home funding, for homes more than 50 km from another nursing
home or caring for residents in a special needs group; and
• isolated home funding, for homes in remote locations.
Initially, no additional funding was available for costs associated with enteral
feeding and oxygen requirements. However, in the 1991-92 Budget, the
Government provided such funding in the form of supplementary payments.
In 1993, the Government commissioned Professor Bob Gregory to undertake a
review of the structure of nursing home funding arrangements (Gregory 1993). This
was later extended to include the interaction between nursing home and hostel
funding and their different fee arrangements, and the issue of the maintenance of the
quality of nursing home buildings and the replenishment of capital stock
(Gregory 1994). Gregory’s findings are summarised in box 3.2.
Hostels
From 1954, Commonwealth funding — both capital and recurrent — was available
to provide suitable accommodation for aged or disabled people so that they might
reside in conditions approaching as closely as possible normal domestic life. This
early support was largely a housing initiative for those who did not have families




In 1969, personal and hostel care subsidies were introduced. These were intended to
meet costs which could not be met from the resident contribution of 85 per cent of
the pension plus rental assistance. Hostels could admit any persons they wished, but
the personal care subsidy was only payable for those residents assessed as needing
hostel care.
From 1972, additional capital funding became available for expanding the number
of hostel beds. Capital funding also became available for upgrading of existing
facilities.
Box 3.2 Gregory review of the structure of nursing home funding
arrangements — summary of main findings
Stage 1 findings
• The requirement to acquit the CAM component of funding meant there was no
flexibility in the allocation of staff between nursing and personal care duties, and
domestic duties.
• The requirement to use all of the CAM component of funding for nursing and
personal care meant that efficiencies in the nursing and personal care budget
would not increase profits.
• In conjunction with the non-recognition of over-award payments in the CAM
formula, the acquittal system reduced nursing home proprietors’ incentives to
participate in enterprise bargaining.
• Because indexing was based on movements in the relevant nursing awards, it was
not possible to take account of enterprise agreements.
• The funding system did not provide sufficient incentive for the maintenance of the
quality of nursing home buildings and the replenishment of nursing home capital
stock over time.
Stage 2 findings
• There were financial disincentives for private investment in nursing home stock,
because:
– homes would gain no extra income as a result of that investment; and
– the number of nursing homes was closely regulated, resulting in nearly all
homes operating at near to full capacity, regardless of the state of their
buildings.
• The hostel capital system was working reasonably well, through targeted use of
capital funding and the hostels’ ability to charge variable amounts according to
residents’ income and assets.
Source:  Gregory (1993, 1994).28 NURSING HOME
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From 1986, hostels were required to ensure that 20 per cent of persons admitted
were financially disadvantaged (that is, in receipt of the full pension plus some
rental assistance). These residents could not be charged more than 85 per cent of the
standard rate of pension plus rental assistance, and were exempt from what were
sometimes known as ‘donations’ (capital bonds or outright capital contributions).
Fees and donations paid by the remaining 80 per cent of residents were negotiated
between the hostel and the prospective resident.
The current system
In its 1996-97 Budget, the Commonwealth Government announced major changes
in its residential aged care policies. The changes were intended to:
address major structural problems with the existing residential aged care system in order
to make it more sustainable and to make the system more responsive to the needs of frail
older people. (Commonwealth of Australia 1996, p. 215)
These changes were included in the Aged Care Structural Reform Package.
Amongst other things they provided for an end to the funding distinctions between
nursing homes and hostels. The key element of the aligned funding structure is ‘a
single funding and classification system, designed to distribute funding equitably
across the residential aged care sector’ (DHFS 1997a, p. 1-2). The new
arrangements are also designed to ensure that access to residential care is based on
need rather than capacity to pay. The Residential Care Manual states:
This system ensures that funding is properly matched to the care needs of residents and
provides appropriate support for dementia care, wherever residents are in the system.  It
provides improved flexibility and choice for residents and providers, including greater
opportunities for ‘ageing in place’. (DHFS 1997a, p. 1-2).
The Package (as subsequently amended) also introduced significant changes to
resident charges. These include an income tested fee for people entering after March
1998. This is to ensure that wealthier residents make a fair and reasonable
contribution to the cost of their care (Commonwealth of Australia 1996, p. 216).
The package, as originally introduced, also included a uniform system of
accommodation bonds across the residential aged care sector. This system was
subsequently amended on 6 November 1998, so that different arrangements for
accommodation payments again operate for high care residents compared to low





The residential care subsidy
Under the new funding arrangements, from 1 October 1997 nursing home income
consists of a residential care subsidy from the Government, plus care fees and
accommodation payments from residents. The residential care subsidy consists of a
basic subsidy (current rates are given in table 3.3), which is subject to additions or
reductions in respect to particular categories of resident. Details of how the
residential care subsidy is calculated are given in box 3.3.
Table 3.3 Basic subsidy rates for residential aged care
$ per resident per day as at 1 July 1998
Resident
classification
National NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas ACT NT
1 104 109 90 97 100 110 100 106
2 94 98 81 88 91 100 91 95
3 81 84 70 76 78 86 78 82






Some features are worth a mention:
• for the time being, different basic subsidy rates for high care continue to apply
for different States and Territories (subject to coalescence — see below);
• the not-for-profit sector, while exempt from payroll tax for its own staff payroll,
may be eligible to claim the payroll tax supplement where it employs contract
labour;
• provision to pay a higher subsidy to higher cost homes is limited; and
• there is no provision for a higher subsidy for any additional costs incurred by
particular facilities in providing better accommodation, for example, in single
rooms.
The indexation arrangements which applied at the end of the CAM/SAM system
have continued under the new arrangements. The basic subsidy rates are indexed
annually on 1 July using the Commonwealth Own Purpose Outlays (COPO) index
formula. The particular COPO index used is Wage Cost Index 9 (WCI9) which is
weighted 75 per cent for wage costs and 25 per cent for non-wage costs. WCI9 uses
the Safety Net Adjustment for indexing wage costs and the Treasury Measure of
Underlying Inflation for non wage costs. For 1998-99, the WCI9 was 1.014. All30 NURSING HOME
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other payments, other than the oxygen and enteral feeding supplement, are also
indexed using the WCI9. The oxygen and enteral feeding supplements are indexed
using the TMUI, which was 1.015 for 1998-99.
Box 3.3 Calculating the Residential Care Subsidy
[Note: some transitional arrangements apply — see text.]
The basic subsidy amount is determined first (see table 3.3).
A number of supplements may be added:
• the concessional and assisted resident supplement (for residents unable to afford
to pay an accommodation bond or charge);
• the respite supplement (for residents receiving respite care);
• the oxygen supplement (for residents in need of oxygen treatment);
• the enteral feeding supplement (for residents in need of enteral feeding);
• the payroll tax supplement (where providers care for high dependency residents
(categories 1 to 4) and are liable for state based payroll tax);
• the transitional supplement (for residents in nursing homes and hostels as at
1 October 1997, who therefore cannot be assessed for concessional resident
status and who do not receive the concessional resident supplement);
• the pensioner supplement (this replaces the contribution previously made by
pensioners out of their rent assistance, and is payable for all residents who receive
an income support payment, have a dependent child, or are respite residents);
• the viability supplement (where a provider is operating in circumstances which
might otherwise be financially non-viable, assessed against a range of criteria
including remoteness, whether a facility is co-located with another service, and any
special resident needs); and
• the hardship supplement (for residents for whom the fee as assessed under the
income test (see below) would cause financial hardship).
A number of reductions may apply:
• the extra service reduction (applies where residents receive care on an extra
service basis. The amount of the reduction is equal to 25 per cent of the fee for the
extra service);
• the adjusted subsidy reduction (for residents of state owned and operated facilities,
and ex-government facilities);
• the compensation payment reduction (where residents receive a lump sum or a
continuing payment for compensation under a judgment or settlement); and
•  • the income tested reduction (where a resident is liable to pay an income tested fee
— see text).




The Resident Classification Scale
Before the introduction of the Aged Care Reform Package, different care need
classification schedules applied to the hostel and nursing home sectors. Assessment
in nursing homes was based on the Resident Classification Instrument, and in
hostels on the Personal Care Assessment Instrument. As part of the Aged Care
Reform Package, a single classification system was introduced, one of its objectives
being to:
break down the distinction between different types of residential care — that is, nursing
homes and hostels — leading to funding being based on level of care need rather than on
the type of facility and [encouraging] ageing in place. (DHFS 1998b, p. 5)
Under the new Resident Classification Scale (RCS), there are eight care levels.
RCS1 represents the highest dependency level, and RCS8 the lowest. As a first step
towards admission, an Aged Care Assessment Team may assess a potential resident
as eligible for admission, classifying the resident as requiring either high level care
or low level care. The more detailed classification is undertaken after admission,
when the care provider assesses the person against the RCS. The provider
determines an RCS category on the basis of 22 questions covering such areas as
clinical needs, ability to do various daily tasks, major areas of personal care need,
communication or sensory assistance, and the need for social or emotional support.
Apart from unifying the nursing home and hostel sectors, another intention of the
Aged Care Reform Package in general, and the RCS in particular, was to
redistribute funds towards the hostel sector where hostels cared for high dependency
residents. It was also intended to provide better support for residents suffering from
dementia. A review of the RCS (DHFS 1998b) found, inter alia, that the RCS had
resulted in an increase in total recurrent funding for all residential care facilities,
with total funding for hostels increasing by 10 per cent, and total funding for
nursing homes increasing by 1 per cent.
Coalescence
As part of the new funding arrangements, a ‘coalescence’ process was proposed,
and indeed commenced. DHFS provided a rationale:
hostel rates had always been national, nursing home infrastructure [SAM] rates had
already been coalesced to a single national rate over five years and personal and care
salaries [reflected in CAM] were coalescing themselves [through reduction of interstate
wage differentials] in the period before structural reform. Given these developments, and32 NURSING HOME
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the desire of the Commonwealth to purchase consistent outputs rather than to fund
inputs, the strategy of coalescence was the natural progression of funding policy.
(Sub. 52, p. 22)
Under the proposed coalescence arrangements, the jurisdictional differences in basic
subsidy rates for high care residents (RCS 1 to 4) were to be phased out over seven
years. The phasing program specified a 2 per cent adjustment — up or down
towards the national average — on 1 July 1998, followed by adjustments in
subsequent years of 4, 8, 14, 24, 24 and 24 per cent respectively. The payroll tax
supplement was also to be coalesced over seven years.
The first step in the coalescence process took effect as proposed. However, further
coalescence has been deferred pending the outcome of the Commission’s review.
Box 3.4 provides a notional example of how coalescence was to work (see also
appendix D).
Clearly, there would be winners and losers from coalescence, with providers in
some States and Territories receiving relatively more, and some relatively less, than
if separate jurisdictional subsidies and current indexing arrangements were to
continue. Those States benefiting would be Queensland, South Australia, Western
Australia and the ACT (except for RCS 4). The biggest losers would be Tasmania
and Victoria (see table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Differences in basic subsidy rates per bed/day
Compared with the 1998-99 national average
Category NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas ACT NT
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
1 -1.82 -6.76 12.03 4.74 1.42 -8.26 1.61 -3.73
2 -1.82 -6.20 10.85 3.91 1.15 -7.82 1.07 -3.62
3 -1.24 -4.96 9.76 3.48 1.39 -6.68 0.88 -2.74
4 -1.14 -3.62 6.88 1.75 0.91 -5.50 -0.29 -2.07
Source: Derived from DHFS information.
Capital funding
Since 1954, various arrangements have been in place to provide government support
for investment in new facilities and the upgrading of existing facilities. Different
provisions have operated in the hostel and nursing home sectors. Within the nursing
home sector, capital grants have been more readily available to charitable and not-




through ‘additional recurrent funding’ (ARF). This provided a subsidy for
replacement or upgrading of facilities, paid monthly over a 10-year period.
Box 3.4 Coalescence — an illustration of how it works
(Notional example based on Queensland 1997-98 RCS1 rate — see also
appendix D)
The proposed coalescence program phases out jurisdictional differences in basic
subsidy rates over seven years. It does this by reducing the difference between
individual state rates and the national average, commencing on 1 July 1998, with a 2
per cent adjustment, followed in subsequent years by adjustments of 4, 8, 14, 24, 24
and 24 per cent respectively.
The actual calculations involve multiplying the differences from the national average
(after indexation), each year, by a fraction arrived at by dividing the relevant
percentage by the proportion of the difference yet to be coalesced. In the first year
that fraction is 2/100, in the second year it is 4/(100-2) =4/98, in the third year it is
8/(100-2-4) = 8/94, in the fourth year 14/(100-2-4-8)=14/86 and so on until in the
seventh year the fraction is 24/(100-2-4-8-14-24-24) = 24/24. The amounts so found
are added to those individual state rates where they are lower than the national
average, and subtracted from the individual state rates where they are higher than the
national average. The table below shows how this process would change Queensland























1998-99 99.86 101.26 87.74 88.97 12.29 2/100 +0.25 89.21
1999-00 101.26 102.68 89.21 90.46 12.22 4/98 +0.50 90.96
2000-01 102.68 104.11 90.96 92.24 11.88 8/94 +1.01 93.25
2001-02 104.11 105.57 93.25 94.55 11.02 14/86 +1.79 96.35
2002-03 105.57 107.05 96.35 97.69 9.36 24/72 +3.12 100.81
2003-04 107.05 108.55 100.81 102.22 6.33 24/48 +3.17 105.39
2004-05 108.55 110.07 105.39 106.86 3.21 24/24 +3.21 110.07
Source: Based on methodology advised by DHFS.
From 1 October 1997, the Government introduced accommodation payments (see
below) for eligible nursing home residents. While the Government ceased most of
its other capital funding, a capital program of $10 million a year over four years has
been made available to target services in rural and remote areas and those with34 NURSING HOME
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special needs. When accommodation payments were first introduced, those
providers in receipt of ARF at October 1997 who elected to continue to receive
these payments, would not be eligible to charge accommodation payments nor to
receive the concessional supplement. In December 1998 the Minister announced
that the legislation would be changed to enable current holders of ARF to both
continue to receive ARF (but phasing down as the proportion of residents living in
the home prior to 1 October 1997 declines) and to receive accommodation payments
and concessional supplements.
3.2 Residents fees and payments
Until the introduction of the CAM/SAM system, nursing home proprietors were
largely free to determine residents fees. With the advent of CAM/SAM, the resident
contribution was fixed at 87.5 per cent of the single pension plus rent assistance (a
supplement received by those who lived in rental accommodation), irrespective of
their care needs or the quality of the service provided. There was no additional
income tested fee. Thus, there was no direct link between the costs of providing care
in nursing homes and fees paid. As noted above, hostels continued to be able to
negotiate fees with the majority of their residents.
With the changes implemented since 1997, there are now two main types of fees
which may be charged to nursing home and hostel residents — care fees and
accommodation payments, both based on the financial circumstances of the
resident. Care fees (consisting of standard fees and income tested fees) are a
contribution towards the recurrent cost of providing care. Accommodation payments
are primarily intended as a contribution towards capital costs, although in practice
they too may be used for recurrent purposes.
Care fees
Residents entering care since March 1998 have been liable to pay both a standard
resident contribution plus an income tested compulsory fee if private income
exceeds $50 per week. The Government’s subsidy is reduced by the amount of any
such income tested payment. However, the majority of residents (see chapter 2) are
full pensioners and do not pay any income tested fee. Further, ‘higher income’
residents in care before 1 March 1998 do not have to pay any income tested fee,
even if they move from one service to another.
Care fees currently payable by eligible residents are:




• part pensioners: up to $34 per bed/day (a standard fee of $22, plus an additional
fee of 25 cents for each dollar of private income above $50 a week up to a
maximum of $12 a day); and
• self-funded retirees: up to $65 per bed/day (a standard fee of $27 plus an
additional fee of 25 cents for each dollar of private income above $50 a week up
to a maximum of $38 a day).
DHFS estimates that by 2007 income testing will provide around 2.5 per cent of
total residential care income.
Extra service places (see below) are subject to additional charges. As the
government subsidy is reduced by an amount equivalent to one quarter of the extra
service fee, the resident may be asked to make up the loss of subsidy in addition to
paying the fee for the extra service (see DHFS 1997a, p. 15-15).
Accommodation payments
Since the 1950s, hostel operators have been able to levy capital contributions (bonds
or outright contributions) from (most) new residents as a condition of entry. The
department indicated that these entry contributions averaged about $26 000 per
resident in 1993. No similar arrangements existed for nursing homes. Under the
current system there are still differences in the accommodation payments payable by
high care and low care residents.
High level care residents — the accommodation charge
The accommodation charge is an additional daily fee which residents with assets
above a specified minimum, who enter permanent high level care (RCS 1 to 4) may
be asked to pay by the provider, once a facility has achieved certification (see
below).
Residents living in a nursing home prior to 1 October 1997 cannot be asked to pay
an accommodation charge as long as they remain in the same home. If they move to
another service, an accommodation charge may be levied if they are otherwise
eligible. Residents who enter an extra service place may be asked to pay an
accommodation bond (see below).
The amount of the charge is agreed between the resident and the provider, subject to
an indexed maximum of $12 per day (or $4380 a year), depending on the resident’s
assets at time of entry. A resident with assets less than 2.5 times the annual age
pension (around $23 000) cannot be asked to pay an accommodation charge. A36 NURSING HOME
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resident’s home is not included as an asset if the resident’ partner or dependent
child is living in it, or if a carer of the resident has been living there for at least two
years, and is eligible to receive an income support payment. It is also excluded if a
close relative, who is eligible to receive an income support payment, has been living
there for at least five years.
An accommodation charge cannot be levied for more than 5 years.
Low level care residents — the accommodation bond
Low level care residents, and high level care residents entering extra service places,
may be asked to pay another form of accommodation payment — an
accommodation bond, the balance of which must be refunded if the resident dies or
leaves the facility. The provider can take $2600 (indexed) annually for five years
out of the capital amount, and retain the interest earned on the full amount of the
bond for the full period of care. Prudential requirements are in place which
providers must observe when charging accommodation bonds. To generate revenue
from a bond broadly equivalent to that generated by the accommodation charge for
high level care residents, with an interest rate of 5 per cent, a bond of around
$35 000 would be required. The department indicated that the average bond is
around $54 000 (late 1998).
For the purposes of determining whether a resident is potentially liable for an
accommodation bond or a charge, only the resident’s classification (of high level
care or low level care) at the time of entry to a facility is relevant. Thus, for
example, residents who originally entered low level care and paid an
accommodation bond, and who are later reclassified as needing high level care, and
who remain in the same facility, do not lose their status with regard to the
accommodation payment. The service provider retains the bond until permanent
separation from the facility.
As is the case for high level care residents, low level care residents cannot be
charged an accommodation bond if it would leave them with less than the minimum
permissible asset value of 2.5 times the annual pension. Apart from that provision,
there is no ceiling on the amount of accommodation bond which can be charged.
However, where a pensioner resident pays an accommodation bond of more than ten
times the pension (currently $92 000), the pensioner supplement is not payable in
respect of that resident. That loss would be equivalent to $1825 a year, or the
earnings (at 5 per cent) on $36 500. Hence, the loss of the pensioner supplement
would mean the bond would have to be larger by at least that amount to compensate




3.3 Controls over bed numbers
Planning targets
In the period following the introduction of nursing home benefits in 1963, there was
rapid growth in nursing home beds as well as a significant expansion of hostel
accommodation. According to the Nursing Homes and Hostels Review conducted in
1986, this was the direct result of government intervention, and its consequences
were largely unseen, unplanned and uncoordinated (DCSH 1986). The review
concluded that, if beds were available, they were likely to be filled. It suggested that
the focus should be on the provision of alternatives to nursing home care, with
greater emphasis on maintaining people in their own homes rather than in
institutional or residential care. The review recommended that the overall ratio for
general purpose hostel places and nursing home beds should be 100 per 1000
persons aged 70 years or over, with 40 of those beds reserved for people over 70
with high care needs.
These targets were subsequently adopted, and have been carried through to the
present arrangements, the current targets being 40 high level care places, 50 low
level care places and 10 community care places per 1000 of the population 70 years
and over, by 2011 (DHFS 1997b). For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people,
the target is 100 places for every 1000 indigenous Australians over 50 years and
over. However, the total number of aged care places has fallen short of these targets
(see table 3.5). A recent Auditor-General’s report (ANAO 1998) was critical of this
shortfall, saying that to meet the target planning ratio immediately, an addition of
nearly 10 100 places would be needed. It attributed the decline in part to time lags
inherent in the system (see below) and recommended that DHAC:
conduct a review of its planning process to put in place appropriate action to achieve
reduction in the time between estimation of the need for new places and the actual
provision of these places. (ANAO 1998, p. 20)
Table 3.5 Provision ratios of nursing home, hostel and care package
places
a
1985 1990 1998 Target 2011
Nursing homes 67 59 47 40
Hostels 33 37 41 50
Care packages na na 6 10
na: not applicable; community care packages were introduced in 1992.
a Provision ratios are number of places per 1000 persons aged 70 and over. These ratios are based on
operational places at 30 June.
Source: DHFS (1998a).38 NURSING HOME
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Allocation of places
The process of allocating new places commences with an estimation of the number
of new places needed to cater for increases in the target population. Aged Care
Planning Advisory Committees in each State or Territory then consider how the new
places should be distributed between regions and special needs groups, and advise
the Secretary (of the department) on the most appropriate allocation and distribution
of new places. The Secretary then invites applications from approved providers.
Applications are assessed against the criteria in the Aged Care Act 1997 and the
Allocation Principles 1997. These include whether the applicant has the necessary
expertise and experience, whether the premises used, or intended to be used, are
suitably planned and located, and the provision of appropriate care for people with
special needs. In May 1998, 2007 new residential aged care places were allocated to
providers who had applied for places in advertised target areas of identified need
(DHFS 1998a, p. 167).
Once new places are allocated, providers can proceed to make them operational.
This can involve additions to an existing facility or the construction of a new
facility. The ANAO (1998) said it can take from one to three years or more from the
time of the estimation of the need for new places before those new places are
operational.
Allocations are provided without charge, but conditions apply. Amongst the general
conditions is a requirement that a specific ratio of places be available for
concessional residents. (Essentially, a concessional resident is someone who is
unable to afford to pay an accommodation bond or charge.) Currently this ratio is
set at an overall 27 per cent of places nationally; but it is specified on a regional
basis, ranging from around 16 per cent in some metropolitan areas to 40 per cent in
Alice Springs and some remote areas. According to the RCS review, about 38 per
cent of residents nationally are concessional residents (DHFS 1998b, p. 19).
Those wishing to provide care for special needs groups must apply in response to a
formal invitation by the Secretary. Special needs groups include people:
• from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities;
• from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds;
• who live in rural and remote areas; and/or
• who are financially or socially disadvantaged.
Government policy is that places should go to those who need it most and for whom




and Hostels Review (DCSH 1986) to exist in access to aged care places had been
reduced but regional inequities remained significant. In particular, it said:
the disproportionate numbers of places in some metropolitan areas persists and rural and
remote areas remain underserviced. (p. 15)
As noted earlier, under the current system, an ACAT assesses a person seeking to
become an approved care recipient and, after admission, the care provider assesses
the new resident’s RCS classification. The average waiting period in 1996-97
between an ACAT approval for entry into care and actual entry was 18 days for
nursing homes and 58 days for hostels (DHFS 1997b). In 1997-98 this had
increased to 31 and 108 days respectively (DHFS 1998a).
Transferring places
All transfers of places between providers must be approved. Approval is generally
given, provided the transfer results in no significant changes to the distribution of
places, and the new provider continues to fulfil any obligations imposed on the
original provider. Transfers between regions may be approved when the move is
towards regions with greater need. Although, as noted earlier, the department
allocates bed licences without charge, once allocated, they can be traded. DHFS
said that in 1997 bed licences could be purchased on the open market for $27 000
(sub. 52, p. 22).
Transfers of places often occur as a result of the sale of a facility. The seller must
give the department at least 90 days notice of the sale of a home. The buyer also has
certain obligations with regard to informing the department of the purchase,
including the purchase price, the address where the sale will be finalised, and the
proposed time and day of completion of the sale.
Extra service places
Care recipients prepared to pay for ‘a significantly higher standard of
accommodation and services’ (DHFS 1997a, p. 15-1) can elect to enter an extra
service place, if one is available. Maximum extra service fees must be approved by
the department, and must average at least $10 a day.
The subsidy for the recipient of the extra service is reduced by 25 cents for each
dollar of extra service fee approved. The provider may require this extra service
subsidy reduction to be paid by the resident in addition to the extra service fee.40 NURSING HOME
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The number of extra service places is controlled. The current limit is 12 per cent of
places, and this applies on a regional basis. However, the Commission understands
the number of residents currently in extra service places is well below that limit.
From time to time, the Government invites applications for the provision of new
extra service places. To be approved, certain conditions need to be satisfied. For
example, they must be in a ‘distinct part’ of the service that:
• is physically identifiable as separate from the rest of the premises (although it
may be in the same building);
• includes sufficient living space to provide residential care for all the places in the
area;
• includes dining and lounge areas (located together or separately) for the
exclusive use of care recipients living in the area; and
• has at least five places.
In addition, the service (or distinct part) must offer a significantly higher standard of
accommodation, food and services than the average standard.
Non-approved places
Under the Aged Care Act 1997 it is possible to have places in a service which are
additional to the number of allocated places. Providers can use these places to
provide other compatible services, such as rehabilitation or hospice care. However,
these places are not subsidised by the Commonwealth. PJ Pusey (sub. D97, p. 1)
said the 81 bed facility operated by his family company contains 51 beds which do
not attract a subsidy and which are entirely resident funded.
3.4 Specified care and services
Commonwealth and state government regulations influence the nature of care
services provided in nursing homes and hostels. They cover a number of aspects
ranging from the supply of necessary equipment, specification of services, the
qualifications of staff, and building design. Regulations governing the quality of





A brief summary of the care and services specified by the Commonwealth
Government is given in box 3.5.
Previously, the Commonwealth required 24 hour on site care by a ‘qualified’ nurse
if there were eight or more high care residents. Less stringent requirements applied
where there were less than eight residents requiring nursing care. However, since
August 1998, a less prescriptive requirement has been in place, which allows homes
themselves to determine staffing arrangements based on their assessments of
resident needs.
Box 3.5 Specified care and services — Commonwealth
Specified care and services are those basic services a facility must provide to
residents, based on their level of care needs, at no extra cost. Some need to be
provided only to high care residents. Where a low care resident (category 5 to 8 of the
RCS) requires any services specified only for high care level residents (category 1 to
4), they may be charged for the provision of these additional services. The list of
specified care and services consists of three components:
• Part 1, ‘hotel’ or accommodation related services, to be provided for all residents
who need them. These include furnishings, bedding, general laundry, toiletry
goods, cleaning services, meals, maintenance of buildings and grounds and the
provision of staff on call to provide emergency assistance.
• Part 2, personal care services, to be provided for all residents who need them.
These include assistance with the activities of daily living such as bathing, toileting,
dressing, and eating; support for rehabilitation; assistance in obtaining health and
therapy services; and support for people with cognitive impairments.
• Part 3, nursing and personal care services and equipment to be provided for all
high care level residents (RCS levels 1 to 4) who need them. These include
equipment to assist with mobility, incontinence aids, basic pharmaceuticals,
provision of nursing services and procedures, administration of medications,
provision of therapy services and the provision of oxygen.
Source: DHFS (1997a).
State and Local Governments
The States generally have their own legislation governing aged care and nursing
homes. For instance, in New South Wales, there is the Nursing Home Act 1988 and
Regulations 1996. Under that legislation, all nursing homes pay an annual licence
fee to the New South Wales Private Health Care Branch. The fee ranges from $111042 NURSING HOME
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for homes with fewer than forty beds to $4195 for homes with one hundred beds or
more. Further, the legislation prescribes the minimum qualifications that a Director
and Deputy Director of Nursing must possess.
Legislation may prescribe that particular categories of qualified nurses perform
certain functions. For example, in New South Wales, medications must be
distributed by a registered nurse. In addition, there is a New South Wales
Department of Health protocol which requires certain medical procedures to be
carried out by registered nurses. Similar requirements exist in other States. Further,
requirements in some States provide that enrolled nurses work under the direction of
a registered nurse.
While the staffing profile for an individual facility is to a large extent determined by
resident needs, specific staffing requirements are prescribed in some States. For
example:
• In Victoria, a staff/resident ratio, previously prescribed by the state legislation,
has been incorporated into the nurses’ industrial award. The Queensland Nurses
Union has lodged a claim for a staff/resident ratio similar to that in place in
Victoria.
• In New South Wales, nursing homes must employ a Deputy Director of Nursing
if the home has more than 40 beds. A registered nurse must be on duty 24 hours
a day regardless of the number of beds. This requirement also applies in South
Australia.
• The Federal Nurses Award in Tasmania requires each nursing home to have 25
per cent of their nursing establishment at least at Level 2.
Workers compensation is governed by state government legislation. The
requirements differ from State to State, as do the basic premiums — from nearly 4
per cent of wage costs in Victoria and Queensland to 7 per cent of wage costs in
Tasmania.
While the Building Code of Australia (BCA) applies to residential aged care
facilities in all jurisdictions, various state and local government building legislation
and regulation also impact on the industry. These relate to such matters as building
standards (lighting, stairs, lifts, bathroom and toilet facilities, wheelchair access
etc), the provision and accessibility of fire prevention equipment, fire escapes, and
evacuation procedures. The board of the BCA, in consultation with the industry, is
currently undertaking a review of the building code as it applies to residential aged
care facilities. This review is to address state and local variations to ensure that a
national regulatory framework for new residential aged care facilities is put in place




3.5 Quality of care
The underlying aim of much of the regulation surrounding residential aged care is to
enhance quality of life and care, and to ensure the safety of residents. Concerns
about quality of care in some nursing homes during the early 1980s led to the
development of outcome standards and a standards monitoring program. As part of
the Aged Care Reform Package, a set of Residential Care Standards has been
developed.
Residential Care Standards
The aim of the Residential Care Standards, effective from 1 October 1997, is to
ensure that the individual needs of all residents are met, including those of residents
from rural and remote areas, those with culturally diverse backgrounds, and
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The requirements are categorised into
three standards:
• The Health and Personal Care Standard refers to the promotion of residents’
physical and mental health. It includes outcomes such as appropriate clinical and
nursing care, medication management, pain management, palliative care, dental
care, adequate nourishment, continence management, meeting the needs of
residents with challenging behaviours, and achieving optimum levels of mobility
and dexterity for all residents.
• The Resident Lifestyle Standard refers to the rights of residents to retain their
personal, civic, legal and consumer rights, and assistance to residents to achieve
and maintain active control of their own lives. It is concerned with the social,
cultural and spiritual aspects of residents’ lives, and includes emotional support,
achieving maximum independence, privacy and dignity, participation in leisure
activities, participation in decisions about the services received by residents and
security of tenure.
• The Physical Environment and Safe Systems Standard refers to the rights of
residents to live in a safe and comfortable environment. It is concerned with
outcomes which enhance the residents’ quality of life, such as regulatory
compliance, the minimisation of fire, security and emergency risks, infection
control and catering, and cleaning and laundry services.
Each standard also includes provision for continuous improvement, and education
and staff development.
It is the responsibility of the Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency to
assess facilities against the Residential Care Standards. Standards Monitoring44 NURSING HOME
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Teams are made up of at least one nursing officer and one clerical/administrative
officer. An extra team member may be added where appropriate, for instance an
interpreter, or an expert in a particular area of a facility’s operation. The teams will
visit facilities and speak to residents, relatives of residents, staff and other persons
who may be involved in the running of the facility. For routine assessments, 24
hours’ notice will generally be given, but unannounced assessments will be made
where concerns exist, or complaints have been made, and reassessments may occur
at any time, unannounced. Failure to comply with the Residential Care Standards
may result in sanctions. Meeting those standards is also a requirement of
accreditation. As discussed below, non-accredited facilities will not be eligible for
subsidies after January 2001.
Two mechanisms are available to residents and non-residents who want to make a
complaint about an aged care service. Service providers must have in place a
process for addressing complaints, as well as ensuring that people are aware that
they can complain to the department.
Certification
Facilities which are assessed as meeting specified building and care standards may
ask residents to make accommodation payments and receive concessional resident
supplements. The process of assessing these standards is called certification. A
service may apply for certification at any time. Certification is not mandatory.
The physical standard of a facility is measured against a ‘benchmark’ set by the
Certification Instrument and Guidelines. Points are awarded for each standard.
Inspections focus on:
• safety — with emphasis on fire safety;
• hazards;
• resident privacy;
• occupational health and safety;
• lighting and ventilation; and
• heating and cooling.
To obtain certification, residential facilities must score 57 points for safety,
occupational health and safety, and fire standards. Requirements will be
progressively tightened. For example, with regard to privacy and space, new
facilities will need to satisfy a mandatory standard of a maximum average of 2




appropriate). For existing facilities, a mandatory standard of a maximum of 4
residents in any room must be met by 2008.
Aged Care Australia said that, during the initial inspection process, 370 services
were refused certification, with the highest incidence of failure being in Victoria. As
a result of a review process, the number of failures has since been reduced
(sub. 26, appendix 4, p. 4). However, the Victorian Government said 33 per cent of
Victorian nursing homes remain uncertified (sub. 60, p. 5).
Accreditation
To continue to receive Commonwealth Government funding after January 2001, all
services must be accredited. To obtain accreditation, facilities must meet the
Accreditation Standards incorporating the Residential Care Standards, the building
and care standards required for certification at the time of accreditation (although a
service does not have to be certified), and a Management Systems, Staffing and
Organisational Development Standard.
The latter standard is aimed at ensuring that management systems are responsive to
the needs of residents, their representatives, staff and other stakeholders, and the
changing environment in which they operate. As well as requiring continuous
improvement and staff education and development similar to the Residential Care
Standards, this standard requires that residents have adequate access to internal and
external complaints mechanisms, and that facilities employ appropriately skilled and
qualified staff. Other elements of the Accreditation Framework are the Prudential
Arrangements in place (if a facility holds accommodation bonds) and the
Concessional and Assisted Resident Ratios, both specified by the Department.
The Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency will manage the accreditation
system, which will involve a self-assessment process followed by a desk audit and a
site audit. The agency will also carry out regular supervision of facilities to ensure
that they continue to satisfy the accreditation standards. If the agency is concerned
that an accredited service is not complying with the Accreditation Standards, it may
arrange for the service to be audited.
During the three year period between 1998 and 2001, it will be up to each provider
to decide when to apply for accreditation. Accreditation will be for a period of up to
three years, depending on the overall assessment of the service against the
standards. Providers will then need to re-apply for accreditation.46 NURSING HOME
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State government controls on quality
Some State Governments also have quality controls. This appears to result in some
duplication of the Commonwealth requirements. For instance, the Aged Services
Association of NSW & ACT said:
nursing homes need to have written procedures in order to establish the quality of care
provided ... This ... is a duplication of the requirements of the Accreditation Standards,
but is more prescriptive than is required by the Commonwealth legislation.
(Sub 35, p. 23)
Baptist Care - WA (sub. 5) raised similar concerns, saying there is duplication
between the care standards imposed by the Western Australian State Health
Department, and those required by the Commonwealth’s accreditation process. It




4 Assessment criteria and implications
4.1 Criteria
For the Commission, a starting point for determining appropriate assessment criteria
is the general policy guidelines set out in the Productivity Commission Act 1998.
Amongst other things, these require the Commission to have regard to the need to
improve the productivity and economic performance of the economy, reduce
unnecessary regulation, encourage the development of efficient and internationally
competitive industries, facilitate adjustment to structural change, recognise the
interests of the community generally and all those likely to be affected by its
proposals, and promote regional employment and development. Collectively, the
guidelines require the Commission to give due regard to social, regional and
environmental concerns as well as to economic performance.
As well as its own policy guidelines, the Commission has also had regard to the
objectives of the Aged Care Act 1997. These objectives (see box 4.1) underpin the
new Residential Aged Care Program arising from the Aged Care Structural Reform
Package.
Box 4.1 Objectives of the Aged Care Act 1997
• Promote a high quality of care and accommodation and protect the health and
well-being of residents
• Help residents enjoy the same rights as all other people in Australia
• Ensure that care is accessible and affordable for all residents
• Plan effectively for the delivery of aged care services and ensure that aged care
services and funding are targeted towards people and areas with the greatest
needs
• Encourage services that are diverse, flexible and responsive to individual needs
• Provide funding that takes account of the quality, type and level of care
• Provide respite for families, and others, who care for older people
• Promote ‘ageing in place’ through the linking of care and support services to the
places where older people prefer to live
Source: As summarised in DHFS (1997a, p.  1-1).48 NURSING HOME
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Several participants recognised that explicit assessment criteria could help resolve
the coalescence issue. For example, Aged Care Australia outlined three key
principles, as well as criteria for evaluating funding approaches (see box 4.2).
Box 4.2 Aged Care Australia’s criteria
Guiding principles
Access — older people assessed as needing care in a residential aged care facility
should be able to receive care appropriate to their needs on a timely basis, within their
local community wherever possible, and irrespective of their financial status.
Quality — older people should be able to receive the same quality of residential aged
care throughout Australia; and the quality of care provided should be consistent with
the standards for accreditation.
Viability — residential aged care facilities must be able to operate as ongoing viable
concerns.
Criteria for evaluating funding approaches
Funding adequacy: will the funding approach deliver funding adequate to provide
quality care outcomes for consumers? Does it take into account the extent to which
services are able to control and manage their costs and income?
Funding equity: will the funding approach enable services with different inescapable
costs to provide the same standard of care for residents? Will it maintain funding over
time as cost relativities change?
Universal access: will the funding approach ensure universal access by people
assessed as needing residential care irrespective of their location or ability to pay?
Will it ensure that a high quality of care, consistent with accreditation, is provided to all
residents who are financially disadvantaged?
Incentives for quality and efficiency: is there scope within the funding approach to
encourage and reward quality and efficiency? Does it provide flexibility to manage the
funding to achieve quality and efficiency improvements?
Administrative efficiency: will the transaction costs of the funding approach be
efficient and affordable? Will the funding arrangements be easy for consumers to
understand? Will implementation costs be funded and will they be justified by ongoing
overall improved outcomes from the funding arrangements?
Source: Sub. 26, pp. 3, 19.
The emphasis given to different criteria is important, as is their interpretation. In
general, participants placed greatest emphasis on equity, in the sense that overall





The Commission would agree that in examining funding methodologies, equity is
the core criterion. Equity has at least three aspects:
• ensuring that the necessary physical and human resources are available in a
suitable location — ie equity of physical access;
• ensuring that the care provided always meets an acceptable standard of care
benchmark that addresses the individual needs of each person — ie equity of
care; and
• ensuring that access to care is not denied through inability to pay — ie equity of
financial access.
Providing equity of care does not necessarily rule out allowing people to pay for
extra services over and above the acceptable quality standards. Similarly, providing
equitable financial access does not imply that all residents should be equally
subsidised irrespective of their ability to pay. Indeed, targeting available funding to
those people least able to pay for themselves is more equitable than distributing
funding equally among all residents. The recent introduction of income tested care
fees recognises this principle.
Subject to a funding methodology meeting this core criterion of equity, a number of
other criteria are relevant to the assessment process. As far as possible, the funding
methodology should:
• enhance incentives for the efficient delivery of care. For example, subsidies
should not indefinitely underwrite inefficient arrangements in management or
staffing;
• avoid creating incentives for the wasteful consumption of care. For example, the
methodology should not create incentives to use residential care, if non-
residential aged care services would be more appropriate;
• encourage diversity and provide choice wherever possible. Those from particular
social or cultural groups, for example, should be able to choose care appropriate
to their needs;
• provide flexibility, to facilitate adjustment over time to changes in the aged care
system with minimum disruption; and
• minimise administrative and compliance costs.
Program design principles are also relevant. For example: the objectives of funding
should be clearly spelt out; as far as practicable, methodology should be simple,
stable and predictable; incentives for fraud should be minimised; and transparency
should be maximised.50 NURSING HOME
SUBSIDIES
4.2 Implications for funding methodology
Funding to a standard of care
As noted above, equity means that, ideally: residential aged care would be available
to all Australians needing such care, in a suitable location; that care would be of an
acceptable quality; and that access to that care would not be constrained by ability
to pay.
A few participants considered that the differentiation of basic subsidies for aged
care on the basis of regional costs runs counter to the national uniformity principle
underlying a range of social support payments. For example, unemployment
benefits, pensions and the like do not vary according to differences in the regional
cost of living.
However, major social programs such as health and education are provided across
Australia irrespective of differences in regional costs. Hence, the underlying subsidy
varies across regions. More broadly, the operations of the Commonwealth Grants
Commission (CGC) ensure that Commonwealth funding for the States takes account
of differences in the costs of service provision. As Aged Care Tasmania stated:
The CGC recognises that there are very clear and significant differences between the six
States and the two Territories in their social, economic, demographic and geographic
make-ups. These differences give rise to marked cost differentials, a fact widely
recognised, and specifically taken into account in Commonwealth-State funding
arrangements. (Sub. 40, pp. 5–6)
The Productivity Commission’s view is that two important implications for funding
methodology arise directly out of this equity principle.
• Variability in care needs should be recognised. As some residents have higher
needs than others, providing an equal subsidy to all would not be equitable.
• Differences in the cost of delivering care cannot be ignored. Some cost factors
are largely beyond the control of nursing home operators, and differ between
jurisdictions and between regions. If no allowance is made for significant
regional cost differences, equity of care could not be achieved across Australia.
Standardised costs
While funding should be adequate to meet an efficiently delivered standard of care
Australia wide, the subsidy arrangements should not indefinitely underwrite cost




remove incentives for productivity gain and cost control. For example, providing
higher subsidies to all smaller operators, irrespective of location, could reduce
incentives for providers in the cities and the larger towns to expand or amalgamate
to provide quality care at lower cost.
For this reason, the Commission considers that subsidies should not directly reflect
variations in the actual costs incurred by providers in delivering services. Rather
they should only reflect significant regional variations, if any, in the ‘standardised’
cost of providing the benchmark standard of care. This is discussed in more detail in
chapter 5.
Netting out the impact of differences in input quantities means that, where higher
costs in a particular jurisdiction reflect the use of more inputs to provide a standard
of care above the benchmark, the Commonwealth would not contribute towards this
quality premium. That is, funding for the quality premium would have to come from
higher resident charges and/or efficiencies achieved by providers. State and
Territory Governments might also have a role to play in providing top-up funding if
they require the employment of more staff than provided for in the benchmark level
of care, impose higher building standards and the like.
The Commission recognises that, without adequate quality assurance arrangements,
providers may attempt to increase returns by reducing the quality of their care or the
standard of their premises, thus putting the well-being of some residents at risk.
However, the certification and accreditation requirements are aimed at preventing
this. Achieving a balance between encouraging efficiency and safeguarding resident
well-being is addressed in chapter 7.
Maintaining care quality
To maintain equity of outcomes over time, the funding methodology must make
allowance for changes in the price of inputs. If the costs of providing residential
aged care run ahead of increases in subsidy rates, then the objective of ensuring
access to an acceptable quality of care could be compromised. Similarly, an increase
in the required standard of care (at the direction of the Government, or through
changes in community expectations) will be difficult to achieve unless subsidies are
increased.
However, this raises the issue of how to compensate providers for cost increases,
without removing incentives for improvements in efficiency. In turn, this focuses
attention on the basis for indexing subsidies (see chapter 7).52 NURSING HOME
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4.3 Implications for coalescence
As noted above, the Commission considers that some allowance needs to be made
for significant regional differences in (standardised) costs faced by nursing home
providers in providing a benchmark standard of care. Thus, coalescence cannot be
accepted as an equity principle in its own right — it becomes an empirical question
about the significance and stability of cost variations.
This view was shared by the vast majority of participants. With only one or two
exceptions, they considered that the particular nature and extent of cost differences
between homes in different jurisdictions or regions was fundamental to the funding
methodology.
Allowing for cost variation
In principle, there are two broad approaches to dealing with regional cost
differences:
• implementing variable basic subsidies; or
• augmenting a basic uniform subsidy with supplementary funding for high cost
services.
In practice, the current funding arrangements reflect a mixture of these two
approaches. They combine a jurisdictionally variable basic subsidy with a viability
supplement for services in more remote high cost locations.
Nonetheless, the in-principle distinction is useful because it focuses attention on the
importance of the regional dispersion in the costs of providing care when choosing
between funding methodologies.
The narrower the dispersion in (standardised) costs around the average, the stronger
is the case for nationally uniform basic subsidies to be augmented with
supplementary funding for services which face significantly higher costs.
Administratively, it is likely to be less complex to cater for a relatively small
number of facilities requiring above average support through targeted arrangements,
than to have a more complex basic subsidy scheme to fund the majority of homes.
However, if there is wide dispersion in regional costs, nationally uniform basic
subsidies will lead to two types of problem.
• There may be a relatively large number of high cost facilities that warrant
supplementary funding support. Catering for these needs through supplementary




providers (through the need to apply for additional funding) and the Government
(through the need to process those applications).
• The extent of over-funding of providers operating in relatively low cost regions
is also likely to be higher.
The relative significance of these two problems will depend on the level at which
the uniform subsidy is struck. If it is based on the lower end of the cost scale, then
the problem of processing a large number of claims for supplementary funding will
predominate. Conversely, if it is based on the higher end of the cost scale, then
over-funding will dominate. In either case, however, the existence of significant cost
dispersion increases the justification for implementing regional/jurisdictional
variations in the basic subsidy.
To assist in resolving these issues, chapter 5 examines variations in nursing home
costs. Chapter 6 follows with a discussion on which of the two broad approaches is
the more appropriate.NURSING HOME
COSTS
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5 Nursing home costs and their
determinants
As discussed in chapter 4, the extent and nature of (standardised) cost dispersion
between different regions is central to whether nursing homes subsidies are funded
nationally or regionally. Expected future changes in cost variation are also relevant
in choosing the most appropriate funding methodology.
In accordance with the terms of reference, this chapter outlines the factors
influencing nursing home costs as well as a method for comparing cost information
across jurisdictions. Using this methodology, the chapter compares costs across
States and Territories, and examines recent wage trends and likely future directions.
To undertake this analysis, the Commission has relied primarily on information
provided by participants.
The chapter does not attempt to present a complete analysis of the costs of
providing nursing home care. Rather, the emphasis is on discovering whether there
are significant cost differences that may inform choices between alternative funding
methodologies.
5.1 Factors influencing unit costs
A wide range of factors can influence the costs of delivering nursing home care, not
the least of which is the expertise of management in efficiently running a facility in
a caring manner. Other factors include:
• Resident mix: The resident mix has an important influence on costs as care needs
of residents increase with the level of dependency. The present arrangements
recognise this by providing different funding for each RCS classification —
subsidies for RCS category 1 residents are more than 80 per cent higher than
those for RCS category 4 residents.
• Quality of care: Better facilities or better personal care often cost more to
provide, though not always (see below). The cost premium for better personal
care may reflect the use of more staff, or alternatively more experienced, and
more costly, staff.56 NURSING HOME
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• Home size: Larger homes have greater opportunity to reduce costs through
spreading overheads (such as the costs of the Director of Nursing, and
administration), and taking advantage of scale economies for services, such as
meals and laundry services. Homes that are part of a larger group can also reduce
unit administrative costs.
• Service integration: Co-location of a nursing home with hostel accommodation
and/or independent living facilities offers further opportunities to spread fixed
costs and reduce unit variable costs.
• Ownership: Government and not-for-profit operators are exempt from certain
taxes on inputs levied on for-profit homes. Some would argue that the profit
motive gives for-profit homes an incentive to operate more efficiently than
not-for-profit homes.
• Location: The location of a nursing home affects costs in at least three ways.
First, prices of goods and services used by nursing homes vary between cities
and between the city and the country. Certain costs (eg land) can even differ
markedly within a city or region. Second, individual States and Territories have
different industrial awards, requiring different staff ratios and staff mix, as well
as different workers compensation, payroll tax and other requirements. Third, in
some locations there can be a difference in the fundamental nature of care
required, as exemplified in many rural and remote areas.
Cost comparisons could draw out the effects of all these different influences on the
regional costs of delivering care. However, as discussed in section 4.2 and
section 5.2 below, not all these factors are equally relevant to determining a funding
methodology.
Importantly, the quality of care is not always directly related to cost levels. The
provision of a wider range of lifestyle activities or better personal dignity does not
necessarily cost more. Nor do higher costs automatically indicate better care — they
could just reflect higher wages or less efficient rostering. Thus, in comparing
observed costs, it is difficult to separate out the influence of quality.
Further, the current regulatory regime has the effect of disguising underlying cost
drivers between homes providing different quality care or facing different input
prices. As nursing homes cannot respond to increases in the prices they need to pay
for inputs (such as staff, goods and services) by increasing their revenue — this is
controlled by the Government — they can only respond by improving efficiency,
reducing their services or by reducing their surplus (if any). The actual costs of
different nursing homes can accord closely with existing subsidy levels, even
though those subsidies may not accurately reflect underlying cost factors,
particularly after a period in which increases in input prices run ahead of subsidyNURSING HOME
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increases. A possible indication of this ‘circularity’ between costs and subsidy
levels is given by the correlation between qualified nursing hours provided to
residents in individual States and Territories, and jurisdictional subsidy rates (table
5.1).
Table 5.1 Qualified nursing hours compared to subsidy
a
Average hours per resident per week
State RCS 3 subsidy per day Average hours
ACT (2 facilities) $78 10.0
SA (5) $76 11.2
WA (10) $78 11.9
NSW (14) $81 12.2
Victoria (7) $84 14.1
Tasmania (3) $86 14.1
a Details for QLD and NT were not provided in source.
Source: Sub. 26, appendix 2, p. 2; sub. 33, p. 12.
Aged Care Tasmania contended that this limited example only provides indirect
evidence of circularity of costs and subsidy levels as it does not allow for other
factors influencing nursing input, such as the size of a nursing home. However, as
Aged Care Queensland stated:
a challenge is to avoid the temptation to simplify the exercise by examining the costs at
any number of individual nursing homes. In a system with such rigid controls over
financial inputs, costs only reflect income. (Sub. 33, p. 6)
This highlights the need for a more detailed and standardised method of cost
comparisons.
5.2 Developing a basis for comparing costs
A starting point for useful cost comparison — one recognised by several
participants — would be to accept that there is a relationship between input mix and
care outputs, in terms of both the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of care provided. Next, a
series of standardised input mixes would be defined to reflect the different levels of
care output required by residents with different RCS classifications. Comparisons
would then consist of costing those standardised input mixes, common to all
regions, at the unit costs faced by operators in individual regions (ie at the prices
they have to pay).
An important issue is whether different input mixes should also be specified to
account for other factors which influence costs such as ownership status and size.58 NURSING HOME
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As noted in chapter 4, however, the subsidy regime should not support ongoing
inefficiency or remove incentives for productivity gain and cost control. This
principle immediately rules out differentiating subsidies on the basis of ownership,
except for possibly compensating for differences in liability for government charges
on inputs such as payroll tax on labour (see section 7.5). It would also rule out
compensating for small home size, except in rural and remote areas where limited
demand makes scale economies unachievable. For this reason, the Commission
considers it preferable to address the higher costs incurred by smaller rural and
remote nursing homes separately from consideration of the basic funding
methodology (see sections 7.2 and 7.6). Thus, the remainder of this chapter
proceeds on the basis that standard input mixes need only differentiate on the basis
of care needs.
These standardised input mixes should reflect all relevant inputs necessary for
providing care, including wages, superannuation, purchases of supplies and
equipment, energy costs, contracted services, as well as depreciation on buildings
and equipment, and a return on investment. (In this latter regard, providing a return
on equity capital invested in a nursing home is no less a cost than making interest
payments on borrowed capital.) In principle, relevant input taxes and government
charges such as workers compensation should also be included.
5.3 Cost comparisons
Many participants provided cost information for nursing homes. Some participants
made attempts to ‘standardise’ inputs for a specific resident profile. However, in
most cases, the information related to the cost of particular nursing homes, or
comparisons of the observed costs incurred by different homes. Detailed
comparisons were also presented of some of the underlying factors affecting
jurisdictional costs, such as different wage rates, and differences in workers
compensation payments.
This information is very useful in shedding light on the cost structures of particular
homes, factors influencing actual costs in particular jurisdictions, and on cost
trends. However, for the reasons given above, it is of less value in determining
whether the basic subsidy regime should be uniform or regionally differentiated.
This section describes the cost data provided by participants, concentrating on cost
information that attempts to net out variations in input mix arising from factors
other than care needs. The information standardises the level of inputs for nursing
homes for a given resident profile. This is a slightly different approach to the
methodology outlined above which standardises inputs for each level of care.NURSING HOME
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Despite this practical difference, the essential principle of standardisation remains
and the information illustrates the extent of cost variations across jurisdictions.
As most of the information provided relates to labour costs, and associated on-costs,
the next section seeks to put the importance of labour in nursing home costs into
context. The following section then goes on to provide the cost comparisons.
Importance of labour costs
Past subsidy and indexation mechanisms have commonly used an average wage to
non-wage cost ratio of 75:25. Information from participants suggests that this ratio
is conservative in respect of the current labour share (see table 5.2). However, not
all of the comparisons allow for items of cost such as depreciation and interest paid
on borrowed funds. As ANHECA noted, the inclusion of these items would reduce
the ratio of labour to non-labour costs.
The precise ratio will vary across homes and will depend in part on the extent of
contracting out of services such as food and laundry. Nevertheless, the comparisons
indicate that wage costs are overwhelmingly the most important cost item.
Consequently, a variation in non-labour costs between jurisdictions of 10 per cent
would have approximately only one-third the impact on total costs as a 10 per cent
variation in labour costs.
Comparisons of labour costs
Differences in standardised labour costs — which abstract from variations in staff
mix — essentially arise from differences in wage rates and labour on-costs.
Several participants provided comparisons of wage rates. Aged Care Tasmania
provided a comparison of award rates for the most senior staff in each employee
category (table 5.3). The variation in hourly rates (over the six States) is
approximately 7 per cent for enrolled nurses, 18 per cent for registered nurses and
19 per cent for care assistants. However, the comparisons are sensitive to the stage
of wage negotiations in individual jurisdictions. Thus, relativities and the magnitude
of observed differences are likely to fluctuate over time.
Similarly, labour on-costs such as leave entitlements and workers compensation
premiums also vary between States and Territories. For example, according to Aged
Care Tasmania (see sub. 40, attachment):
• workers compensation premiums differ from about 4 per cent of wage costs in
Queensland and Victoria to 7 per cent of wage costs in Tasmania;60 NURSING HOME
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• long service leave entitlements range from 26 weeks after 15 years in Victoria to
8 weeks after 10 years service in New South Wales; and
• sick leave entitlements for employees in Tasmania and Victoria (4 weeks
annually) are double the national standard (2 weeks annually).
Higher labour costs in one area can be offset by lower costs in another. For
example, Aged Care Tasmania’s data indicates that although long service leave
entitlements are more generous in Victoria, workers compensation premiums in
Victoria are the second lowest after Queensland.




(sub. 6, p. 2)
For the year ended June 1998, nursing and personal care costs
accounted for 62 per cent, other staff costs 18 per cent, workers
compensation 4 per cent, and non staff costs 17 per cent.
Sundale Garden Village
(sub. 16, p. 23)
Wage costs comprised 82.85 per cent of income in 1997-98.
ANHECA (sub. 24, p. 10) The commonly espoused 75:25 ratio of wage to non-wage costs
is reasonable provided that the ratio does not include the return
on investment (ROI). A more appropriate ratio of wages to non
wages, excluding ROI, is 80:20. The inclusion of the ROI would
distort this figure to approximately 70:30.
NANHPH (sub. 25, p. 22) Wages together with wage on-costs account for approximately
75 per cent of the total costs of operation of a facility.
Our Lady of Consolation
Home (sub. 27, p. 4)
The ratio of salaries to other costs in 1997-98 was 86.9 per cent.
Baptist Community Service
(sub. 29, p. 3)
Wages and wage-related costs typically represent no less than 81
per cent of total expenditure.
Aged Care Queensland
(sub. 33, p. 11)
A survey of 26 members’ nursing homes showed total staffing
costs represent 84.39 per cent of total expenditure.
Aged Care Tasmania (sub.
40, p. 35)
Depending on the size of home, labour costs (including on-costs)
can vary from 70 to 80 per cent, with very little scope for
substitution of labour and equipment.
May Shaw Nursing Centre
(sub. 41, p. 3)
The commonly espoused 75/25 ratio of wage to non-wage costs
does not hold true with the May Shaw Nursing Centre
experience. Ratios for the three years from 1995-96 were 78/22,
78.6/21.4 and 84.5/15.5. It should be noted that in 1995-96 and
1996-97 administration wages were costed to administration
rather than salaries.
Umina Park (sub. 44, p. 5) Analysis of data provided shows that salaries plus on-costs
comprised 88 per cent of nursing home expenses.
The Uniting Church Division
of Aged Care & Domiciliary
Services - Queensland Synod
(sub. 62, attachment A)
Based on expenditure numbers for 1996-97 and using a sample
of 26 Uniting Church nursing homes in Queensland, labour costs
accounted for around 82 per cent of total cost. Because of wage
increases since 1996-97 and some increase in the resident





Table 5.3 Hourly award rates of pay
$ per hour
Category NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas
Enrolled nurse 14.18 13.55 14.24 13.79 13.27 14.04
Registered nurse 20.75 17.56 18.97 18.71 17.96 18.98
Extended care assistant 11.42 11.65 10.54 np 11.72 12.52
Service employee 12.00 11.65 10.91 11.50 11.22 11.07
Cook (qualified) 12.24 13.00 12.21 13.34 13.44 13.83
Trades 12.96 13.32 11.79 np 13.44 14.43
Clerical 15.09 14.75 15.25 15.48 14.23 15.57
np: not provided
Source: Sub. 40, attachment, pp. 2, 4, 5.
Although wage rates and direct on-costs differ between jurisdictions, there is little
evidence of significant variation within jurisdictions. For example, according to
ANHECA:
In most cases the wages and conditions for a particular State are peculiar to that State,
however, in Queensland and Western Australia there are varying award rates and
conditions in the majority of the State compared to the far North of the State. The
variations within States are not significant ... (Sub. 24, p. 13)
However, while wage rates may not differ much from city homes, facilities in rural
and remote areas do face additional labour costs. For example, Frontier Services,
which operates a number of such homes in the Northern Territory and Western
Australia, considered that:
The current funding structure does not recognise the cost implications of meeting
cultural needs nor the higher costs associated with training, recruitment and retention of
staff. (Sub. 8, p. 1)
These costs, and their implications for funding arrangements, are discussed in
chapter 7.
Aged Care Australia
Aged Care Australia commissioned La Trobe University to undertake a relative
labour cost study using various notional baskets of staff mix based on rosters
provided by homes. In general, this approach accords well with the Commission’s
preferred basis for comparison. Aged Care Australia said:
The notional baskets of staff mix are not prescriptive but act as a proxy for determining
whether there are cost differences in delivering the same standard of care (as measured
by staff mix). The study therefore examines relative staff costs without the impact of
differences in staff mix. (Sub. 26, p.  9)62 NURSING HOME
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Initially, 12 baskets of staff mix were chosen based on two rosters from each
mainland State (except Queensland), one from the ACT and three from Tasmania:
• eight are in capital or provincial cities, three in rural areas and one in a remote
area;
• they are almost equally divided between stand alone and co-located facilities;
• two have fewer than 40 beds, two have over 100 beds and the remainder have
between 40 and 60 beds; and
• four cater mainly for people with dementia, five for those with high level needs,
one for lower level and two cater for a combination of care levels.
One basket was subsequently dropped from the study as the number of staff hours
per resident was well outside the range of the other baskets. The remaining 11
baskets were costed across each jurisdiction using four different models, which
progressively added shift loadings, workers compensation, and other wage related
costs to the base model.
The Aged Services Association of NSW and the ACT criticised the methodology of
the La Trobe study:
the theoretical basis used to compare wage rates does not reflect the legislative
requirements and practical experience of the industry in NSW ... [where] the
predominant age of the labour force in nursing homes is 41–50 years ... (Sub. 35, p. 3)
However, the La Trobe study is valuable for the very reason that it nets out different
‘legislative requirements’. Similarly, if the labour force is more experienced in New
South Wales than elsewhere, the same number of staff may be able to deliver a
higher quality of care. Thus, in costing a uniform quality benchmark, it is desirable
to net out this type of effect also. For this reason, the La Trobe study costed two
additional models with higher salary classifications for staff: ‘the classifications
used were those suggested by state associations as reflecting typical classifications
in their States’ (sub. 26, appendix 3, p. 8).
A summary of results averaged across the baskets is presented in table 5.4.
While noting a number of caveats to the study (in particular, relating to the ‘other
on-costs model’), Aged Care Australia went on to draw out a number of broad
conclusions (sub. 26, appendix 3, p. 14):
• the standardised labour costs vary within a ‘narrow’ range, 4 to 5 percentage
points for the lower salary method, and about 6 for the higher salary method;NURSING HOME
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• in the lower salary method models (leaving aside the ‘other on-costs’ model as
suggested by Aged Care Australia), Western Australia is always the lowest cost
State with Queensland and South Australia towards the higher cost end;
• in the two higher salary models, Victoria, New South Wales and Western
Australia are at the lower end, Queensland is in the middle, and South Australia
and Tasmania are at the higher end — thus the models are sensitive to the
assumed salary structure;
• there is a reasonable level of consistency between States in the baskets of staff
mix which are expensive and those which are less costly; and
• the relative differences are far less than those existing in the present structure of
subsidies.
Table 5.4 Comparison of standardised labour costs
Averaged across baskets. Base = lowest State
Model NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas Average
Base model 102.71 103.08 104.74 103.29 100.00 102.54 102.73
Add shift loadings 102.76 103.51 104.92 103.54 100.00 102.87 102.93
Add workers compensation 103.17 102.33 104.02 105.27 100.00 104.19 102.98
Add other on-costs 102.05 104.45 102.05 105.43 100.00 105.70 103.28
Base model with higher
salaries 100.00 100.24 102.60 103.26 100.14 103.50 101.62
Workers compensation
model with higher salaries 100.89 100.00 102.34 105.76 100.70 105.88 102.59
Source: Sub. 26, appendix 3, p. 9 (as revised).
TriCare
TriCare costed common staff rosters for 60 bed and 148 bed homes, across different
jurisdictions including the Northern Territory and the ACT. TriCare noted in its
submission that:
the roster was developed on a notional resident mix and the same roster as a base was
applied for every State. In adding to the base roster, specific state requirements such as
staff resident ratios and staff supervisory requirements prescribed in specific state
awards were applied. (Sub. 34, annexure A, p.1)
Using a base roster to estimate cost accords well with the Commission’s preferred
approach to standardised cost comparisons. However, the concept of a standard
input mix reflecting a standard quality across all jurisdictions would be lost if the
base rosters are adjusted to allow for specific state staffing requirements. Further
consultation with TriCare revealed that adjustments had been made for higher staff
supervisory requirements for registered nurses in Tasmania. However, TriCare did64 NURSING HOME
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not make any adjustments to Victorian rosters for the higher staff resident ratios as
required by Victorian awards, as it found little evidence of compliance in the private
and charitable sectors.
Thus, the Commission has recalculated the costs for Tasmania to reflect a standard
input mix. The results are shown in table 5.5.
Table 5.5 TriCare’s labour cost comparisons
Base = lowest State
NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas
a NT ACT
60 beds
Nursing & personal care 110.14 103.25 107.44 100.00 101.82 111.41 107.99 102.51
All staff 106.97 103.41 106.95 100.00 102.20 110.46 108.06 102.76
148 beds
Nursing & personal care 109.27 100.00 108.04 101.06 102.25 110.28 109.63 100.92
All staff 106.75 100.00 107.24 100.42 102.12 109.02 109.07 100.56
a TriCare’s estimates were adjusted to conform with a consistent standard labour input mix across all
States. Initial cost estimates for Tasmania allowed for one quarter of registered nurses to be employed at
level 2.
Source: Derived from sub. 34, annexure B.
These results indicate up to 11 per cent variation in costs — a greater cost variation
than the averages shown by Aged Care Australia. In addition, when the TriCare
results are compared with Aged Care Australia’s (the higher salary models are the
most comparable), the state rankings differ. In particular, New South Wales ranks
much higher and South Australia much lower. Finally, TriCare’s cost estimate show
the ACT at the lower end of the cost scale, and the Northern Territory at the higher
end.
The Commission sought further input from TriCare and Aged Care Australia to help
reconcile the different results. The two organisations put forward a number of
reasons to explain the divergences. For example, Aged Care Australia noted that,
unlike the TriCare study, the La Trobe study does not include uniform, cleaning and
on-call allowances or the cost of leave provisions (sub. 57, p. 2). Similarly, TriCare
said that it did not include the costs of workers compensation premiums which are
included in the La Trobe study (sub. 59, p.2). This may partly explain the low cost
ranking for South Australia in the TriCare study — the inclusion of workers
compensation costs significantly increases the cost ranking of South Australia in the
La Trobe study (see table 5.4). (Further details of differences in workers
compensation premiums are given in box 5.1.) Furthermore, the Aged Care
Australia study assumed standard penalty rates across all categories of staff across
all States, whereas TriCare used actual penalty rates in accordance with the relevant
state awards (sub. 59, p. 2).NURSING HOME
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Although these observations highlight the difficulty of undertaking such cost
comparisons, they do not invalidate the methodology nor mean that a standardised
input mix (or mixes) could not be transparently negotiated and agreed by all
relevant stakeholders.
Box 5.1 Workers compensation
Workers compensation is a state/territory responsibility. The actual premium paid by a
particular nursing home is generally a percentage of wages paid plus (less) a loading
(bonus) for past claims experience. Information provided by participants about base
premiums by nursing homes by jurisdiction is reported in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Summary of workers compensation base rates payable
in each State and Territory
Percentage of wages paid
State NANHPH Aged Care Tasmania ANHECA
NSW 5.57 5.57 5.57
Vic 3.95 3.95 3.95
QLD 3.91 3.91 3.39
WA 5.65 5.15 5.15
SA 6.90 6.90 6.90
Tas 5 to 6a 7.00 6.50
a Privately negotiated, approximate only.
Source: Subs 25, 40, 24.
NANHPH
NANHPH presented funding models based on rosters worked by individual homes,
in different size ranges. These models help to paint a picture of the differing cost
structures across the sector. For example, they highlight the relatively greater use of
registered nurses in Victoria, at least for homes of less than 60 beds.
However, the models are of less value in looking at the degree of variation in
standardised costs, as they build in cost differences arising from state variations in
input usage. Further NANHPH commented that its data ‘obviously has some major
deficiencies’ (sub. 25, p. 17).
Aged Care Tasmania
Aged Care Tasmania started with a ‘standard care model’ for a 45 bed nursing
home, including both labour and non-labour costs. The model was costed for66 NURSING HOME
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Tasmania and cost comparisons were made for Tasmania relative to the average
across all other States and Territories. Then it was adjusted in two ways to ‘quantify
Tasmania’s overall relative cost disability’ (sub. 40, p. 16): an adjustment of input
prices, and an adjustment for ‘service delivery scale disability’. Allowing for input
price variation is in line with the Commission’s preferred basis for comparison, but
the adjustment for scale builds in variations in input mix. (As noted, the
Commission considers it preferable to make any funding allowance for smallness
and remoteness separately from the basic subsidy regime.)
In regard to input costs, Aged Care Tasmania calculated the Tasmanian disability
(ie the percentage by which costs are higher compared to the average) as 5.7
per cent for labour, 11.5 per cent for labour on-costs, 7.1 per cent for non-labour
costs, equating to a total disability of 6.5 per cent. The scale disability was
estimated as an additional 7.7 per cent.
ANHECA
ANHECA presented detailed costings of subsidy rates which it considered should
apply for each of the high care RCS classifications in each jurisdiction. Although
ANHECA’s costings also include non-labour costs, this section concentrates on the
labour component and associated on-costs, presented in its submission.
The basis for the costings are average ‘state based hourly wage rates’ for different
categories of employee: RNs, non-RNs, therapists and domestic (including clerical).
These averages were calculated from ‘actual nursing home rosters in each State, as
at 1 July 1998’ (sub. 24, attachment 2, p. 1). The averages were multiplied up to
give total wage costs, using standard staff weightings and standard hours of care, for
each RCS category.
In ANHECA’s costings, the differences between jurisdictions in total wage costs
can be fully explained by the differences in state based hourly wage rates. The rates
used in the calculations are summarised in table 5.7. When these figures are
compared with those in table 5.3, some significant differences are apparent. For
example, for RNs, Aged Care Tasmania has Victoria with the lowest rate, NSW
with the highest, and a variation of 18 per cent. In contrast, ANHECA has Western
Australia as the lowest, Victoria as the highest, and a variation of 21 per cent.
Some of the differences can be explained by the different basis for the two tables.
ANHECA’s average hourly rates include ‘basic rates (weighted to include the
various penalty rates) plus the additional costs involved with annual leave, sick
leave, other leave, public holidays and the cost of replacing staff on leave’
(sub. D84  p. 3). Aged Care Tasmania’s data covers just the basic award rates.NURSING HOME
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Table 5.7 ANHECA’s average hourly wage rates
$ per hour
State NSW Vic QLD SA WA Tas ACT NT
RN 25.97 26.99 24.57 25.49 22.31 25.18 23.12 22.75
Non-RN 14.50 13.70 15.03 14.95 14.20 15.75 14.20 11.26
Therapist 15.76 12.53 11.96 13.71 11.88 14.15 12.12 11.54
Domestic
& clerical 13.94 12.85 12.84 13.53 13.29 14.51 12.64 13.71
Source: Sub. 24, attachment 2.
Another important reason for these differences is that ANHECA’s average rates
include the effects of differences in staff structures across jurisdictions. Thus, it
noted that its costings take into account ‘state variations from the norm eg the
Victorian 10/15 rule, and the NSW requirement for a Deputy Director of Nursing in
a nursing home with 40 or more beds’ (sub. 24, p. 29). Also, ANHECA’s costs
include differences across jurisdictions in the average experience of staff. In this
regard, the relatively low average rates for the Northern Territory may be explained
by high staff turnover which results in a higher proportion of staff being at the lower
levels of the wage structure. As noted, differences in the experience of staff will
affect quality, meaning that their effects on costs should be excluded from
standardised cost comparisons.
These differences in wage structure carry through into ANHECA’s comparisons of
labour costs, see table 5.8. The reported cost variation — of the order of 25 per cent
between the highest and lowest — is therefore much more than in Aged Care
Australia’s and TriCare’s standardised comparisons.
Table 5.8 ANHECA’s labour cost comparisons
For NPC and domestics: $ per day
State RCS 1 RCS 2 RCS 3 RCS 4
NSW 97.46 84.80 75.30 49.98
Vic 98.21 85.36 75.71 50.00
Qld 91.26 79.34 70.40 46.55
SA 94.77 82.41 73.15 48.44
WA 91.21 79.41 70.55 46.95
Tas 100.78 87.72 77.92 51.79
ACT 89.95 78.23 69.45 46.02
NT 80.22 70.05 62.42 42.08
Source: Sub. 24, attachment 2.
Further, the jurisdictional rankings also differ. For example, in comparison with the
‘workers compensation model with higher salaries’ from Aged Care Australia and
TriCare’s 60 bed all staff model, ANHECA’s RCS 1 model shows Victoria to be a68 NURSING HOME
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much higher cost jurisdiction, and Queensland and the Northern Territory in
particular to be much lower cost.
The jurisdictional variation of about 25 per cent in ANHECA’s cost-driven subsidy
rates is of the same order as the variation in existing subsidies of about 22 per cent.
Further, leaving aside the two territories and Western Australia, the ranking of
jurisdictions exactly matches that of the existing RCS 1 subsidies. This could
indicate that the non-standardised input mix used by ANHECA captures much of
the influence of present subsidies on costs. Essentially, ANHECA’s model is based
on cost reimbursement. For this reason, the Commission has not drawn further on
ANHECA’s data in the comparison of subsidies and standardised costs given below.
ANHECA - SA
ANHECA - SA costed a staffing roster for a 50 bed nursing home across New South
Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. Costs included direct
labour, plus annual leave, sick leave and public holidays. The comparisons appear
to net out the impacts of state-specific award conditions and regulations that would
affect actual staffing levels in each of those jurisdictions.
On the basis of its calculations, ANHECA - SA concluded that ‘the total cost of
identical rosters in each State under the present funding system [is] not significantly
different’ (sub. 21, p. 3). Its data show aggregate cost differences of only about
4 per cent (see table 5.9).
Table 5.9 ANHECA - SA’s labour cost comparisons
Based on a 50 bed roster
Category Proportion of South Australian cost
Direct labour costs
South Australia 100
Victoria no enrolled nurses 99.34
50% enrolled nurses 101.22
Western Australia 99.48
New South Wales 101.82
Direct labour costs (including annual leave,




New South Wales 104.12
na: not available.
a Excludes long service leave. ANHECA commented that adding in long service leave would narrow the gap
considerably, as long service leave in South Australia is more generous than in New South Wales.NURSING HOME
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Source: Sub. 21, appendix 1.
Comparisons of non-labour costs
While comparisons of most non-labour costs should, ideally, also be made on the
basis of a standardised input mix, no such data was available. However, given that
non-labour costs represent a smaller proportion of total costs, lack of standardisation
is a much lesser problem in comparisons than it would be for labour costs.
ANHECA presented summarised information on recurrent non-labour costs, drawn
from the 1995-96 cost survey by Bentleys Chartered Accountants. Generally, the
reported variations between jurisdictions in non-labour costs were quite small,
especially when related to total nursing home costs.
ANHECA (Tasmania) provided information on the comparative retail prices, in
capital cities, for food, cleaning and hygiene, and petrol costs. The rankings are
different across each category (see table 5.10). For example, Adelaide has the
lowest cost of cleaning and hygiene, and food, while Perth and Hobart are at the
high end of the scale. The cost of petrol is the lowest in Brisbane and highest in
Hobart. For these items, the overall cost variation around the average is
approximately 6 per cent. However, these figures only represent variations between
capital cities.
Table 5.10 Comparison of some non-labour costs across capital cities
Base: lowest city = 100
Category Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart Average
Food 108 104 105 100 110 110 106
Cleaning &
hygiene
104 104 110 100 105 115 106
Petrol -leaded 114 110 100 114 116 120 112
Petrol -unleaded 115 111 100 114 117 125 116
Total 106 104 107 100 107 112 106
Source: Derived from Sub. D63, p. 10.
In contrast, there appear to be more significant variations in non-labour costs
between city and country areas. Frontier Services gave a number of examples of
higher costs for homes in more remote areas including: additional freight, higher
cost of food, STD rates for phone calls, shorter life of fittings and fixtures and
higher maintenance of building and grounds due to climate (sub. 8, p. 4).
In regard to capital inputs, NANHPH noted that:70 NURSING HOME
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land and building costs in New South Wales are significantly greater than in all other
States. The greatest contrast is between New South Wales and Tasmania. (Sub. 55,
p. 7)
Aged Care Australia noted that both the CPI capital city housing cost index and the
Housing Industry Association’s Multi-Unit Building Cost index point to
considerable variations in building costs. It also observed that land costs vary
markedly across regions, but argued that these are likely to be relatively
homogenous within a local community. Aged Care Australia concluded that:
this is a relevant consideration where there is a component of user-pays funding towards
the capital cost of residential care accommodation. (Sub. 26, p. 13)
The Commission also observes that lower land costs will often offset to some extent
other cost premiums incurred by homes in rural and more remote areas. It is relevant
to note, however, that land is sometimes provided free, or at subsidised rates, to
nursing home providers.
5.4 Wage trends and productivity
Each of the standardised cost comparisons presented in the previous section reflects
differences in wage rates at particular points in time. Over time, these differentials
could change, as wages in one jurisdiction move relative to those in other
jurisdictions. As NANHPH stated: ‘wage movements will continue to move out of
kilter with each other’ (sub. 25, p. 28). However, as reflected in the terms of
reference, it is relevant to ask whether the differences are likely to narrow (or
widen) over time.
There is conflicting evidence on whether the differences in wages within the aged
care sector have been narrowing in recent years. Information provided by the
department shows that, in April 1993, wages in the highest wage State were on
average 29 per cent higher than those in the lowest wage State. In April 1998, wages
in the highest wage State averaged only about 9 per cent more than those in the
lowest wage State. This comparison indicates that the differential in hourly wage
rates has fallen by close to 70 per cent over the last five years.
Some participants differed with this assessment. For example, the Australian
Nursing Federation (SA Branch) commented that there is a very significant range in
outcomes in the aged care sector, with a growing gap (transcript, p. 64). The NSW
Nurses’ Association provided evidence of a growing gap in nursing home wage
rates for New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, and Victoria, over the
period from 1994 to 1998 (table 5.11). Based on nursing award wages in 1994, theNURSING HOME
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weekly wage dispersion between the highest and lowest wage States was
approximately 4 and 8 per cent for first year nurses and eighth year nurses,
respectively. By 1998, this dispersion had increased to 19 and 24 per  cent,
respectively.
Table 5.11 Weekly wage rates for registered nurses in nursing homes
Base = lowest State in 1994
State 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
First year or grade 1 RN
NSW 104 105 107 117 119
Vic 101 103 103 105 107
QLD 100 102 111 113 116
WA 100 100 100 100 100
Eighth year or grade 2 RN
NSW 108 108 110 121 124
Vica 100 100 100 101 103
QLD 101 101 110 111 113
WA 101 100 100 100 100
a Grade 2, year 6 nurse.  
Source:  Derived from sub. D107, attachment 1.
Aged Care Australia supplied ABS information which it claimed showed mixed
results in relation to the notion of increasing convergence of wages rate (sub. D94,
p. 1). However, the information covers both hospitals and nursing homes, and
relates to average weekly earnings, not wage rates.
It was argued by many participants that there is a strong relationship between nurse
wages in the nursing home sector and those in the acute sector. This raises two
further issues: the size of any gaps in wages between the sectors, and the differences
between jurisdictions in wages within the acute sector.
In regard to the first issue, participants indicated that in some States, nurse wages in
the aged care sector lag significantly behind those in the public hospital sector. The
Australian Nursing Federation (Federal Office, sub. 48, p. 11) said that there are
significant wage disparities in Victoria, Western Australia, the Australian Capital
Territory and the Northern Territory. A joint submission from the NSW College of
Nursing and the NSW Nurses’ Association (sub. 46, p. 4) made similar observations
and added Queensland to the list. The Australian Nursing Federation (Victorian
Branch) indicated that Victorian private nursing home wages lag the public sector
by around 10–15 per cent (sub.  D105, table 1). Information provided by the
department shows similar differences (table 5.12).72 NURSING HOME
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The Australian Nursing Federation has tabled a log of claims aimed at closing the
gaps between wages for nursing home and acute care nurses. Whether this would
lead to a closer alignment of nurses wages in the aged care sector across different
jurisdictions (and consequently less variation in standardised costs) would then
depend on the range of variation between jurisdictions in acute care nurses wages.
Table 5.12 Award wages for first year registered nurses by sector, by State
$ per hour




NSW 14.78 14.49 2.0
Vic 14.52 13.26 9.6
Qld 14.34 14.00 2.4
WA 14.16 13.31 6.4
SA 13.30 13.93 -4.5
Tas 14.20 13.30 6.7
ACT 15.22 13.30 14.4
NT 12.80 13.30 -3.8
Source: Department of Health and Family Services.
In regard to this second issue concerning wage differentials within the acute sector,
the evidence is mixed. The ANF (SA Branch) indicated that in the early 1990s there
were nationally consistent wage rates both for registered nurses and enrolled nurses
(except for New South Wales). It stated that all States and Territories have achieved
‘similar order increases’ in the public (acute) sector since then as a consequence of
enterprise bargaining agreements (sub. D102, pp. 7–8). Information from Aged Care
Australia, however, suggests that the gap may have widened over the three year
period from 1994 to 1996.
The impact of enterprise bargaining
In looking at future trends in wage costs, a relevant factor is the likely extent of
productivity-based wage increases. If a wage increase in a particular jurisdiction is
matched by a productivity increase, then the disparity in wage rates between
jurisdictions resulting from that wage increase is not relevant in considering whether
to differentiate subsidies in terms of total output costs.
At present, the scope of over-award payments in the non-government sector appears
limited. The Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry, for
instance, reported the results of a survey of more than 150 Victorian residential aged




Further, many participants considered that the scope for significant productivity
improvements in the residential aged care sector was minimal. For example, Aged
Care Australia (sub. 26, p. 11) indicated that ‘the opportunities for productivity
gains by nursing homes through enterprise bargaining or through the substitution of
labour inputs with equipment are extremely limited’. This is due to:
the nature of the industry, quality care standards, the high level of productivity and staff
flexibility that already exists, and insufficient funding or productivity gains to offset
further changes in working conditions. (Sub. 26, p. 11)
Some participants indicated that previous SAM funding, which had applied for
about 10 years, had driven improved productivity in the non-labour areas. They
went on to argue that the scope for further productivity gain is therefore minimal.
These views were not universal, with some participants pointing to enterprise based
negotiations that will lead to potentially significant improvements in productivity.
Box 5.2 summarises TriCare’s experience with enterprise bargaining, where cost
offsets and productivity improvements helped to fund an increase in wages.
Box 5.2 TriCare’s recent enterprise agreement
• Conditions of employment throughout TriCare have been standardised:
– Permanent nursing staff who work regular shifts without rotation lose a week’s
annual leave. The reduction to four weeks attains consistency with other
categories of staff.
– Sick leave entitlements have been reduced from 10 to 8 days per annum for all
staff.
– Penalty rates for Sundays have been reduced from 175 per cent to 150 per
cent.
– Night shift penalties now apply only to actual hours worked rather than starting
time.
– Seniority based progression has been abolished in favour of competency
based progression.
• Demarcations which prohibit the efficient delivery of care and service to residents
have been abolished. Staff must now perform any task within their range of
competency.
• The team based structure inherent in TriCare’s best practice program has been
enshrined as the core unit of workplace activity and review.
• The new wage increase amounts to 3.6 per cent over two years. A CPI adjustment
will follow after a year.
Source: TriCare 1998, pp. 14–15.74 NURSING HOME
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Some participants expressed doubt over whether these types of tradeoff reflect true
productivity gains. For example, the Australian Nursing Federation (SA Branch)
noted that:
Wage increases appear to be totally or substantially funded through cutting of other
conditions of employment.  This is at odds with the objective of sustainable
improvement to real efficiency or productivity and is instead a short term negative cost
cutting approach ... (Sub. D102, p. 5).
Nevertheless, TriCare’s agreement demonstrates that it is possible to undertake
enterprise bargaining within the nursing home sector. Enterprise bargaining can lead
to less rigid employment conditions and flexibility in improving quality care.
5.5 Relationship between standardised costs and
current subsidies
Relating standardised labour costs to existing subsidy levels gives an indication of
the inequity in the current funding arrangements. Some caution is needed in such
comparisons because most residents pay a flat dollar charge, irrespective of
location, therefore existing subsidies relate to less than 100 per cent of the cost of
providing care. This means that a given variation in total costs requires a somewhat
larger variation in subsidy rates to fully compensate. Even so, it is clear that
standardised costs and existing subsidies are very much out of line.
Using Aged Care Australia’s standardised costings, a comparison between
standardised costs and subsidies is made in table 5.13. Two results stand out:
• the range of variation in subsidies (22 per cent) is much greater than the range of
variation in standardised labour costs (6 per cent); and
• the state ordering is very different. All States, except for Queensland and South
Australia, rank higher (or equal) in terms of subsidy order than they do in terms
of costs. In contrast, providers in Queensland and South Australia receive the
lowest subsidies although they appear to have the highest (or near highest)
standardised costs.
Using TriCare’s data, Queensland’s ranking on the subsidy scale would again be
much lower than its position on the standardised cost scale. TriCare’s data would
also place the Northern Territory and possibly New South Wales in the
‘disadvantaged’ category. The cost ranking of South Australia in TriCare’s




Table 5.13 Comparison of standardised costs with subsidy
Using ACA’s data, and RCS 1 subsidy rates






WA 100.00 Vic 100.00 Qld 100
Vic 102.33 WA 100.70 SA 108
NSW 103.17 NSW 100.89 WA, ACT 111
Qld 104.02 Qld 102.34 NSW 116
Tas 104.19 SA 105.76 NT 118
SA 105.27 Tas 105.88 Vic 121
Tas 122
Source: Derived from above tables, and subsidy rates.
5.6 Conclusion
There are considerable uncertainties and caveats in the cost data available to the
Commission.
Nonetheless, the Commission considers that regional variations in the standardised
cost of delivering nursing home care are significantly smaller than the current
jurisdictional differences in subsidy rates.
Moreover, the correlation between the state and territory ordering of the current
subsidy scale and the ordering of standardised cost is poor. In particular, all
standardised cost comparisons show Queensland to be particularly disadvantaged.
Even if a regionally differentiated subsidy regime is to be retained, the current




6 Should coalescence proceed?
The choice between nationally uniform and regionally differentiated basic subsidies
rests primarily on the significance of regional differences in the prices of inputs for
the production of a benchmark standard of care. The narrower the regional
dispersion in input prices, the stronger the case for nationally uniform rates, with
supplementary funding for services in high cost regions.
Additional arguments advanced in favour of nationally uniform subsidies include
that they would:
• obviate the need to set and process regional subsidy rates;
• discourage significant movements in the input costs of any one jurisdiction; and
• enable integration of the subsidy regime for high care residents with the uniform
regime applying to low care residents.
The potential savings from not having to set and process regional subsidy rates are
likely to be relatively small. For example, a nationally uniform subsidy regime
would not obviate the need to assess the industry’s cost base on a regional basis
from time to time to ensure that government funding in combination with resident
charges was sufficient to support the benchmark standard of care. Also, it would not
remove the need for an indexation arrangement that provided for some link between
funding levels and temporal movements in the industry’s costs.
6.1 The merits of a uniform basic subsidy
The cost data in the previous chapter are not conclusive. The estimates of
differences in standardised costs vary considerably, the rankings of some States and
Territories vary, and the estimates are sensitive to the underlying assumptions.
Given these uncertainties, the Commission considered the option of applying a
percentage-based regime which would see the Government meeting a fixed
percentage of the cost incurred by a home in providing care services. Residents
would then meet the percentage balance of the cost.
A percentage-based regime would automatically differentiate subsidies across
providers and regions on the basis of even very small differences in the total cost of78 NURSING HOME
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providing care. Thus, at least in its pure form, it would remove the need for the
detailed cost calculations necessary under either a regionally differentiated or
uniform dollar subsidy regime.
But the Commission concluded that this alternative approach would be impractical,
and unacceptable — a view shared by most participants who commented on the
approach. For example, it would be likely to reduce the pressure on providers to
deliver services cost effectively. It would also mean that, for the same standard of
care, low income residents in a high cost location would pay higher fees than low
income residents in a cheaper location.
Despite the uncertainties, the available data suggest that the choice between
nationally uniform and regionally differentiated subsidies is finely balanced. On the
one hand, cost variations do not appear all that large. On the other hand, however,
several participants noted that a continuing unfunded cost penalty of even a few
percentage points can be significant for home viability.
In broad terms, the current cost situation can be summarised in the following way.
• The standardised cost comparisons show jurisdictional variations in labour costs
of up to 11 per cent. However, the broadest set of comparisons (from Aged Care
Australia) suggests a much smaller variation of 4 to 6 per cent, or 2 to 3 per cent
either side of the national average.
• While there may be some regional differences in wage costs within jurisdictions,
there was no evidence provided to suggest that these are generally significant in
total cost terms. (However, as discussed later, providers running small homes in
rural and remote areas have higher recruitment, retention and training costs, and
are required to undertake a range of additional functions, the costs of which are
not reflected in these types of comparisons.)
• Non-wage recurrent costs vary across regions, but are a relatively small part of
the overall cost of providing care.
• Land and building costs vary significantly across Australia. However, the
Commission notes that the need to reflect differences in these costs in the basic
subsidy depends on the nature of the resident charging regime. As Aged Care
Australia (sub. 26, p. 14) and others pointed out, if accommodation bonds were
reinstituted for high care residents, then the need to allow for these sources of
cost difference would be reduced. As an example, a home located in a high land
or building cost area would have greater capacity to raise revenue through
accommodation bonds for residents who had lived in the area, than a home




However, in assessing the merits of uniform basic subsidies, it is also necessary to
consider likely future trends in cost variation. This is particularly important in
relation to labour costs — the major cost driver in the nursing home sector.
Assessing trends in labour costs is complicated by the fact that comparisons at any
point in time are sensitive to the stage of wage negotiations in particular
jurisdictions. Accordingly, there will be fluctuations in the spread of labour costs as
well as differences in jurisdictional rankings over time.
As discussed in chapter 5, there is conflicting evidence on whether or not the longer
term trend has been for a narrowing of jurisdictional differences in wage costs for
nursing staff. The key issue, though, is whether jurisdictional differences in wages
are likely to narrow (or widen) in future. A number of factors are relevant,
including:
• the extent of productivity-based enterprise bargaining;
• the influence of the subsidy regime for residential aged care; and
• the relationship between nurses wages in the residential aged care sector and in
the acute (public hospital) sector, and the relativities between jurisdictions in
acute sector wages.
While greater uptake of enterprise bargaining could lead to some increase in wage
rate differentials, such increases would be offset (at least in part) by productivity
improvements. Without such offsets, there would be little incentive for employers to
deviate from awards. Against this background, the underlying differential in overall
labour costs (adjusted for productivity change) is more likely to narrow further in
the future than to increase.
The current variations in wage rates presumably partly reflect the current
differences in jurisdictional subsidy rates. In other words, the current subsidy
regime may underpin some of the observed difference in wage rates, as noted by the
ANF (SA Branch) for example. On that premise, a move to nationally uniform basic
subsidies could tend, over time, to bring about a reduction in wage differentials.
Many participants argued that wage increases for nurses in the acute (public
hospital) sector create strong pressures for similar increases in residential aged care.
Thus, under an indexation regime more closely related to actual price movements,
an important influence on the differential between jurisdictional wages for
residential aged care nurses could be the differential between wages in the acute
sector. Although May 1998 data supplied by the DHFS indicate the range of wages
in the acute sector is greater than in non-government nursing homes, the important
issue is how acute sector wages will compare in future. However, as noted in80 NURSING HOME
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chapter 5, here the evidence is mixed also about whether jurisdictional differences
are narrowing.
Evidence presented during the inquiry suggested that the financial performance of
providers varies within each particular jurisdiction. The less ‘efficient’ providers
will be under greater financial pressure than the more efficient, irrespective of
whether there are jurisdictionally based subsidies or not.
Further, with jurisdictionally based subsidies all providers in those jurisdictions
which have below average standardised costs would receive lower subsidies than
under uniform subsidies, while all those in jurisdictions with above average costs
would receive more. Thus, jurisdictional subsidies would not advantage all
providers facing financial difficulty — some would be better off, and some less well
off, than under nationally uniform subsidies.
In summary, the current variation in standardised costs between jurisdictions is
relatively small, and the current case for continuing to differentiate basic subsidies
is not compelling. However, future cost trends are uncertain, and thus cost
differentials between jurisdictions would need to be monitored.
On the basis of the information available to it, the Commission’s view is that an
approach based on nationally uniform basic subsidies should be adopted. However,
there are two important provisos:
• there must be adequate additional ‘special needs’ funding to ensure equitable
access to services in some particular circumstances, for example in rural and
remote regions where costs are significantly higher than average; and
• the extent of dispersion in costs across Australia must be monitored. If the
dispersion in standardised costs across or within jurisdictions were to increase
significantly, then the nationally uniform approach should be reassessed.
A nationally uniform basic subsidy itself could bring about some realignment of
jurisdictional costs — so time is needed for this to occur. Thus, reassessment of the
case for separate jurisdictional subsidies should not be done every year, but could





6.2 Should the announced coalescence arrangements
proceed?
While giving qualified support for nationally uniform basic subsidies, the
Commission does not endorse the current coalescence proposal. It sees this as being
deficient in several important respects.
First, the national subsidy rates that would emerge from the current proposal are
simply an (indexed) average of the current state based subsidies, not linked
transparently to the cost of providing a benchmark standard of care.
Second, the indexing arrangements that would continue to apply under the
coalesced regime are deficient in that they are not directly related to movements in
industry-specific costs. The COPO index used to increase subsidies since 1996 is
premised on the view that virtually all wage increases are productivity based.
Hence, it only makes provision for safety net increases in wages (and for economy-
wide movements in non-wage costs).
While there is clearly some scope for productivity-related wage deals in the nursing
home sector, as noted above, wage costs are fundamentally influenced by pay
outcomes for nurses in the acute care sector. Wage increases in that sector
inevitably create pressure for increases in the nursing home sector, irrespective of
whether productivity offsets are available. The fact that a number (but by no means
all) in the nursing profession consider the aged care sector to be ‘less attractive’
than the acute sector, only adds to the pressure to closely match wage increases so
as to attract and retain staff. In these circumstances, if equitable access to quality
care is to be maintained over time, indexing must clearly reflect movements in
nursing home costs.
Moreover, funding methodology should build in periodic reviews of changes in the
nature of residential aged care and the expectations of residents. Examples include
the need to make provision for the purchase of improved incontinence aids, and for
the lower number of beds per room that will be required as accreditation and
certification progresses.
Finally, the Commission considers that current special needs funding arrangements
are inadequate. Payments under the viability supplement ($6 million a year),
together with capital support for remote area services ($10 million a year) account
for only around one-half of one per cent of total Commonwealth support for
residential aged care. Apart from the intrinsic cost disadvantages that come from
smallness and remoteness, some of these services must undertake a wider range of82 NURSING HOME
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functions than services in the major population centres. The current subsidy regime
makes little or no allowance for the costs of these extra functions.
A move to nationally uniform basic subsidies which does not address these types of
deficiencies would lead to inappropriate and inequitable outcomes. The next chapter
spells out changes that should be made to the broader subsidy framework as a
precursor to implementing uniform basic subsidies.
Recommendation 1: The Commonwealth Government should adopt nationally
uniform basic subsidies (that is, a separate nationally uniform basic subsidy for
each RCS category) for high care residents, as part of a package of changes to
address deficiencies in the current subsidy arrangements.AN ALTERNATIVE
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7 An alternative uniform regime
7.1 Introduction
When measured against the assessment criteria spelt out in chapter 4, the
Commission has concluded that the current coalescence proposal should not
proceed. While a move to a nationally uniform basic subsidy regime is supported
given the current fairly limited dispersion in the standardised costs of providing
care, there are broader shortcomings in the current subsidy arrangements. The need
to consider the coalescence issue in this wider context was an important message in
many submissions.
This chapter spells out a subsidy framework which would address these deficiencies
while moving to a nationally uniform basic subsidy regime. This approach is
consistent with the terms of reference which ask the Commission to report on
whether the proposed coalescence of basic subsidy rates should be replaced by an
alternative funding structure.
At the outset, the Commission wishes to emphasise some important aspects of its
subsidy proposal.
• The arrangements could apply to all those in residential aged care, rather than
just high care residents, and irrespective of whether they lived in a hostel or a
nursing home. The subsidy design principles outlined earlier in the paper are no
less relevant to low care residents than to high care residents.
• To complement the basic subsidy regime, there would be an augmented role for
special needs funding which would replace the current viability supplement.
Such funding would provide additional support to services facing special cost
circumstances, particularly in rural and remote areas.
• The basic subsidy regime would not make provision for the higher unit costs of
small facilities as such. Where higher funding for small services is warranted, it
would come through special needs funding. Also, the basic subsidy would not
differentiate between homes on the basis of ownership.
• While the proposal is premised on there being nationally uniform basic subsidy
rates (based on the currently available information on the dispersion in costs), all
other recommendations would apply equally to a regionally differentiated
regime, if a subsequent assessment of the cost base (see below) were to reveal84 NURSING HOME
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wider dispersion in standardised costs and a case for retaining or reinstating
regional subsidies.
In developing its subsidy proposal, the Commission has not specified detailed
subsidy rates, detailed eligibility criteria for access to special needs funding and the
like. There are a number of reasons for this.
The Commission is seeking to focus attention on the key principles underlying its
proposal. Moreover, the specific subsidy rates would depend crucially on the
Government’s preferred outcomes by way of the benchmark standard of care. Many
participants claimed that the current level of funding is inadequate, especially in the
context of the quality of care that the Commonwealth is pursuing through
accreditation and certification. Other evidence suggests that current funding can
provide an adequate return to providers, with some being willing to pay substantial
amounts for bed licences. Reconciliation of this tension through the current
Residential Aged Care Review would be necessary before subsidy rates under the
Commission’s regime could be struck.
Some of the changes canvassed by the Commission are beyond the direct purview of
this inquiry. Further assessment of the merits of these proposed changes as part of
the Residential Aged Care Review may also be appropriate.
Finally, there will be costs in implementing the Commission’s preferred funding
methodology. Thus, there is merit in awaiting the Government’s decisions on the
Commission’s recommendations before the detailed implementation work is
commenced.
7.2 The benchmark standard of care
A deficiency in the current coalescence proposal is that the national subsidy rates
which would emerge are not linked transparently to the cost of providing a
benchmark standard of care. In effect, the quality of care could become a residual
balancing item, irrespective of the accreditation, certification and other regulations
aimed at promoting quality care. Quality care is central to the well-being of nursing
home residents, and the standard of care supported should be a conscious and
transparent decision.
Accordingly, the starting point for the Commission’s proposed regime is explicit
specification of desired outcomes by the Commonwealth in terms of the standard of
care benchmark it wishes to support. In its position paper, the Commission observed
that this has effectively been achieved by the Government through the newAN ALTERNATIVE
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accreditation and certification requirements (see box 7.1) in combination with the
objectives set out in the Aged Care Act 1997.
Box 7.1 Certification and accreditation
Certification
Under the Aged Care Act 1997, certified residential aged care services which meet
specified building and care standards may ask residents to make accommodation
payments and/or receive concessional resident supplements. However, certification is
not mandatory. In the medium term, the focus of certification requirements will be on
improving fire safety. In the longer term, improving privacy and space for residents will
be the major goal.
Accreditation
To continue to receive Commonwealth funding after January 2001, services must be
accredited. To obtain accreditation, services must meet the legislative requirements of
the Aged Care Act 1997 and be providing high quality care within a framework of
continuous improvement. More specifically, a service must meet the Accreditation
Standards which incorporate the Residential Care Standards, the building and care
standards required for certification, and a Management Systems, Staffing and
Organisational Development Standard. These incorporate an ethos of continuous
improvement.
The Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency will manage the accreditation
system and carry out regular supervision of services. Up until 2001, it will be up to
each service to decide when to apply for accreditation. Accreditation will be for a
period of up to three years, depending on the overall assessment of a service’s
performance against the standards. Services will then need to re-apply for
accreditation.
A service does not have to be certified to meet accreditation requirements, but it does
need to meet the relevant building standards.
Source: DHFS (1997a), DHFS Service Provider Newsletter No. 2.
Most participants supported the principle of explicitly stating the standard of care
required, but some expressed qualifications about the use of accreditation as the
benchmark. For example, Resthaven noted that accreditation outcomes will be
reported as ‘commendable’ or ‘satisfactory’ for three year accreditation,
‘unsatisfactory’ for one year accreditation, and ‘critical’ with no accreditation. It
commented that accreditation and certification may involve ‘outcomes more
divergent’ than the Commission’s position paper assumed (sub. D72, p. 2). Aged
Care Australia considered that a ‘satisfactory outcome’ for each of the four
accreditation standards would be the minimum requirement along with a
‘satisfactory’ certification pass-mark (sub. D77, p. 5).86 NURSING HOME
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The Aged Services Association of NSW & ACT presented information about a
national project to develop a ‘first generation’ set of financial, organisational and
quality ‘benchmarks’. It commented that:
Because of the complex relationships between minimum standards of care, quality care
(‘best practice’) and financial viability, there is currently no unanimity as to what are the
best indicators. (Sub. D67, p. 2)
The Commission accepts that some rule such as that suggested by Aged Care
Australia would be needed if accreditation is to serve as the specification of the
benchmark standard of care. With this qualification, it is clear that accreditation
could serve to specify the care standards required by the Government — in any
case, a more satisfactory specification does not appear to be currently available.
Recommendation 2: The Government should specify its intended outcomes in
terms of a standard of care benchmark. The purchase price of care outputs from
providers by way of subsidy funding, in combination with funding from residents,
should be adequate to meet the cost of providing that benchmark standard of
care.
The underlying cost base
In basing funding on a standard of care benchmark, it is necessary to decide on
which costs would be included, and which excluded, from the standardised model.
In the Commission’s view, the Commonwealth should not support costs associated
with the provision of a higher standard of care than that required under its quality
benchmark. For example, the Commission would not propose indefinite support for
the higher nurse ratios required in Victoria under the relevant award. As ANHECA -
SA (sub. 21, p. 5) noted, if a particular State wishes to impose higher quality
requirements on its providers, then it should meet the resulting costs.
In the position paper, the Commission proposed that basic (uniform) subsidy rates
should be linked to the cost of providing the benchmark level of care in an efficient
sized facility using an average input mix. It was proposed that the average cost base
should include the costs of workers compensation premiums, and that the industry
cost base should reflect nursing wage rates and conditions applicable in the aged
care sector rather than in the acute care sector.
While some participants supported these proposals, many participants had
significant concerns, or requested the Commission to provide greater details about
how they would operate in practice. These issues are dealt with immediately below,




As foreshadowed in chapter 4, there is a tradeoff to be made in determining the
broad size of home which the basic subsidy regime is based on.
• Setting a low home size would add to overall subsidy costs because of the
proportionately higher costs incurred by small homes. It would provide higher
than necessary subsidies to the larger, relatively lower cost, homes. Further, it
would impede the rationalisation necessary in the sector. Although the number of
facilities with less than 25 beds fell by more than 40 per cent between 1992 and
1997, the median size remains at around 40 beds and the mean at around 50.
• Setting a higher home size, say at the 60 bed level which a number of
participants suggested now constitutes minimum efficient scale, would reduce
overall subsidy costs. Although it would reduce the level of over subsidisation to
larger homes, it could adversely affect smaller homes which currently provide a
good level of care and which were established when smaller homes were more
favourably looked on by the Government. For instance, the Australian Nursing
Federation (Federal Office) commented that in the 1980s large facilities had
been broken up into 30-bed homes to conform with government policy
(transcript, p. 198). Aged Care Australia also referred to existing homes
established under government policies which ‘favoured small home-like
environments’ (sub. D77, p. 8). The Ainslie House Association said that it had
been ‘forced’ to reduce bed numbers by 11 to receive Commonwealth capital
funding for its new home (sub. D98, p. 1). According to Geriaction, any strategy
which actively encouraged the demise of smaller homes would ‘contradict the
philosophy of care espoused by government which is to allow “ageing in place”’
(sub. D99, p. 3).
Irrespective of the range of home sizes chosen to set the cost base, the Commission
is not proposing that smaller centres be necessarily closed, rather that all homes be
efficiently run. In addition, in rural and more remote areas, where there is limited
scope for rationalisation to achieve economies of scale, ongoing additional support
for small facilities may well be warranted on equity grounds. The need to target this
component of support dictates that it is best handled through the special needs
funding pool.
On balance, the Commission considers that subsidy levels should be set initially on
the basis of the input structures that embrace the average sized homes together with
ones of greater size — a range of homes from, say, 40 to 60 beds — rather than
focus on the higher level of 60 beds proposed in the position paper. Over time, the
mean number of beds would increase as smaller homes are amalgamated or closed,
and there are fewer remaining very large homes to be broken up.88 NURSING HOME
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Level of costs
A related question is whether, for the representative facility sizes used in the
standardisation exercise, the cost base should reflect the input structures of the
‘average’ provider or those of the most efficient provider. In other words, should
standardised cost calculations reflect typical staffing profiles and average usage of
non-labour inputs, or industry best practice? Participants indicated that there is
considerable variation in efficiency in the sector.
The use of best practice input structures would be appropriate if the sole objective
was to improve the efficiency of service delivery. Such an approach would increase
the pressure on less efficient operators to improve their performance and minimise
windfall gains for more efficient operators able to supply services at below the
benchmark cost.
However, too much short term emphasis on efficiency could cause significant
dislocation and put some residents at risk. In the first instance, inefficient providers
might try to offset their higher costs by running down the quality of care provided.
On the assumption that the accreditation and certification requirements set a floor
on such behaviour, the capacity of some to stay in operation would be under threat.
While more efficient operators could move in to take their place, extensive
rationalisation over a short period would entail disruption for a large number of
residents at a time when they are frail and their families and other carers are also in
need of support.
Here, again, there is no ‘correct’ answer. On balance, the Commission sees
subsidies based on the ‘average’ cost of providing the benchmark level of care in a
range of ‘efficient’ (that is well-run) homes as an appropriate compromise between
pursuing best practice delivery and safeguarding the welfare of residents.
Calculation of such an average should exclude, of course, smaller higher cost homes
in rural and regional areas.
With subsidies based on average costs, providers using a more expensive mix of
inputs would still face pressure to improve their efficiency or exit the industry. Over
time, this would put downward pressure on the ‘average’ benchmark cost. Indeed, it
is important that the indexation arrangements ensure that these effects occur (see
below).
Nurse wages
Another cost base issue raised by many participants was how nursing labour should
be priced in determining the base. Their concern was to ensure that the aged careAN ALTERNATIVE
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sector is not disadvantaged in competing for nursing staff. Participants indicated that
there were growing difficulties in particular jurisdictions in attracting nursing staff
into the sector, because their wages and conditions were significantly below those in
the acute sector. ANHECA, for example, stated that:
Without wages parity for nursing staff between the acute and aged care sectors nursing
homes will find it increasingly difficult and eventually impossible to attract and maintain
good nursing staff. This will result in a decrease in standards or a further erosion of
staffing levels with over award payments being compensated by a decrease in staffing
levels. (Sub. D84, p. 5)
Hence many participants, including for example the Australian Nursing Federation
(SA Branch), recommended adoption of ‘a base subsidy rate for nursing and
personal care immediately based on parity with nurses wages in the acute public
sector’ (sub. 11, p. 16).
The link between wages for nurses in the acute care and aged care sectors is not in
dispute (see chapters 5 and 6), nor does the Commission have a view on whether
wages in the aged care sector should be below or equal to those in the acute care
sector. The Commission does acknowledge that the level of subsidy paid to nursing
homes has an important influence on the wages they can pay. In turn, under the
Commission’s proposals for a revised indexation system which would more closely
reflect the sector’s costs than the current system (see below), changes in wages paid
in the sector would be factored into the subsidy. The issues are: should subsidy
changes lead or lag wage outcomes; and should the extent to which indexation
reflects wage increases be limited?
The Commission considers that it would be unreasonable to ask taxpayers to fund a
one-off increase in subsidies in the expectation that the increase would
automatically flow through into increased wages for nurses leading directly to
improved quality of care. There would be too much uncertainty: the wage increases
could be delayed, funding could be diverted by providers into other areas of
recurrent expenditure or into capital works, or even into higher profits. There would
be little incentive to challenge wage claims, or to strive for productivity gain.
Further, it could discourage enterprise bargains tailored to the specific requirements
of the aged care sector.
The Commission considers that adjustments in subsidies should lag rather than lead
wage outcomes. In addition, under a nationally uniform subsidy regime, those
adjustments would reflect the national average change in wages, rather than the
change in any particular jurisdiction. This would provide greater incentives to
providers to control cost increases than would jurisdictionally based subsidies, as90 NURSING HOME
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only a proportion of an above average cost increase would index through into the
national average subsidy.
Nevertheless, under the Commission’s proposed indexation, the incentives for
providers to challenge wage claims would be reduced because the costs could be
passed through to the Commonwealth, albeit with some lag. Thus, without some
form of control, nurses wages in the aged care sector could ultimately exceed those
in the acute sector. For this reason, the Commission considers that when the
Commonwealth determines its purchase price for outputs, the basic subsidy rates
should reflect nursing wages and conditions in the aged care sector only to the
extent that these do not exceed those applying in the acute care sector.
Deriving the cost base
In the position paper, the Commission commented that the cost base could be set on
the basis of a survey, or alternatively by a joint industry and government panel of
experts. The work would aim to define a standardised bundle of inputs, reflecting
the agreed home size and cost basis, which could deliver the standard of care
required to meet accreditation.
As Aged Care Australia commented, however, ‘it is imperative that these inputs do
not become prescriptive’ (sub. D77, p. 7). The Commission agrees. The bundle
would be used merely to derive the cost base, and individual homes would be free to
use whatever input mix they considered necessary to meet the benchmark standard
of care. The Commission does not support the call of some participants to
reintroduce some elements of the previous acquittal system (see below).
A central point about this method for deriving a cost base is that it has been proven
before. For example:
• cost data together with expert advice were used to develop CAM (differing
between care levels);
• the RCS itself implicitly matches subsidy relativities and categories of care need;
and
• the development of casemix in the hospital system relies on cost data and
relativities.
The exercise could be based on the allowable input structures of a representative
sample of efficient homes of relevant size, which already meet accreditation
standards (if that were chosen as the quality benchmark) and whose resident mix
approximates the average mix Australia-wide. A standardised input structure could
be developed which reflects the average input structure of those homes. This wouldAN ALTERNATIVE
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then be costed on the basis of the average of the prices faced by homes in different
regions. At this stage, a final decision could be made on whether the extent of cost
variation justified regionally differentiated subsidies or not. Total funding would be
set at a level which was adequate to meet the benchmark level of care. RCS subsidy
relativities could continue to be used to apportion the subsidy between residents
with different care needs.
The Commission notes that, even with revised indexation arrangements (see below),
there would still be a need to periodically review the industry’s cost base. Changes
in the care environment would be relevant in such a review, such as if the
Commonwealth were to mandate a higher level of care, or if innovations — such as
improved incontinence aids — changed the cost of providing an ‘acceptable’
standard of care. The Commission considers that cost assessments should be
undertaken every five years, transparently and independently of Government, in the
context of a broad industry review.
Recommendation 3: As a basis for setting the output purchase price, the
Government should arrange for a five yearly assessment of the jurisdictional and
national average input costs of providing the benchmark level of care using a
standardised input mix averaged across a range of efficient facilities (with, say,
40 to 60 beds). These assessments should be set in a broad context taking into
account any changes in the residential aged care benchmark and in care
expectations, and re-examining the case for nationally uniform basic subsidies.
The reviews should be conducted transparently and independently of
Government.
Recommendation 4: Basic subsidy rates should reflect nursing wage rates and
conditions applicable in the aged care sector, but only to the extent that these do
not exceed the rates and conditions applying in the acute care sector.
Funding adequacy
A dominant theme in many submissions from providers was that an
accreditation/certification standard would be higher than the standard of care
currently delivered by many in the sector. They considered that, with current levels
of government funding, and without significant increases in resident charges, they
would find it difficult to meet the standard of care required to achieve accreditation
and certification. Indeed, many claimed to be experiencing viability problems at the
current quality level.
Some of their concerns related to the impact of the new requirements on recurrent
costs. For example, Aged Services Association of NSW & ACT (sub. 35, p. 31)92 NURSING HOME
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suggested that, by 2008, facilities will potentially have to be twice the physical size
as at present to meet certification requirements in relation to residents per room, and
that this will have a significant impact on operating costs. Lucan Care (sub. 1, p. 2)
said that utility, maintenance and cleaning costs increase by nearly 30 per cent in
single bed wards, with the cost of personal care increasing by around 15 per cent.
There were also concerns about the additional licensing and administrative costs of
achieving and maintaining accreditation status.
However, the greatest concern related to the capital costs of meeting the new
standards and of building new nursing homes, particularly given the limited
availability of accommodation bonds.
The Tasmanian Department of Health and Human Services noted that small rural
facilities in that State are in need of ‘significant’ upgrading (between about $1.5
million and $2 million per site) to meet certification (sub. D100, p. 2). Many
participants contended that the Government’s decision not to implement
accommodation bonds for nursing home residents will leave the sector starved of
investment capital. Most suggested that income from accommodation charges and
the concessional resident supplement will be nowhere near sufficient to meet the
investment gap. In this regard, Sundale Garden Village commented:
The measures in place to deliver capital for infrastructure will not deliver sufficient funds
for many years hence. If the Government is so convinced that their figures are correct,
then they should be prepared to fund the capital investment and take the income from
the accommodation charges in repayment. (Sub. 16, p. 17)
A number of participants provided ‘ball-park’ estimates of the funding gap. For
example, Baptist Care - WA estimated that, across Australia, an extra $1 billion
would be required to bring the existing stock up to standard (sub. 5, p. 10).
Estimating the extent of any capital funding shortfall goes well beyond the scope of
this inquiry. Nonetheless, the Commission observes that some investment in
facilities that will comply with the new standards is occurring under the current
subsidy regime. Moreover, there is evidence of significant interest from potential
investors in the sector. DHFS argued:
recent planning rounds indicate record levels of interest from prospective providers in
entering the sector or expanding the size of their existing services. The market value of
places — a good indicator of confidence — has also increased since the reforms.
(Sub. 52, p. 22)
In contrast, Aged Care Queensland suggested that prices for bed licences had fallen
substantially over the last two years, and that such prices are not necessarily an
indicator of the health of the residential aged care sector: ‘it may well be an
indicator of the speculators who are coming in or their lack of experience in prices’AN ALTERNATIVE
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(transcript p. 102). Nevertheless, the substantial prices paid for bed licences do not
sit comfortably with the view that there is a funding crisis in the sector. Similarly,
the Commission notes that many homes, private-for-profit and non-profit alike, are
producing operating surpluses under current subsidy levels, even in the lowest
subsidy State of Queensland.
The nexus between care standards and funding is not clear cut, especially in the
shorter term. Although accreditation is based on continuous improvement, this will
not necessarily add significantly to costs of providing residential aged care, if
improvements can be made by using current resources more effectively and
efficiently. In addition, not all the extra costs associated with accreditation will
necessarily be incurred in the near future: for example, some of the new building
requirements do not come into effect until 2008.
The terms of reference for the Residential Aged Care Review direct it, amongst
other things, to examine the adequacy of subsidy rates. That review is therefore the
appropriate forum for resolving whether the current quantum of Commonwealth
support for residential aged care is compatible with the standard of care required to
meet the accreditation and certification requirements (see recommendation 17).
7.3 Relating subsidies to the care needs of individual
residents
Under the present regime, the Resident Classification Scale (RCS) is the instrument
for relating subsidies to the care needs of individual residents and thus to the
circumstances of individual aged care facilities. The system, which has been in
operation since October 1997, replaced separate classification instruments for the
nursing home and hostel sectors.
A significant number of participants raised concerns about the detailed operation of
the RCS. Some of these related to the administration of the system, some to the
adequacy of the subsidy rates specified for the various classification scales, and
some to the subsidy relativities between the scales.
On the other hand, there was support from Aged Care Australia and others for
persisting with the new RCS.
Like the quantum of funding issue, possible changes to the RCS approach go
beyond the scope of this inquiry. In any event, as the new scales have only been in
operation for little more than a year, it would be premature to contemplate
significant changes at this stage. This is particularly the case as the Centre for94 NURSING HOME
SUBSIDIES
International Economics has recently undertaken a review of the scales and made a
number of ‘fine tuning’ recommendations to the Government (DHFS 1998b).
A few participants suggested variations to the present system of funding based on
the care needs of individual residents. These are described in chapter 8.
Another concern is that under the present arrangements, a person can only be
admitted to residential aged care after an ACAT assessment team classifies the
person as needing high care or low care. Several participants commented on the
adverse effects on nursing home providers where people admitted on the basis of an
ACAT high care assessment are subsequently reappraised as low care under the
RCS (ie to classifications 5 to 8). Similar losses of income can occur when a pre-
October 1997 resident, considered high care under the previous classification
system, is reclassified as low care under the RCS. According to ANHECA:
Not only does the provider lose subsidy, which in some cases and in some small way can
be overcome by roster variations, he/she also loses the payroll tax supplements for those
residents [as payroll tax supplement is only provided in respect of high care residents].
(Sub. D84, p. 12)
Some participants considered that part of the difficulty arises from the fact that the
ACAT team often sees the person in an acute phase, but that the person
subsequently responds positively to the regular medication and regular care
provided in the nursing home.
The Commission suggests that the situation be kept under review.
7.4 Indexation of basic subsidy rates
As spelt out in the previous chapter, the current COPO indexation regime is not
based on movements in industry-specific costs. With other sources of income for
providers largely tied, inadequate increases in subsidies after allowing for possible
efficiency improvements will, in one way or another, compromise the delivery of
quality care. As Aged Care Australia put it:
nursing homes will be forced either to reduce the standard of care provided by
employing lower qualified staff or they will progressively become non-viable.
(Sub. 26, p. 15)
Aged Care Australia went on to claim that under-compensation for cost increases
under the indexation formula has cost the industry $128 million in the past three
years. (The Commission notes, however, that many actual costs are linked closely to




In its position paper, the Commission proposed that:
• a revised indexation arrangement should apply. It would not extend to full cost
reimbursement, but would explicitly link increases in subsidy rates to
movements in industry-specific costs;
• a discount would be made to reflect productivity improvement (if any);
• once developed by the ABS, sector specific productivity indexes should be
utilised; and
• pending availability of those indexes, current COPO indexing arrangements
should continue.
Participants supported the proposal to relate indexation more closely to industry
costs. However, although some participants, such as Aged Care Australia and
Sundale Garden Village, gave in-principle support to the notion of a productivity
discount, others expressed strong opposition. ANHECA, for example, considered
that ‘the word “discount” is incorrectly used. This is a levy on industry and simply a
discount for Government’ (sub. D84, p. 6). Others considered the real need was for
additional funding, rather than the removal of funding through productivity
discounting. For instance, in noting that accreditation required continuous
improvement by providers, the Queensland Government commented that:
to have a productivity discount at a time when there’s general acknowledgment that the
level of funding nationally is insufficient is a ... problem. (Transcript, p. 76)
However, it is important to recognise the draw-backs of linking changes in subsidies
too closely to movements in the cost of individual items.
• Relating subsidy increases solely to changes in the unit prices of inputs will
make no allowance for improvements in productivity. Thus, if wage rate
increases are partially paid for through higher labour productivity, increases in
the wage rate component of the subsidy will overstate the increase in overall
labour costs. In this regard, the Department of Finance commented that an
underlying principle of wage cost indexation is that taxpayers should not fund
productivity-based wage increases (sub. 50, p. 2).
• Full compensation for increases in industry costs will greatly reduce incentives
for providers to improve efficiency. For example, there would be little incentive
to challenge wage claims, or to seek improved productivity in return for higher
wage rates. The absence of such incentives has been a problem with previous
indexing arrangements.
Three additional points are relevant. First, as noted in chapter 5, many participants
considered that the scope for productivity gain was minimal in the nursing home96 NURSING HOME
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sector. If this were in fact the case, then any productivity discount should be
minimal. Not all participants shared that view, however. As also noted in chapter 5,
there have been examples of enterprise bargaining encompassing productivity
tradeoffs. Further, the trend towards larger nursing homes where unit costs are
lower, and the scope for making economies through the association of nursing
homes with hostels, provides further evidence of productivity gains.
Second, several participants argued that full discounting of productivity gains would
remove incentives for providers to increase efficiency. For instance, NANHPH
(sub. D 70, p. 4) commented that: ‘what incentives would [there be] for providers if
they were going to get less assistance by being more efficient’? However, as the
discount would relate to the average level of productivity gain, incentives would
certainly remain for providers to do better than average.
Third, in response to the claims for additional funding, the Commission notes that
this issue needs to be addressed in relation to the consideration of overall quantum,
not as part of the indexation arrangements. In this regard, the Commission considers
the question of the $128 million claimed to have been lost over the past three years
through inadequate indexation as a quantum issue also.
Since the position paper was published, the ABS has advised the Commission that it
will not be developing a sector specific productivity index:
The ABS has no plans to undertake productivity analysis, even on an in-house basis, for
components of the health service industry, for example, the nursing home component, as
suitable input measures are not available at a component level. (Sub. D91, p. 2)
There are several possible alternatives to indexation of the subsidy, however. One
approach would be to derive a suitably weighted average measure of wage
movements through annual surveys of the wage rates in each jurisdiction (a move
back, in this regard, towards the previous CAM arrangements). The productivity
discount could be derived from empirical evidence of actual productivity gain. Non-
wage costs could be indexed by the TMUI (Treasury Measure of Underlying
Inflation), as at present.
Another approach to the labour component would be to adopt a readily available
index as a proxy for wage movements in the residential aged care sector. For
example, Aged Care Australia preferred the use of the Wage Cost Index for Health
and Community Services (sub. D77, p. 11). The Australian Nursing Federation (SA
Branch) preferred an index based on AWOTE earnings in the health sector
(sub. D102, p. 13). It would be necessary to determine how closely these indexes
are likely to reflect actual labour cost movements in the residential aged care sector.AN ALTERNATIVE
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Further, in this case, the productivity discount might have to be more ‘arbitrary’ as
direct empirical evidence would not be available.
The Commission has not endeavoured to come to a final conclusion on the most
appropriate indexation methodology, as it is not in a position to assess all the
benefits and costs of the various alternatives within the limits of this current inquiry.
However, in contrast to its approach in the position paper, the Commission
considers that revised indexation arrangements for the subsidy should be introduced
as soon as possible. The Commission suggests that the Government immediately
establish a committee of relevant experts, including sector representation, to decide
on a suitable indexation arrangement in line with the principles established in this
report.
As noted above, the Commission considers that there is a need to periodically
reassess the industry’s cost base, in the context of a broader review which considers
any changes in the residential aged care benchmark and in care expectations. Some
participants were concerned that such a process of review could lead to ‘double
discounting’ of productivity gains. This is not the case, however. Applying a
productivity discount to the yearly indexation of the subsidy would compensate, as
it were, for the fact that the input base is not revised every year. The reassessment
of the industry’s cost base would re-establish the standardised input mix anew
against the then current benchmark standard of care.
The Commission sees the proposal to align indexation more closely with actual
changes in the sector’s costs as being compatible with the Government’s policy on
the indexing of budget outlays for programs of this type. In this regard, the
Department of Health and Family Services commented that the policy allows for
non-standard indexation where this:
is necessarily and explicitly linked to Government’s policy objectives and alternative
indexes comply with certain principles of indexation, most notably that they exclude
productivity based wage increases.
Residential care meets the first of these because it is tied to providing a set standard of
care for residents of different levels of dependency. (Sub. 52, p. 27)
The proposed approach would also enhance the transparency of the indexation
system for all involved in the industry.
Recommendation 5: Basic subsidy rates should be adjusted annually according
to indices which clearly reflect the changes in the average cost of the standardised
input mix, less a discount to reflect changes in productivity. Revised indexation
arrangements should be introduced as soon as possible.98 NURSING HOME
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7.5 Supplements and deductions
Under the Commission’s proposed regime, there would be a continuing role for
supplementary payments. Such payments are a way of supporting care needs not
closely linked to a resident’s classification under the RCS. For instance, not all high
care residents require oxygen treatment. Supplementary payments are also a way of
addressing special cost circumstances which would be difficult to incorporate within
the basic subsidy regime.
There are currently several supplements available:
• pensioner supplement (which replaced the former Residential Care Allowance);





• enteral feeding supplement;
• payroll tax supplement; and
• viability supplement.
In the position paper, the Commission proposed that the pensioner, oxygen, enteral
feeding, respite, and hardship supplements should be retained in their current form
in the new subsidy regime. This proposal was generally supported by participants.
However, there were some queries about the appropriate levels of funding. For
example, the Victorian Healthcare Association considered that the respite
supplement should be set higher than at the current RCS 3 level. There was also
concern about the adequacy of funding to cover all additional areas of particular
need. The Agmaroy Nursing Home stated that:
Currently if a resident requires a prescribed dressing which costs $275 per month, or
dietary supplements which do not fall under the category of enteral feeding, oxygen that
is not delivered other than by a concentrator and continence aids there is no provision in
any of the supplements to cover these extra costs when they are incurred by an
individual who is unable to bear the additional cost. (Sub. D89, p. 2)
In view of these comments, the Commission has modified its preliminary proposal.
Recommendation 6: The pensioner, oxygen, enteral feeding, respite and
hardship supplements should be retained in their current form at this stage. The
rates should be suitably indexed. The appropriateness and adequacy of theseAN ALTERNATIVE
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existing supplements, and the justification for any additional supplements, should
be re-examined in each five yearly assessment of costs.
In the Commission’s view, there are arguments for modifications to the
concessional and payroll tax supplements, as well as a need to replace the viability
supplement with a new and augmented special needs funding pool — see next
section. There is also the question of how best to reimburse workers compensation
premiums and superannuation charges.
The concessional, assisted resident and transitional supplements
The concessional and assisted resident supplements are paid in respect of ‘new’
residents assessed as unable to afford all, or part of, the accommodation charge.
(‘New’ residents are those entering a certified facility after 1 October 1997, or after
the date on which a facility was certified, whichever is the later.) The transitional
supplement is paid in respect of residents who cannot be assessed for eligibility for
the concessional and assisted resident supplements. Essentially, these supplements
substitute for the accommodation charge which is intended to be used for capital
purposes.
The concessional supplement is two-tiered, with the higher rate of $12 (indexed) a
day for eligible residents applying where 40 per cent or more of new residents
qualify as concessional residents. Where the percentage is lower than 40 per cent,
the rate is $7 (indexed) a day. The assisted resident supplement is a flat $3.50
(indexed) a day. Transitional supplement rates of $2 per resident per day apply to
certified nursing homes, and $1.50 to non-certified homes. (There are also separate
arrangements prescribing minimum, regionally-based, ratios of concessional
residents — see section 7.9.)
In the position paper, the Commission invited comment on whether the current two-
tier concessional resident supplement is appropriate, and on the implications of any
changes in the structure of the supplement for the assisted resident and transitional
supplements.
In response, participants raised a number of issues. Some relate mainly to quantum:
the desirability of separately identifying payments for capital purposes; the
withdrawal of $66 million from the existing funding pool to fund these supplements;
and concerns (widespread) about the adequacy of the daily rates to fund the sector’s
capital needs.
In regard to the tiering of the concessional supplement, there is a major
discontinuity in the level of support at the 40 per cent tier. For example, a certified100 NURSING HOME
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100 bed home with 39 new concessional residents would receive a supplement of
around $100 000 a year. Were the home to have 40 new concessional residents, the
payment would rise to around $175 000 a year. The Commission notes that
according to the recent RCS review (DHFS 1998b, p. 19), the average proportion of
concessional residents is about 38 per cent. If this figure is still valid, then the
discontinuity can have real impact, rather than being just theoretical.
Participants generally considered that such a major discontinuity was not justified,
and called for either a sliding scale to be implemented, or for a common rate of
supplement to apply. Aged Care Australia considered that the original rationale for
the tiering — to provide greater support to those facilities unable to achieve levels
of capital funding through accommodation bonds or charges — had been weakened
when the provision to allow accommodation bonds had been replaced by the
maximum $12 per day accommodation charge (sub. D77, p. 20). The Victorian
Healthcare Association considered that the two-tier system may encourage some
homes to ‘discriminate’ against residents able to afford the accommodation charge
(sub. D85, p. 4). In supporting a single rate of payment, the Queensland
Government commented that as the payment was meant for capital purposes, its rate
should not depend on a home’s proportion of concessional residents (transcript
p. 79).
In the Commission’s view, the funding inequity created by the present two-tier
concessional supplement should not be allowed to continue. It effectively
discriminates against non-concessional residents by providing significantly greater
funding at the margin than the accommodation charge of about $12 per day (ie
$4380 per annum) — in the above example, the marginal funding for an extra
concessional resident is about $75 000 per annum.
This inequity could be eliminated by setting a sliding scale of payment increasing
up to $12, or by setting a uniform rate of $12 per resident. Although the uniform
rate approach would have some quantum implications, it would remove one more
layer of regulation and administration. Further, a sliding scale approach is not
necessary to encourage homes to cater for concessional residents as an alternative
mechanism to do so already exists.
The Commission notes that concessional resident ratios (see section 7.9) apply (on a
regional basis) to encourage homes to care for concessional residents. Homes are
required to comply with these minimum ratios and, according to the Residential
Care Manual (DHFS 1997a, p. 6-10), ‘financial sanctions will apply to those
facilities which do not meet the required ratio’. The Commission notes that these
required ratios are generally less than the 40 per cent breakpoint under the
concessional supplement. However, these requirements could be tightened if it wereAN ALTERNATIVE
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considered that the incentives for providers to accept concessional residents were
unduly affected by the removal of the step in the rate of concessional supplement
through a uniform rate. In the Commission’s view, this more direct approach to
ensuring the needs of concessional residents are met would be preferable to the
regulatory impost of a sliding scale subsidy.
Recommendation 7: The concessional supplement should be set at a single
uniform daily rate.
Input tax supplementation
The Commission’s proposals would generally not recognise variations in ownership
structures, except to the extent that they should take account of the ownership
impacts on the price of inputs. Thus, the Commission supports the concept of a
supplement for private providers to offset differential taxes levied on their inputs.
Without such supplementation, the capacity of private homes to provide the same
quality of care as charitable and government homes could be compromised. This
rationale does not extend to supplementation for income tax, which is a tax affecting
the distribution of profit, not a tax affecting the cost of inputs.
At present, such tax supplementation is limited to payroll tax liability. In principle,
it could extend to other input taxes levied on private providers such as fringe
benefits tax, sales tax and land taxes. In the position paper, the Commission
commented that, in practice, however, it is not clear whether these other taxes are
sufficiently significant to justify the additional administrative costs of establishing a
system of supplementation or exemption.
In response, TriCare indicated that its nursing home division incurs about $500 000
annually in sales tax and FBT for purchases related to resident care and
accommodation — equivalent to slightly more than $1 per resident per day
(sub. D78, p. 4). If this is typical of private providers, then the Commission would
not consider the cost sufficiently significant to warrant the administrative burden of
supplementation or exemption.
However, the Commission considers that this issue could be considered further in
conjunction with formulating the arrangements for the nursing home sector in
relation to the proposed GST.
Payroll tax issues
Most participants’ comments on tax supplementation were about specific aspects of
the payroll tax supplement. A number argued that there are major inequities in the102 NURSING HOME
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current structure of the supplement — both across States and Territories and
between small and large homes (see box 7.2). A few canvassed major changes to the
arrangements. For example, ANHECA (sub. 24, p 11) raised the possibility of
paying the supplement in the form of a grant to the States who would then exempt
nursing homes from payroll tax. Another alternative would be to institute a cost
reimbursement system.
The Commission concurs with participants that there are significant inequities in the
current payroll tax regime. Moreover, a number of these would remain at the end of
the proposed coalescence process. For example, despite the fact that the rate of
payroll tax in NSW is higher than in Tasmania and the tax-free threshold the same
(see table 7.1), NSW homes of 60 beds or less would continue to receive a much
smaller supplement than their Tasmanian counterparts.
More generally, there is the question of whether inequities are an inevitable
outcome of linking payroll tax supplementation to the number of beds in a facility.
The existence of tax-free thresholds means that the average payroll tax liability per
resident increases with the number of beds in a facility. However, it is likely to be
very difficult to reflect this changing liability — which actually depends on the
wages bill rather than the number of residents — in a simple tiered structure tied to
the number of beds.
In proposing an appropriate funding methodology for this item, the Commission
notes that it is non-discretionary, with rates set at arms length by State and Territory
Governments, and it has particular effect on one group of providers. An exemption
system (with corresponding grants made to State and Territory Governments) or a
cost reimbursement system might be warranted in this one particular area. The
Commission, however, notes that State/Territory Governments have already rejected
an exemption system. This leaves a cost reimbursement system as a possible
alternative.
To avoid increased payroll tax imposts on nursing homes, such reimbursement
would be limited to the generally applicable rate of payroll tax in a particular
jurisdiction.
There was strong support from participants for such a cost reimbursement system
for payroll tax. For example, ANHECA commented that this is ‘the only equitable
method of funding payroll tax’ (sub. D84, p. 14).AN ALTERNATIVE
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Box 7.2 Payroll tax arrangements
Payroll tax is a state tax, paid by firms on their wages bill (typically including a range of
labour on-costs such as bonuses and fringe benefits). The structure and level of the tax
vary somewhat across the States and Territories (see table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Payroll tax arrangements as at 1 January 1998
Threshold Maximum rate
State Scheme $000 %
NSW Single rate 600 6.85
Vic Single rate 515 6.25
Qld Single rate with phase out 850 5.00
WA Marginal rates with phase out 675 5.56
SA Single rate 456 6.00
Tas Single rate 600 6.35
ACT Single rate 800 6.85
NT Average rates with phase out 520 7.00
The nursing home payroll tax supplement is payable to providers who care for RCS 1 to
4 residents and who are liable for payroll tax. The structure of the supplement varies
across jurisdictions — in some cases it increases with the numbers of beds in a facility, in
others it is a flat rate (see table 7.2).
Table 7.2 Payroll tax supplement
dollars per high care resident per day from 1 July 1998
NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
61+ places 4.61 3.83 3.31 4.58 3.11 4.85 4.79 5.29
or grouped
31-60 places 3.15 3.24 1.27 0.99 2.33 4.85 4.79 5.29
1-30 places 1.41 2.08 1.03 0.55 1.19 4.85 4.79 5.29
A number of participants said that, in jurisdictions where the tiered structure applies,
homes in the 31-60 bed category can be significantly disadvantaged. Western Health
Care Group gave an example for Western Australia:
a 60 bed nursing home [in Western Australia] is about $80 000 per annum worse off than a
facility of 61 beds. The 60 bedder makes a deficit of $18 000 and the 61 beds enjoy a
surplus from this one item of funding of $61 000! (Sub. 2, attachment B, p. 2)
It also argued that the flat rate structure for homes in Tasmania, ACT and the Northern
Territory allows them to make a considerable profit out of the payroll tax supplement.
Coalescence
Under the proposed nationally uniform subsidy regime, the payroll tax supplement is to
be coalesced. The process for each tier will be the same as for the basic subsidy rate.
However, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory will retain a single rate structure
at the level of the coalesced rate for the top tier.104 NURSING HOME
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Some participants drew the Commission’s attention to an administrative
arrangement that allows charitable facilities that are exempt from payroll tax to
access the payroll tax supplement. In essence, by incurring a few dollars of payroll
tax liability through the use of contract nursing labour, a charitable facility can
apparently access the full supplement. For a 61 bed facility in say New South
Wales, the supplement would be worth around $100 000 a year. In the position
paper, the Commission suggested that the Commonwealth should take immediate
action to end this anomaly.
In response, many participants agreed that the anomaly should be removed, but
considered that there should be provision to reimburse payroll tax actually paid by
charitable and not-for-profit homes. They argued that tax could be payable when,
for instance, a home used the services of agency nurses. The Commission agrees
with participants that its recommendation should encompass payroll tax paid by the
charitable and not-for-profit sector, as well as the for-profit sector. The Commission
draws the line at contract nursing and personal care staff, however, and does not
propose extending reimbursement to cover the payroll tax components on contracted
food, laundry, maintenance or other services.
Recommendation 8: The current payroll tax supplement should be replaced by a
system of cost reimbursement for payroll tax paid by providers for their employees
and for contract nursing and personal care staff.
Workers compensation
In each State and Territory, nursing homes are obliged to pay workers compensation
insurance. The premiums generally consist of a base rate plus an adjustment for
claims experience. As noted in chapter 3, base rates vary from nearly 4 per cent of
wages in Queensland and Victoria to 7 per cent in Tasmania.
Under the current subsidy regime, funding for workers compensation premiums is
incorporated in basic subsidy rates. This was in response to concerns that the
previous cost reimbursement system had removed incentives for homes to reduce
their premium costs or employ sound occupational health and safety practices. As
the Department of Health and Family Services commented:
this arrangement provided no control over discretionary expenditure such as workers
compensation insurance. Providers had no reason to negotiate with insurance companies
or indeed improve occupational health and safety arrangements.
(Sub. 52, p. 15)AN ALTERNATIVE
UNIFORM REGIME
105
There are, however, transitional provisions that provide top-up funding for those
homes facing the highest workers compensation costs in each State or Territory.
These are to be phased out by 2001.
In its position paper, the Commission argued that Commonwealth contributions
towards workers compensation costs should continue to be provided through the
basic subsidy regime. This attracted some support from participants, for example
from Aged Care Queensland which considered that ‘individual state levies,
surpluses or penalties should [not] be supported in the aged care funding system’ as
the ‘body imposing the costs should be responsible for their impacts’ (sub. D69,
pp. 14–15). However, this position was rejected by most participants which
commented on the issue. They generally requested that a system of cost
reimbursement apply, possibly with limits to provide some incentive to providers to
endeavour to improve occupational health and safety.
ANHECA recommended a ‘constrained cost reimbursement arrangement’ which
would set caps that introduce a maximum loss and a maximum gain that a facility
can occur. It described the arrangement as follows:
The state average is calculated from certified returns provided by the provider. The
upper cap is set at a level that would protect the 5 per cent of providers paying the
highest levels of workers compensation premiums in each State. Once that cap is set the
lower cap is set at the corresponding level. (Sub. D84, p. 9)
In contrast, the Aged Services Association of NSW & ACT proposed that workers
compensation be reimbursed on a jurisdictional basis to the state average level, with
‘further funding provided for an amount over an unfunded component’ (sub. D67,
p. 6). The Association suggested that ‘a reasonable percentage could be 20 per cent’
of the ‘base tariff premium’ (sub. D67, p. 6). It commented that the state average
could be calculated annually, by requiring providers to submit their final premium
notice received from their insurer to the department.
A number of reasons in support of cost reimbursement were advanced. The first
related to a supposed need for consistency with the cost reimbursement proposal for
payroll tax. However, in the Commission’s view this is not an issue of substance
because, unlike payroll tax, workers compensation does not differentiate between
the charitable/not-for-profit sector and the for-profit sector, and because it is
important to include an incentive in the discretionary element of the premium.
The second reason concerned jurisdictional differences in base rates. In this regard,
NANHPH said:
The diversity of rates and the range and complexity of formulae used for calculating
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compensation premium is not a cost input that readily lends itself to any form of
universal coalescence. (Sub. 25, p. 27)
However, the Commission observes that the standardised cost calculations provided
by Aged Care Australia and others include an allowance for the costs of workers
compensation premiums. Hence, jurisdictional variations in those premiums are one
of the factors contributing, in a net sense, to the relatively small differences in total
standardised costs. This would suggest that at least the costs arising from the
average premium payments (base tariff plus experience adjustments) could be
incorporated into basic subsidy rates without creating significant distortions.
Of course, the average workers compensation rate factored into the basic subsidies
would need to be accurately based, included in the five yearly reviews and
monitored for any significant changes that went beyond the indexation formula.
Some participants, such as the Aged Services Association of NSW & ACT,
contended that the translation of subsidies from OCRE into the rates applying from
October 1997 had failed to pick up ‘sharp increases’ in workers compensation costs
since 1994-95, resulting in underfunding of about $2.60 per resident per day
(sub. D67, pp. 3–4). Further, many participants noted that significant variations in
premiums can occur from year to year.
A third reason concerns additional premiums which may be levied on particular
providers, for a period of up to three years, in response to a workers compensation
claim from an employee. It was not only claimed that these costs could be
significant, but that in many cases the original cause of the claim could be largely
beyond the control of the provider. For instance, Catholic Care of the Aged
considered that ‘nursing homes can have their financial viability threatened by
excess workers compensation costs caused by factors beyond their control’
(sub. D75, p 3). NANHPH cited the case of a ‘very responsible’ member ‘doing
everything possible to make sure that occupational health and safety featured very
strongly’ who had recently had a case which has ‘added a million dollars per annum
to their workers compensation premium for a period of three years’ (transcript,
p. 27). Valencia Nursing Home indicated that it went from a 20 per cent discount to
a 20 per cent loading, and that its claims experience was ‘by no means
unacceptable’ (transcript p. 341).
These views were not universal however. TriCare commented that ‘workers
compensation costs can be largely influenced by individual proprietors depending
upon workplace policies and procedures’ (sub. D78, p. 6). Although it supported a
cost reimbursement arrangement, the ANF (SA Branch) considered that ‘increases
in costs attributable to poor performance in claims management or injury prevention
should not be recoverable’ (sub. D102, p. 17).AN ALTERNATIVE
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In summing up, the Commission considers that the costs arising from the average
workers compensation premium payments should continue to be incorporated in the
basic subsidy, with periodic review and with indexation. On the basis of the
evidence, the Commission considers that there is merit in providing additional top-
up funding to particular providers where they incur significant extra costs. However,
this additional funding should not cover 100 per cent of the additional costs as this
would remove all financial incentive for providers to improve occupational health
and safety. The Commission also considers that such incentives would be enhanced
if providers were able to retain premium savings in years without claims. For this
reason, it prefers a mechanism such as that proposed by the Aged Services
Association to that proposed by ANHECA. However, it would initially set the
discount ‘hurdle’ at a higher rate, 30 per cent, and apply it to average premiums, to
provide a greater incentive than the 20 per cent of base tariff suggested by the Aged
Services Association. The discount could be adjusted up or down in the light of
experience if it were found to be inappropriate.
Recommendation 9: The assessment of costs should include a component to
reflect the average workers compensation premiums (base tariff plus experience
adjustments) incurred by residential aged care providers. This component should
be adjusted between the five yearly assessments if indexation of basic subsidy
rates fails to cover significant changes in average workers compensation costs.
In addition, supplementary funding should be made available for individual
providers which incur higher workers compensation costs than the amount
allowed for in the average cost base, on the condition that those providers bear an
excess equal to 30 per cent of that amount.
Superannuation
Several participants raised the issue of reimbursement for superannuation charges.
The July 1998 adjustment in basic subsidies allowed for a flat amount of $0.52 per
resident per day increase to cover the costs arising from the 1 percentage point
increase in the Superannuation Guarantee Charge.
However, ANHECA, for example, argued against this approach:
Superannuation is directly related to staff input time and therefore the Government’s
inclusion of a standard amount across all categories ignores the increased staffing
requirement for increased dependency ... ANHECA considers that superannuation
should be funded on a cost reimbursed basis ... (Sub. D84, p. 2)
Similarly, as well as querying the methodology for calculating the flat amount, the
Western Health Care Group stated that:108 NURSING HOME
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We find it inconsistent and incorrect that the increase has been added on a flat amount to
all funding levels which of course loads excessive funding into low care to the detriment
of high care funding. (Sub. D116, p. 2)
The Group estimated that the increase for low care residents should have been in the
order of $0.22 per day, and for high care residents about $0.68 per day.
The differences between differential rates and a rate which is uniform across RCS
classifications are small in absolute terms. However, given that separate basic
subsidies would continue to be set for residents in different RCS classifications
under the Commission’s methodology, the extra administrative burden in calculating
reimbursement rates appropriate for each classification would be insignificant.
Further, the Superannuation Guarantee Charge is non-discretionary, applies
nationally and affects all providers equally. The Commission considers that changes
in the superannuation charge should be included in the assessment of costs in
proportion to the staff time spend in caring for the residents in each category.
Recommendation 10: Superannuation charges should be included in the
assessment of costs, at rates appropriate for each RCS classification.
Deductions
There are currently several deductions applying to basic subsidies. Apart from
deductions to reflect revenue from income tested resident fees and charges for extra
service (see section 7.9), there are also deductions for homes where residents pass
on workers compensation payments (for which the Commission proposes no
change) and for government homes.
A few participants raised concerns about the deduction arrangements for
government homes. Their primary concern was that lower rates of basic subsidy
continue to apply when government-owned facilities are transferred to the private
sector. The Queensland Government also noted that the flat rate deduction has a
greater proportional impact on government homes in Queensland because of the
lower basic subsidy rates applying in that State (sub. 10, p. 2).
These arrangements reflect a previous agreement that the Commonwealth should not
pay for capital funding, maintenance costs and a return on investment in state
government homes.
However, as noted above, the Commission sees no reason why the basic subsidy
regime should differentiate on the basis of ownership. Thus, in the position paper it
proposed that government-run homes and those transferred to the non-governmentAN ALTERNATIVE
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sector should receive the same level of basic subsidy as their private and charitable
counterparts.
While this was generally agreed by most participants to be valid in principle, they
raised some issues of practical application. For instance, Aged Care Australia
considered that, in view of the estimated cost of $33.2 million per annum for this
proposal, the particular financial arrangements which had been entered into must be
taken into account:
to establish to what extent the financial agreements regarding the transfer of beds from
State Governments to the private sector have included inducements (such as capital
grants) and/or have taken into account the adjusted subsidy reduction. (Sub. D77, p. 13)
In other words, participants expressed concern about possible over-funding, or
windfall gains.
The Commission notes that such gains and losses can occur whenever funding
arrangements change. Coalescence, for example, will deliver a gain to Queensland
at the expense of currently more highly funded States such as Victoria, and
Tasmania.
However, it is relevant to examine what arrangements currently exist between State
Governments and the private operators of previous government homes. In Victoria
and Tasmania, at least, there are arrangements for the State Governments to provide
supplementary funding to such private operators. Removing the subsidy deduction
in such instances would transfer funds to state government consolidated revenue,
rather than to nursing home providers. Thus, given constraints on the total quantum
of funding available for residential aged care, there could be merit in phasing out the
subsidy deduction over, say, five years.
Recommendation 11: The current subsidy reduction for government-run homes
and those transferred to the non-government sector should be phased out over a
five year period.
7.6 A separate special needs funding pool
In revamping the subsidy arrangements, the Commission sees the enhancement of
special needs funding — that is, funding to cater for special high cost circumstances
not addressed through the basic subsidy or standard supplements — as of the
highest priority. For example, people in high cost rural and remote locations are
most likely to face reduced access to care or care that is provided in more difficult110 NURSING HOME
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circumstances than applies in other parts of Australia. A move to a uniform basic
subsidy regime makes the adequacy of special needs funding doubly important.
The present viability supplement goes some way towards meeting the need for
additional funding for services operating in very high cost regions. However, it is
deficient in at least two respects.
First, funding for the supplement is inadequate to compensate for the additional
costs incurred by services in special circumstances, such as smaller homes operating
in rural and remote areas. These additional costs do not only reflect remoteness and
smallness — they also arise from the wider range of functions that homes in these
areas perform (see box 7.3). As a result of their higher costs, many of these services
have to rely on assistance from State and Territory Governments, local councils and
their communities to remain viable. The higher costs may also explain why, as
noted in chapter 3, rural and remote areas remain underserviced in terms of the
planning ratios for places.
By way of perspective, services in remote and rural areas (outside the major rural
centres) account for around 18 per cent of total nursing home beds. On the
assumption that these services get a similar share of total Commonwealth funding,
they receive some $400 million a year. Payments under the viability supplement of
$6 million a year to homes in these areas therefore allow for an average cost
premium of just 1.5 per cent over and above services in the major population
centres. It is therefore not particularly surprising that, although the private-for-profit
sector provides nearly 50 per cent of nursing home beds Australia-wide, outside
metropolitan and major rural centres the share is less than 25 per cent.
Aged Care Tasmania synthesised the problem as follows:
A strengthened viability supplement provides the opportunity for a two-tier system of
nursing home subsidies ... However, the existing viability supplement would need to be
redesigned and funding levels increased in order to provide adequate assistance for
delivery scale and dispersion related costs ... (Sub. 40, p. 31)
Similarly, NANPH stated:
One of the issues which the industry has been arguing with the Commonwealth and
State Authorities over many years is the inability of ‘authority’ to listen to reality and
understand that remote areas, climatically adversely affected areas, particularly
communities such as the Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders do require market
specific funding assistance rather than a meek acceptance of an Australia wide funding
formula on the basis that one size fits all. (Sub. 55, p. 18)AN ALTERNATIVE
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Box 7.3 Nursing home services in rural and remote areas
A significant number of submissions addressed the challenges and additional costs of
providing nursing home services in rural and remote areas. In the summary that follows it
is difficult to capture the totality of those challenges. Nevertheless, it serves to highlight
that nursing homes in rural and remote areas have a much wider role to play in the lives
of their residents than most homes in the major urban centres.
The care environment
Perhaps the major difference between rural and remote services and those in the main
population centres is the additional functions that service providers are expected to
perform. Maranoa Retirement Village put it this way:
Our experience has shown that facilities in rural areas have a great expectation of providing
services, usually above and beyond what is required by them to provide, placed on them by
the local community.
Many of our clients have no family contact whatsoever and not only does our facility have to
actually arrange for the person to move to our facility but staff are also required to provide
ongoing support in all areas of the person’s life usually provided by family eg: organising
finances, purchasing of goods, paying of bills, transport etc. Some of our residents arrive at
our facility with only the clothes on their back and it is up to staff to organise extra clothing,
toiletries etc. (Sub. 20, p. 4)
Frontier Services made similar observations, as well as pointing to the cultural issues
surrounding service provision:
Culturally appropriate care is an issue we constantly struggle with and have never been able to
completely address. The social implications as well as environmental factors that need to be
considered when providing care to older Aboriginals from a variety of language groups and
skin colours need to be factored into funding levels. The inability to financially compensate
language and cultural interpreters, the need to consider gender issues for care providers and
the difficulty in recruiting appropriate members of the Aboriginal community all impact on the
quality of care in our services. (Sub. 8, p. 5)
Further, the lack of access to allied health professionals such as physiotherapists and
occupational therapists places additional demands on nursing home staff.
Some specific cost pressures
While not exhaustive, the following illustrates the type of cost pressures, additional to
those stemming from smallness and the requirement to provide ‘whole of life’ support for
residents, that homes in rural and remote areas must confront:
• lesser capacity to manage the resident mix because of a smaller population pool to
draw on and a sense of ‘duty’ found in smaller communities;
• more variable occupancy rates, particularly for respite care beds;
• lower staff productivity in tropical regions due to climate;
(continued on next page)112 NURSING HOME
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Box 7.3 (continued)
• added costs of bringing in and accommodating agency staff to cover leave and other
absences;
• more expensive food and basic services such as power, water, telephone, fuel;
• higher transport costs for capital equipment;
• lack of access to skilled tradespeople to maintain equipment and facilities, and higher
costs for service calls;
• reduced life of equipment and fittings due to the harsh climatic environment;
• the cost of sending staff away to training courses; and
• the cost of transporting residents back to communities for ceremonies, family contact
visits and the like.
The second problem with the current viability supplement is that the eligibility
criteria give a heavy weighting to remoteness from major population centres. Thus,
it is difficult for services in larger rural centres to attract the supplement, even if
they are providing the wider services to residents described in box 7.3. For example,
phasing out of the 24 hour top-up funding arrangement (see below), and its
replacement by the viability supplement, will apparently end additional support for
some services in Darwin which, as noted by the Northern Territory Government
(sub. D101, p. 1), serves large numbers of residents from more remote communities.
Against this background, in its position paper the Commission proposed that there
should be new special needs funding arrangements that build on the current viability
supplement. Specifically, the arrangements would have the objectives of providing
additional support (that is additional to the relevant basic subsidies and supplements
and deductions):
• to small, high cost homes in regions where demand for care is insufficient to
support facilities of an efficient size; and/or
• to homes required to deliver services additional to the standard care services
allowed for in the basic subsidy regime.
The Commission indicated that given the very diverse range of circumstances
confronting services in rural and remote areas, it intended to propose that the
Commonwealth develop and cost new special needs funding arrangements in
consultation with providers, resident groups and State and Territory Governments.
In response to the position paper, participants generally supported the concept of a
strengthened special needs pool. Aged Care Australia, for instance, considered that
increased funding for services in rural and remote areas was ‘a matter of funding
equity and that it must be accorded a very high priority’ (sub. D77, p. 14). However,AN ALTERNATIVE
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Aged Care Australia, together with many other participants, did not support a
rebalancing of the existing funding pool to provide that funding, stating that new
funding needs to be allocated.
Costing an enhanced special needs funding pool goes well beyond the purview of
this inquiry. Suffice it to say that without a significant rebalancing of total funding
between the basic subsidy and special needs, underlying equity objectives are
unlikely to be met. The Commission considers that this issue is of such high priority
that it must be achieved through additional funding.
A number of other issues were raised. Some participants considered that special
needs funding should be made available to all small nursing homes. For instance,
Aged Care Victoria considered that there should be additional funding support for
smaller nursing homes, irrespective of location (sub. D79, p. 5). However, the
Commission reiterates that the subsidy regime should not lessen the incentives for
rationalisation. In its view, special needs funding should not be available, for
instance, to prop-up small-scale services in urban areas or major rural centres.
The Tasmanian Department of Health and Human Services considered that
addressing the ‘critical funding issues’ for small rural and remote facilities is ‘so
important and specific’ that there is a need to separate metropolitan and non-
metropolitan into two separate funding structures (sub. D100, p. 3). It considered
that the minimum basic subsidy needs to be structured similar to that of the
Multipurpose Service Program. However, because of the diverse range of
circumstances facing homes in rural and remote areas the Commission considers
that the question of additional special needs funding needs to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis in accordance with appropriate criteria (see below). Providing
additional funding to all rural and remote homes without examination of particular
circumstances could not be justified.
The Ethnic Communities Council of Queensland considered that special needs
funding should not only acknowledge the situation of rural and remote services but
also the ‘higher costs associated with the provision of some culturally inclusive
services’ (sub. D113, p. 7). Examples given were the engagement of interpreters, the
extra costs of preparing traditional meals, and the need to employ bilingual or
multilingual staff.
In the position paper, the Commission commented that developing criteria for the
distribution of the special needs pool is a major task. Indeed, there will be some
special needs for which it will be difficult to specify criteria in advance of the event.
That said, the criteria must be sufficiently rigorous and transparent in application to
limit support to genuine cases.114 NURSING HOME
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As a guide, however, the Commission considers that special needs funding (which
would replace existing viability arrangements, and provide extra funding) could be
considered in three circumstances:
• to provide additional funding to homes in rural and remote areas in each
jurisdiction to take account of factors such as distance and climate. Standard
definitions of rural and remote could be utilised for this purpose (see DPIE 1994,
for example);
• to provide additional funding for small homes in locations where demand in the
local catchment area is only likely to be sufficient to support homes of less than
average size. This could imply a population cutoff of about 10–15 000 people
and, of course, ‘local catchment area’ would require suitable definition; and
• to provide additional funding to homes, including those in metropolitan areas,
which provide services to residents beyond those normally provided and not
captured by the RCS formula or existing supplements. This could include those
homes providing ‘whole-of-life’ support to indigenous and other special needs
groups. Additional support for homes in urban centres needing to employ
interpreters, or that service residents from more remote areas may be other cases
in point.
The Commission considers that the Commonwealth should also consider some form
of supplementation to the special needs homes for one-off capital costs of achieving
accreditation and certification but that this should only be available when services in
a region as a whole would not otherwise be viable.
Finally, in advocating enhanced support for small homes in rural and remote area
services, the Commission acknowledges that this will not address any wider
problems with community health facilities and social services in many of these
areas. It may be that related programs such as Community Aged Care Packages and
Multipurpose Services will give impetus to the development of these facilities and
services. In the meantime, increased funding for residential services will go some
way to ameliorating the pressure on nursing home residents, providers and
employees.
Recommendation 12: Additional funding support for higher cost homes in special
circumstances, such as smaller higher cost nursing homes in rural and remote
areas, should come from a special needs funding pool. The Government should
add to current outlays to meet this purpose, separate from, and additional to, the
funding of the basic subsidy. The new special needs arrangements should be
developed and costed in consultation with providers, resident groups and State
and Territory Governments.AN ALTERNATIVE
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Top-up support for Victorian nursing homes
The Commission gave consideration as to whether the special needs pool should
cater for the cost impacts of the nurse to resident ratio requirements applying in
Victoria. These requirements, which have existed in the relevant nursing awards
since 1936, specify that providers must employ one Division 1 or 2 nurse for each
10 residents or part thereof during day and evening shifts, and one Division 1 or 2
nurse for each 15 residents during the night shift. Aged Care Victoria commented
that as a result of these requirements:
all nursing homes in Victoria suffer a significant cost penalty, when compared with the
regulations in the other States and Territories which do not stipulate a nurse/resident
ratio. (Sub. 23, p. 12)
The Victorian Government considered that ‘unavoidable additional costs’ such as
these should be recognised in the standardised input bundle’ (sub. D92, p. 2).
Some participants said that the Victorian CAM component in the previous subsidy
regime made an allowance for these higher costs. Any such allowance would have
transferred across into the current state based subsidy regime. In addition, some
smaller Victorian homes (along with small homes in other States) received top-up
funding to cover the costs of providing 24 hour registered nurse coverage. This
supplement has now been replaced by the viability supplement. However,
transitional funding arrangements apply to homes that received support under the
previous arrangements.
The Commission accepts that the staff to resident ratio requirements are a unique
impost on providers in Victoria, although it notes suggestions that compliance with
the requirements is far from universal. The Australian Nursing Federation
(Victorian Branch) (sub. 54, attachment 5) supplied the results of a survey of its
members which indicated that nearly two-thirds of homes are in breach of the ratios.
However, putting the compliance issue to one side, in the Commission’s view,
Australian taxpayers should not be expected to indefinitely underwrite staffing
arrangements that prima facie deliver a higher quality of care in Victoria than in
other parts of Australia, and which are not necessary to meet the accreditation
requirements. Compensatory funding will simply reduce the pressure to address the
underlying issue.
Thus, the Commission considers that the issue is not whether special support should
end, but how quickly it should end. Transitional top-up funding for smaller
Victorian homes is to continue until October 2001. Further, while the Commission’s
proposed basic subsidy regime would remove any generalised compensation for116 NURSING HOME
SUBSIDIES
Victorian providers, the new regime could not be implemented immediately (see
section 7.11). The Commission considers that these periods of grace are sufficient.
7.7 Acquittal of subsidy
Under the previous subsidy regime, providers had to return underspent CAM and
OCRE funding below a 1 per cent tolerance level. The primary rationale for these
formal acquittal requirements was to prevent providers improving their profitability
by reducing the quality of care supplied.
The Aged Care Structural Reform Package has removed the requirement for
providers to acquit subsidies against expenditures. As under the previous regime,
policing of the various regulatory requirements governing the provision of nursing
home services will provide one avenue of quality assurance. In addition, the
accreditation and certification systems will provide a financial incentive for nursing
home operators to deliver an acceptable level of care. That is, non-accredited
providers will not attract Commonwealth subsidies, while those not meeting
certification requirements will be unable to collect accommodation charges.
An end to the acquittal system has provided an administrative cost saving for
nursing homes and for the Commonwealth which no longer needs to validate
financial returns. It has also removed a potential disincentive for providers to deliver
services cost effectively. Under previous arrangements, providers had a financial
incentive to seek productivity gains that would reduce their CAM costs to the
jurisdictional CAM rate, but not significantly below it. This was because any
additional cost savings had to be returned to the Government. Further, because only
CAM expenditure had to be acquitted, there were a range of cost demarcation issues
(see Gregory 1993), as well as incentives for creative accounting to transfer costs to
the CAM category.
Nevertheless, a few participants sought a return to some form of system which
would ensure that funding made available for personal and nursing care was
actually used by providers for that purpose. For example, the ACHCA
recommended that providers should provide an audited statement that the subsidies
and grants have been spent in accordance with the purposes intended (sub. D110,
p. 14). The Queensland Nurses’ Union stated:
The shift to an accreditation system based on quality assurance will not ensure adequate
standards unless it is accompanied by complementary controls in the expenditure of
funds. (Sub. 45, para 5.4.1)AN ALTERNATIVE
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Similarly, the New South Wales Nurses’ Association stated that it had consistently
sought some form of acquittal for the care component of funding:
The complexity of and dissatisfaction with previous acquittal arrangements is
acknowledged. It is our view however that accreditation itself and the capacity of the
Accreditation Agency to monitor compliance with the accreditation process is not tested
and will not be sufficient to ensure a satisfactory standard of care for each resident in
each aged care facility. (Sub. D107, p. 5)
However, several participants expressed opposition to a reinstatement of formal
accreditation requirements because of the possible administrative costs and
inefficiencies involved. Aged Care Queensland commented that:
The acquittal of subsidies will only serve to increase the inefficiencies in the system as
money will, from time to time, be spent simply to avoid its repayment. (Sub. D69, p. 16)
The value of acquittal as an assurance of quality is suspect. Further, participants
noted that the accreditation requirements are intended to provide an effective
discipline on providers to deliver quality personal care. Aged Care Australia argued:
Continuous improvement is expected to drive the accreditation system and to deliver
quality improvements over time. This will benefit all residents, especially as the
residential care funding system must guarantee universal access to quality services
consistent with accreditation to all residents, irrespective of their financial position.
(Sub. 26, p. 21)
The Victorian Healthcare Association (sub. 22, p. 8) also saw value in
supplementing accreditation and certification requirements with published ‘league
tables’ to help prospective residents make informed choices about the quality of
service available in particular homes.
At this early stage, it is not possible to judge how effective the accreditation and
certification requirements will be in addressing the sorts of problem at the heart of
the acquittal debate. For instance, it remains to be seen whether in smaller centres
with a single nursing home facility, there will be a tendency to ‘lower the height of
the bar’ for accreditation and certification so as to remove the possibility of major
disruption for residents.
At the commencement of mandatory accreditation in 2001, average standards will
not necessarily be significantly higher than at present. However, there is an
expectation that over time the continuous improvement inherent in accreditation will
lead to higher standards of residential aged care. Further, the Commission considers
that the new approach to quality assurance must be given reasonable time to prove
itself.118 NURSING HOME
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Recommendation 13: There should be no requirement for providers to acquit
subsidy payments.
7.8 Providing subsidy to providers or residents
Under current arrangements, the Commonwealth pays subsidies to providers rather
than to residents.
In contrast, in areas such as child care, some subsidies are paid to the recipient. In
the past, nursing home subsidies have also been paid to residents.
One rationale for payment to recipients is that it makes them more conscious of the
total cost of the service they are receiving and therefore more selective in their
purchasing decisions. There is also the view that, by ‘empowering’ recipients, direct
payment encourages providers to be more responsive to their needs. This view was
supported by the Victorian Government:
where individuals have a funding entitlement ... [p]roviders will ... be required to
compete in a market where common standards are developed. Program growth or
industry restructuring provides the capacity to deliver a more open market with greater
choice for consumers. Where the consumer chooses to spend the funding entitlement in
a residential care service, the funding entitlement should flow directly to the provider of
the consumer’s choice. (Sub. D92, p. 8)
More detail of the Victorian model is described in chapter 8.
Although paying subsidy to recipients has merit in terms of purchasing care across a
range of service delivery models, in terms of the residential aged care sector itself,
the significance of such benefits is less clear. In general, subsidies paid to providers
but which follow the recipients will give the same broad outcomes as direct
payments to recipients. Thus, the key to making providers responsive to the needs of
consumers who are purchasing residential aged care is portability of the subsidy, not
to whom it is paid.
More specifically, in the nursing home sector, the Aged Care Assessment Teams
(ACATs) are positioned between the person seeking care and the provider. That is,
an ACAT determines that an individual requires nursing home care, with the
Commonwealth funding the home ‘chosen’ by the individual.
Further, there are a number of other factors which limit the scope for residents (or
potential residents) to exercise consumer sovereignty. Many suffer from reduced
mental capacity and, once in a facility, it can be difficult for them to switch to
another facility, even if they are unhappy with the service. In addition, providersAN ALTERNATIVE
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have some discretion in choosing whether to take a person approved for entry to a
nursing home. The limits on overall and regional bed numbers supports high
occupancy rates and limit competition between facilities (see section 7.9). Hence,
the empowerment argument is weaker within the residential aged care sector.
Channelling money to homes via the resident would also involve additional
administrative costs. Further, ANHECA (sub. 24, p. 25) argued that providers’
propensity for bad debts would increase and that there would be a need for changes
to legislation and resident rights principles.
Given these costs and the doubtful nature of the benefits of paying subsidies to
residents (unless there is some unbundling of the accommodation, care and clinical
components with greater ability to exercise choice), the Commission sees no case
for changing current payment arrangements.
Recommendation 14: Residential aged care subsidies should continue to be paid
to providers rather than to residents.
7.9 Extra service arrangements and other subsidy
related issues
Extra service arrangements
The core equity objective of the Commission’s subsidy proposal is to ensure that
residential aged care would be available to all Australians needing such care, in a
suitable location and of acceptable quality, with access not constrained by ability to
pay.
This leaves open the question of whether people willing to pay for additional
services should be free to do so, or whether the funding regime should aim to
provide the one set standard of care to everyone.
There are currently provisions allowing for a significant number of extra service
places which offer an appreciably higher standard of accommodation, food and the
like. However, there are a range of restrictions on these places, including a
deduction from the basic subsidy for residents receiving extra services — the
subsidy is currently reduced by 25 cents for each dollar of extra service income.
Residents entering extra service places may be asked to provide an accommodation
bond.120 NURSING HOME
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In the position paper, the Commission noted a range of views from participants on
the merits of freeing up these arrangements. It concluded that it is counterproductive
to try to prevent those wishing to pay for extra service from doing so and,
accordingly, set out the following preliminary proposal for comment:
• the controls on what constitutes an extra service, where in a facility extra service
places are provided, and the price charged for such services should be abolished;
• the current reduction in the basic subsidy for residents receiving extra service
should be abolished — this defacto income tested charge should be incorporated
in a budget neutral way into an income test applying to the basic subsidy; and
• the Commonwealth Government should give consideration to replacing the
current quota on extra service places with a monitoring system aimed at
identifying any cases where extra service provision is reducing access to basic
care. It should also look at the scope to simplify the concessional resident ratios.
Some participants expressed outright opposition to this proposal on philosophical
grounds. The Australian Nursing Federation (SA Branch) stated that it:
continue[s] to oppose the principle of resident fees for either capital works or additional
services. Such systems have the capacity to either discriminate against the well off or
alternatively to create a 2 tier system of care one for those who can afford to make
payments with another ‘welfare’ based system for those who cannot. (Sub. D102, p. 19)
Similarly, but recognising some exceptions in relation to ‘hotel’ services, the
ACHCA considered that:
a fundamental principle of access to aged care should be that the same standard and
quality of care is provided to all regardless of capacity to pay. The expansion of the
user-pays principle should only apply to the additional hotel services and
accommodation style and should not apply to short-stay nursing home residents.
(Transcript, p. 158)
Many participants expressed in-principle support to the freeing up of extra service
arrangements, although some concerns and caveats were expressed. These
participants included Aged Care Australia, NANHPH and ANHECA. Aged Care
Australia considered that the reduction on controls would enable:
residents and their families ... exercise more choice regarding the standard of
accommodation provided ; and
the overall standard of accommodation provided in nursing homes [to be] improved
thereby benefiting all residents over time. (Sub. D77, p. 15)
It considered that ‘there are other more appropriate strategies than constraining
consumer choice for safeguarding universal access to quality care by all residents’.
It listed these strategies as: determining an appropriate benchmark level of care forAN ALTERNATIVE
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all residents; ensuring that this is adequately funded; removing inappropriate
regulation of extra services places, including freeing up access for concessional
residents; and monitoring to ensure that access to the standard benchmark level of
care is not reduced (sub. D77, p. 15).
Similarly, Aged Care Queensland stated that:
The Department [of Health and Family Services] should not be active in regulation of
the standard of accommodation being provided or the ‘hotel’ services being provided
therein.
This is an issue of choice. Residents should be able to choose the type and standard of
accommodation being sought. They should be able to pay more for single rooms, larger
rooms, balconies ... They should be able to pay less for shared rooms, shared facilities,
set menus rather than choices ....
... the use of excessive regulation to control an industry such as nursing homes leads to
monotony, sameness and minimum standards of quality rather than experimentation,
innovation and increasing quality through competition. (Sub. 33, p. 17)
PJ Pusey, the operator of an 81 bed facility in Perth (including 51 beds funded
entirely by residents), commented on the degree of choice available to residents:
there is very little freedom of choice. It is largely a matter of take it or leave it for the
consumer. Unfortunately for them, they have to take it. (Sub. D97, p. 2)
Whilst acknowledging that there is some sensitivity regarding the issue of extra
services, the Commission confirms its view that it is counterproductive to try to
prevent those who wish to pay for extra services from accessing them. With a
funding regime aimed at supporting equitable access to a guaranteed minimum
quality of care, freedom to purchase extra services has a role to play in encouraging
the development of a diverse and responsive industry. Rather than seek to
artificially constrain the development of extra service, the objective should be to
manage its development so that it does not compromise access by those seeking
standard care (that is, to those seeking the benchmark standard of care which is
available to all residents irrespective of their financial means).
The Commission notes that the planning controls, the issue of bed licences and
ACAT assessments will continue to determine the overall numbers of nursing home
residents. In these circumstances, the need for controls on the distribution of those
places between extra service and standard service will depend, in the first instance,
on the adequacy of Commonwealth support for standard care.
If subsidies (in conjunction with resident charges) give an adequate financial return
on the provision of the benchmark standard of care, then the need for any specific
safeguards would be debatable. Of course, this relies on competition between122 NURSING HOME
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providers eliminating any excessive returns on extra service places. The bed
licensing system (see box 7.4), and the other constraints on competition in the sector
noted above, may prevent this occurring, thereby requiring a mechanism to ensure
that the provision of extra service places does not reduce access to standard care.
Box 7.4 Planning ratios and the bed licensing system
The planning ratio and bed licensing systems reduce competition in the nursing home
sector. Together, these mechanisms underpin very high occupancy rates and thereby
lessen the need for homes to compete for residents. This restriction on competition is
reflected in the value of bed licences, which trade for as much as $30 000 in some parts
of Australia.
However, these controls have other, potentially beneficial, effects.
By limiting the total number of places eligible for subsidy, the planning ratios (and the
ACAT assessment process) are the primary means of capping Commonwealth
expenditure on residential aged care. (Of course, if demand exceeds the available
number of places, then there will be an element of cost shifting to other parts of the aged
care and hospital systems and a degree of inadequate assistance.)
Similarly, while it would be possible to implement the planning controls without a bed
licensing system, this could have adverse consequences for residents. In essence, the
bed licensing system limits competition between providers in the delivery of the available
number of subsidised places. In so doing, it increases expected occupancy rates to close
to 100 per cent. Removing the licensing system would increase the risks of operating a
nursing home and consequently the incidence of disruption to residents from failed
undertakings. As the Australian Catholic Health Care Association argued:
Such a move could lead to lower occupancy rates in many facilities thus raising costs,
potentially reducing the quality of care and finally closure for marginal operators.
The dislocation and disruption for residents their families and staff would be enormous ...
(Sub. 7, p. 18)
This is not to argue that such considerations necessarily justify retention of these
arrangements. Rather, it is to recognise that the case for retention involves broader
considerations than just their impact on competition between providers.
At present, the primary safeguard is a quota on the number of extra service places
equal to 12 per cent of total nursing home beds. This percentage applies at the
regional level as well as in aggregate. While the constraint is apparently biting in
particular regions such as the Gold Coast, Australia-wide the total number of extra
service places is well below the limit.
The concessional resident ratio requirements provide a secondary safeguard
(although they are not in place only for this reason). These require homes to care for
a specified proportion of concessional residents who would not, in the normalAN ALTERNATIVE
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course of events, be able to pay for extra services. These ratios are specified on a
regional basis with the differentiation across regions sometimes being only a
fraction of a percentage point. In most parts of Australia, the actual number of
concessional residents greatly exceeds these ratios.
Looking to the future, the Commission sees merit in a less prescriptive safeguard
mechanism as part of a general reduction in the controls on extra service places. In
its view, any growth in demand for extra service places is unlikely to create
widespread problems for those seeking access to standard care. Hence, the quota
system is an unnecessary addition to an already complex regime.
A preferable approach would be to:
• first clearly define items to be included in the benchmark standard of care — that
is, specify what care and hotel-type services are required to be made available to
all residents irrespective of their financial means; then
• leave it to nursing home proprietors to determine the number of extra service
places they wish to provide, applying to the Department of Health and Aged
Care in the expectation of virtually automatic approval, with the department
monitoring those places and the waiting lists for standard care.
The definition of items to be included in the benchmark standard of care could
adopt, or build on, the specified care and services already required as set out in
chapter 12 of the Residential Care Manual. Some participants considered that extra
services should relate only to hotel-type services. However, the Commission does
not consider that this should necessarily be the case — that is, there should be scope
for extra services to also encompass personal care services where they are genuinely
additional to the standard level of care.
Several participants requested that the provision of a single room should be treated
as an extra service. For example, in its initial submission, NANHPH recommended
that ‘partial deregulation of the industry be encouraged by allowing providers who
achieve accreditation to charge a single ward supplement up to $12 per day’
(sub. 25, p. 3). The Commission notes that, while this suggestion has merit, many
providers are already offering single rooms and have no intention of imposing an
extra service charge.
The Commission notes that the department currently monitors places and waiting
lists when assessing applications to provide extra service places. In the unlikely
event of evidence that those seeking standard care were being squeezed out by
provision of extra service places, it would be open to the department to resume
regulation. As an adjunct to this change, there would also seem scope to reduce the
excessive precision in the concessional resident ratios.124 NURSING HOME
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The Commission also considers that the nature and price of extra services should be
a matter for providers to determine in response to the ‘market place’ demand from
residents and their families. This in turn calls into question not only the current
regulations covering what constitutes an extra service, but also where in a facility
extra services can be provided, and the price charged for those services.
Finally, the current reduction in the basic subsidy effectively means that providers
must charge $1.25 for a service costing $1 to deliver. As such, the subsidy reduction
is a defacto income tested charge, levied on those capable of paying for extra
services. Importantly, it is additional to the generally applicable reduction in basic
subsidies for those on higher incomes. In effect, two residents of identical means
pay differing amounts for standard service, merely because one has chosen extra
services and one has not.
In the Commission’s view, the reduction should be abolished. If the Government
wished to recoup this amount in a budget neutral manner, a possible approach
would be to end the subsidy reduction for those residents receiving extra service and
compensate by increasing the stringency of the general income tested charging
arrangements.
Recommendation 15: There should be greater opportunity for the provision of
extra services to residents who wish to meet the relevant costs. In this regard:
•  • an extra service should be any facility or service that exceeds standard care as
defined under the benchmark level of care required to be provided to all
residents irrespective of financial means;
•  • the controls on where in a facility extra services are provided, and the price
charged for such services, should be abolished;
•  • the current reduction in the basic subsidy for residents receiving extra service
should be abolished; and
•  • the current strict quota on extra service places should be replaced with a
lighter-handed approach and a monitoring system aimed at identifying any
cases where extra service provision is reducing access to standard care. The
Government should also look at the scope to simplify the regional matrix of
concessional resident ratios.
Separation of accommodation charges and resident daily fees
In its position paper, the Commission sought views on whether it is appropriate to
continue to separate asset tested accommodation charges and income tested daily
fees. In other words, is it necessary or desirable to separate charges for capital fromAN ALTERNATIVE
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contributions towards recurrent costs? The Commission commented that the current
separation of the charges could make the subsidy regime more complex for both
providers and residents.
Several participants considered that there was value in providing an earmarked
income stream for capital works, particularly as the Commonwealth has reduced its
funding support in this area. Aged Care Australia also pointed to the role of a
separate asset tested capital charge in catering for regional fluctuations in the cost of
care resulting from differences in land and building costs (see chapter 6).
Some participants considered that present administrative difficulties in making
payments to providers would only be compounded if these two charges were
combined.
The Commission considers that accommodation charges and the resident daily fees
should continue to be separated.
7.10 Administration and transparency
Development of the alternative nationally uniform basic subsidy regime has drawn
on the assessment criteria set out in chapter 4, making a number of explicit and
implicit tradeoffs between criteria such as equity, efficiency, flexibility, and
administrative simplicity. Some participants, however, drew the Commission’s
attention to various specific concerns about administration and transparency. Boxes
7.5 and 7.6 outline these concerns.
The Commission’s inquiry does not extend to examining the detail of these. It is
possible that on closer examination some of them might be readily resolved, or not
be well founded. For example, Euan Lindsay-Smith, co-author of the recent review
of the RCS, contended that the RCS appraisal undertaken by care providers relies
completely on documentation already existing at the time of the appraisal (sub. D90,
p. 1).
Nevertheless, there is ground for legitimate concern about the costs imposed on
providers by administrative inefficiencies. Similarly, the lack of past transparency
gives real cause for concern. Changes which can significantly affect the viability of
residential aged care providers should not be made without adequate supporting data
being made publicly and transparently available.
Recommendation 16: The Government should work closely with providers and
other stakeholders to resolve quickly all outstanding concerns in relation to
program administration and transparency of information.126 NURSING HOME
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Box 7.5 Concerns with administration
Aged Care Australia
There have been serious and protracted problems with the payment system for
residential care subsidies since 1 October 1997 which have created an enormous
workload for service providers ...
In addition, frequent reviews of pension entitlement mean there are frequent
adjustments to the income tested user contributions and the resulting residential care
subsidy payable, creating confusion for residents and ongoing work for service
providers. (Sub. D77, p. 22)
Resthaven
The first priority is for the payments system to be accurate ... errors associated with
the payment system ... [still] stem back as far as the October commencement period.
In addition to this the whole sector has been funded at the $12 a day concessional
rate irrespective of their entitlement. This will be recovered when the Department has
managed to fix the software problems. Will this cause a cash flow problem for some
providers? Is such a recovery reasonable? (Sub. D72, p. 8)
Anita Villa
The problems currently experienced are widespread largely due to the fact [that]
compounding errors are committed by the [department], consistently hampering
facilities. While a range of supplements may be added to the basic care subsidy,
these compounding errors have a resounding effect on sustaining & maintaining even
a basic level of service. (Sub. D115, p. 1)
ANHECA
If the current arrangements for income testing remain, nursing homes and hostels for
that matter, will be required to utilise extra clerical hours to sort out the mess and the
billing problems involved with ensuring that residents pay the correct amount of
resident contribution ... This is not income for the provider but goes directly to the
Government. (Sub. 24, p. 51)
Queensland Health
In the interests of consistency and transparency, it is recommended that responsibility
for assessment of a resident’s assets base (concessional resident status) be
transferred from the provider to Centrelink or the Department of Veterans Affairs. The
current system is considered too onerous for the provider and open to abuse.
(Sub. 87, p. 7)




Baptist Care - WA
Through its aged care reforms the Government promised less red tape and regulatory
controls. In fact the opposite has occurred. Beyond any doubt, the documentation and
checking process required as a result of the many changes, additional reporting and
recording has placed significant demands on the financial and staff resources of
nursing home and hostel providers. (Sub. 5, p. 4)
Uniting Community Services Australia
One nursing home has identified an extra nine hours of staff time is required to
execute the new administrative arrangements for each new resident. This specific
example reflects a common trend throughout the majority of our nursing homes.
(Sub. 47, p. 2)
Queensland Nurses’ Union
The introduction of the RCS ... has only increased the burden of documentation in
nursing homes ... the significant time spent by nurses on this activity is over and
above that done by nurses to meet professional and legal requirements. This activity
remains unaccounted for in the RCS instrument and therefore is unfunded despite the
significant time it takes. (Sub. 45, section 5.2.5)
7.11 Implementation issues
Some aspects of the proposals will require more detailed consideration by the
Government prior to actual implementation.
In the position paper, the Commission outlined two broad approaches to
implementation:
• phased introduction involving transitional subsidy rates; or
• implementation in full, following a period of grace to give residents and
providers time to make the necessary adjustments.
It sought views from participants on an appropriate timeframe for implementing the
full proposal, whether new arrangements should be phased-in or simply introduced
after a grace period, and the inter-relationships with the Residential Aged Care
Review.128 NURSING HOME
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Box 7.6 Concerns with transparency
Aged Care Organisations Association (SA & NT)
The difficulty with a differential rate identified in the previous RCI or CAM system and
now the RCS, has been the 1) lack of rigorous and transparent data, 2) lack of review.
Thus, in South Australia, we believe there is little, if any, objective criteria that
explains existing differentials between the States. This lack of transparency has
caused emotive rather than objective arguments and a lack of appreciation of the key
issues. (Sub. 31, p. 8)
Aged Services Association of NSW & ACT
... the Department has been contacted and requested to provide details of the state
average OCRE costs for 1996-97, excluding payroll tax ... we can see no reason why
this information cannot be officially provided. We suspect the Department is not keen
to provide this information because it will show average OCRE costs [to be much
higher than allowed for in the basic subsidies]. (Sub. D67, p. 4)
Resthaven
... brings into question the accuracy of the base data used to formulate the RCI
differentials in 1987 when this system was introduced. The secrecy surrounding this
information has never allowed for this data to be checked by providers, the
bureaucracy often arguing in the past some restrictions by Treasury preventing the
transparency of information. The impact has been the institutionalisation of an
inequitable funding scheme. (Sub. D72, p. 4)
Australian Nursing Federation (Federal Office)
The ANF believes that the Productivity Commission should be more prescriptive in
relation to what it means by desirable transparency and accountability arrangements.
The Productivity Commission should specify the Department’s reporting obligations
and even individual performance indicators that the Department should release
publicly on a regular basis. (Sub. D 74, p. 4)
Australian Nursing Federation (SA Branch)
Surveying the industry or benchmarking have the same limitations, which led to the
CAM system’s obsolescence soon after implementation. Because the process was
not transparent, able to be dis-aggregated and related to particular inputs and was
not subject to change or review, the relative positions of States was fixed.
(Sub. D102, p. 11)
Aged Care Australia
ACA supports [the principle that residential care funding must be sufficient to provide
a standard level of quality care to all residents] as the primary policy design principle
for residential care funding. This will require the development of new concepts and
methodologies as well as clearly transparent funding arrangements which are
appropriately managed to ensure this policy objective is maintained over time.
(Sub. D77, p. 1)AN ALTERNATIVE
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In response, there was fairly general support for the view that implementation
arrangements need to be conditional on the outcome of the Residential Aged Care
Review, in particular regarding funding adequacy. The ACHCA commented that:
Substantial changes to the funding arrangements should be subject to any
recommendations emanating from the residential aged care review. On this basis 1 July
2000 would be the earliest date of implementation other than for correction of basic
subsidy rates and indexation. (Sub. D81, p. 7)
Aged Care Australia also supported 1 July 2000 as a commencement date for the
full proposal. It considered that detailed work on funding adequacy, defining the
standard benchmark level of care, and its subsequent pricing, should commence
immediately and be finalised within 12 months. Detailed ‘implementation
arrangements are best resolved once the review of funding adequacy and the
development of the new funding methodology have been completed’
(sub. D77, p. 24). NANHPH, together with others, considered that phase-in
arrangements needed detailed discussions with the industry as a whole including ‘a
careful analysis of the long term impact to minimise disruption of services and
resident care delivery’ (sub. D70, p. 12).
The thrust of the Commission’s proposal is that basic subsidy rates, together with
funding from residents, should be set at a level that is adequate to meet the cost of
providing the benchmark standard of care. As the terms of reference for the
Residential Aged Care Review direct it to establish the adequacy of subsidy rates, it
would be appropriate for the Review to oversight the initial development and
costing of the standardised input mix.
Recommendation 17: The Residential Aged Care Review should undertake the
first assessment of average costs as part of its examination of the adequacy of
subsidies for residential aged care (as required by its terms of reference). This
should be carried out in accordance with the subsidy methodology set out by the
Commission in its recommendations and in the body of this report.
In the position paper, the Commission noted that providers in Queensland are
particularly disadvantaged by the current arrangements. It commented that, in view
of the delay that would be involved in introducing the new arrangements —
particularly given the required input from the Residential Aged Care Review on the
quantum issue —it considered that some short term relief for Queensland providers
is warranted. It also commented that, while the situation is less clear cut, some of
the cost data suggest that interim relief for South Australian providers may also be
warranted.130 NURSING HOME
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The Commission noted the suggestion from Aged Care Queensland that, if
additional government money is not available, funds earmarked for indexing
subsidy rates across-the-board should be redirected to a progressive increase in the
lowest jurisdictional subsidy rates (sub. 33, p. 19). It proposed that, subject to any
recommendation from the Residential Aged Care Review for an increase in total
Commonwealth funding for residential aged care, funds earmarked for indexing
current subsidies should be redirected to increasing basic rates for the currently low
subsidy States (see appendix D).
In looking at interim changes, the Commission also noted the compelling case for an
immediate boost to funding for smaller rural and remote area services also arises.
However, given the complexity of the issues involved, it proposed that the
Commonwealth develop new special needs funding arrangements in consultation
with the various stakeholders. Rather than pre-empt this process with an immediate
funding boost, the Commission simply stressed the importance of developing the
new arrangements quickly.
Many participants recognised the current inequity in funding between jurisdictions,
and also supported additional special needs funding. However, they generally
considered that the necessary funding should be additional rather than being
redirected from the existing quantum. For example, Aged Care Australia agreed that
‘urgent action’ is needed to address inadequate funding in Queensland and South
Australia, and of residents in rural and remote areas. However, it did not support
redirecting funding from indexation for these purposes as ‘such action would
compromise the quality of care and viability of services’ (sub. D77, p. 16).
Providers from Tasmania and Victoria, in particular, pointed to possibly dire
consequences for care from reductions in subsidy. Aged Care Tasmania considered
that ‘redistribution alone, by coalescence or other methods reducing the current
subsidy levels to Tasmania, will mean loss of jobs and thereby loss of standards of
care. Full coalescence would cause the loss of more than 300 jobs in Tasmania’
(sub. D65, p. 5). The Tasmanian Government (sub. 53, p. 14) said that coalescence
in conjunction with changes in viability funding, likely wage increases and the
impact of accreditation and certification requirements ‘has the potential to result in
the closure of facilities and hence reduced access’. The Victorian Healthcare
Association argued that if coalescence proceeds, up to one third of Victorian
nursing home beds would be forced to close (sub. 22, p. 10). The Victorian Synod
of the Uniting Church presented data for 10 nursing homes which ‘have had to make
significant reductions in costs already, especially with the first reduction in funding
because of coalescence. We believe that any further reduction can only impact on
the quality of residential care’ (sub D80, p. 1). Similarly other providers, such as the
Ashfield Baptist Homes (sub. D106), considered that some homes are on the vergeAN ALTERNATIVE
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of collapse under existing funding, let alone less. Many participants requested
restoration of the $128 million per annum claimed to have been lost through the
change to COPO indexation in 1996.
The Commission does not necessarily agree with the severity of these assessments.
The Commission notes that providers in Queensland, for example, have coped with
relatively low subsidies for years. Further, there continue to be willing investors in
residential aged care at current subsidy levels in the lower as well as in the higher
subsidy jurisdictions. Recommendations about the level of funding provided to
residential aged care are beyond the Commission’s terms of reference. However, as
noted above, the Commission considers that enhancing special needs funding is of
such high priority that additional funding should be provided.
Chapter 5 establishes significant inequity in the ordering of individual States and
Territories on a standardised cost basis compared with their ranking on current
subsidy scales. The Commission considers that this inequity should be removed as
soon as possible, even if base funding quantum were not to increase, while giving
some protection to the higher subsidy jurisdictions.
The original coalescence proposal is deficient as it postpones meaningful change
until about the fourth year of the seven year process. Thus, existing inequities would
continue largely unchanged for at least three more years. The proposal from Aged
Care Queensland has the advantage of implementing the required adjustment from
the first year, while preserving subsidies in nominal terms in every jurisdiction.
These adjustment paths are illustrated in appendix D.
Recommendation 18: Subject to any recommendation from the Residential Aged
Care Review in relation to the adequacy of funding provided by the Government
for residential aged care, funds earmarked for indexing current subsidies should
be redirected to progressively increase the basic rates for the low subsidy States
until a coalescence (or, if nationally uniform basic subsidies are not adopted,
until a revised set of jurisdictional subsidies) is achieved.
In this report, the Commission has sought to focus attention on broad concepts and
to make recommendations on an appropriate funding methodology that would better
meet the Government’s objectives in supporting residential aged care. A
consolidated list of the Commission’s recommendations is given at the end of the
Summary, together with a table which summarises the Commission’s subsidy
proposals using the current regime as a reference point.
In broad terms, the Commission considers that its proposals would:
• support a uniform quality of care across Australia at a specified benchmark level;132 NURSING HOME
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• establish greater transparency in the link to the cost of providing care to meet
those standards;
• address current funding anomalies across jurisdictions;
• improve the resources available to homes catering for special needs, for example
those in rural and remote regions;
• provide incentives for improvements in the efficiency of residential aged care
service provision; and
• encourage the development of services which are more responsive to the needs
of residents.SOME LONGER TERM
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8 Some longer term options
The terms of reference, and therefore this report also, focus on examining and
reporting on an appropriate funding methodology for high level residential care.
In their submissions and at the public hearings, however, some participants raised
issues which, although extending beyond consideration of subsidy arrangements,
might contribute to improved longer term outcomes for the aged and for the
community generally. This chapter presents a brief overview of some of those ideas.
The intention is not to come to any firm conclusions or judgments, but to
acknowledge the contribution of some of those who are debating these important
‘bigger picture’ issues.
By way of a broader context, it is of interest to observe that not all countries deal
with aged health care in the same way as Australia. There are a range of differences
in funding mechanisms, the balance between institutional and home care, and in
institutional structures. A brief review of the international scene in set out in
appendix C.
8.1 Income and asset tested resident charges
Resident charges account for most of the costs of care not met by the
Commonwealth subsidy. (Donations, contributions from State and Territory
Governments and cross subsidies from other aged care services are among the other
minor sources of revenue available to homes.)
While resident charging arrangements would fall outside a narrow interpretation of
the terms of reference, in any broader sense it is impossible to isolate them from the
government subsidy regime. For example:
• the level of resident charges has a critical bearing on what quality of service the
available Commonwealth funding will support; and
• the more that those who are able to contribute to the cost of their care do so, the
more any given government contribution can be channelled to those most in need
of support.134 NURSING HOME
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In the position paper, the Commission sought comment on issues relating to resident
charges, in particular comment on whether, in moving to a new subsidy regime,
another round of changes to income and asset tested resident charges should be
contemplated.
A few participants considered that resident charges should be reduced or eliminated.
As noted in chapter 7, the ACHCA considered that parallels could be drawn
between those entering the acute sector under Medicare, and high care nursing home
residents. It proposed that the accommodation charge and income tested fee should
be removed for ‘short stay’ residents — that is, those staying for less than about one
year (sub. D81, p. 5 and transcript p. 163).
ANHECA considered that the income tested arrangements should be abolished in
favour of recoupment via the taxation system:
administration on both the provider and the Government would decrease if income
testing was abolished and in return the rebatable amount for nursing home and personal
care fees was excluded from the medical rebate. This would also decrease the burden on
residents and take away one of the barriers to access for the resident and family.
(Sub. D84, p. 14)
Some participants were mainly concerned to ensure that the financial burden on
residents did not increase, at least at present. The Queensland Government (sub. 10,
p. 1), for instance, argued that any new funding model ‘... must not increase the
proportion of care costs for which residents are responsible’. According to the
Victorian Healthcare Association, another round of changes to resident charges at
this stage would be ‘unacceptable to the community and impose unwarranted
administrative burdens on staff’ (sub. D85, p. 5). However, while commenting that
it is unlikely there would be political support for further changes at this stage, Aged
Care Australia considered there was a need to promote ‘informed public debate’ on
the role of income testing and user contributions and other approaches to financing
in the context of developing a National Strategy for an Ageing Australia (sub. D77,
p. 22).
Several participants pointed to the scope for raising additional revenue from
residents without compromising basic equity objectives.
In some cases, these proposals related to the provision of extra services. As noted in
chapter 7, Aged Care Australia and NANHPH, for example, suggested that homes
be allowed to charge a single room supplement.
There was also support for seeking greater capital contributions from nursing home
residents more generally. In this regard, NANHPH (sub. 25, p. 5) expressed its
disappointment about the Government’s decision not to implement anSOME LONGER TERM
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accommodation bond system for nursing homes, arguing that bonds are ‘inherently
sound’. Similarly, others such as ANHECA, claimed that the accommodation charge
is deficient in that it is limited to a maximum rate of $12 a resident a day. It
considered that the charge should be increased to $16 per day ‘commensurate with
the return from the average accommodation bond, with interest calculated at 6 per
cent’ (sub. D84, p. 14). Alternatively, it suggested that the Government should
extend taxation concessions to providers.
Increased levels of residents charges could be facilitated if they were to receive
extra services in return, some participants considered. Aged Care Queensland noted
that ‘there is an expectation by residents and their families that the payment of
additional charges should permit access to a higher level of service’ (sub. D69,
p. 21). Similarly, the Residential Care Rights Advocacy Service pointed to the ‘need
to link any proposals for increased resident charges to the actual delivery of
improved care quality’ (sub. D93, p. 5).
TriCare’s experience suggests that even pensioners and their families are willing to
pay higher charges for extra service. Greater access to occupational superannuation
and larger numbers of self-financed retirees may increase the ability of residents to
contribute more towards the costs of care in future.
Some consider that, after a lifetime of paying taxes, access to subsidised nursing
home services is a right. Others draw parallels with the Medicare system which
provides free or heavily subsidised medical and public hospital treatment
irrespective of a person’s means. However, access to many social support payments
and programs is limited to those of lesser means. For example, the aged pension is
means tested as is access to public housing programs.
Importantly, targeting support for residential aged care to people and areas most in
need is consistent with both general equity principles and the Aged Care Act 1997.
The Commission has identified at least four areas where resident charging
arrangements might be seen as deficient against equity criteria.
• Income tested daily fees only apply to residents entering facilities after March
1998. Hence, those in residential care prior to this date, no matter how wealthy,
pay only the standard fee applying to concessional residents.
• There is a ceiling on the maximum income tested daily fee. Thus, once a
resident’s income exceeds $57 500 a year, he/she faces no further increase in the
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• Providers can collect accommodation bonds from low care residents and from
high care residents receiving extra services, but not from high care residents
receiving basic care (who entered as high care residents).
• The asset tested accommodation charge of up to $12 a day for high care
residents receiving basic care does not apply to those in nursing homes as at
October 1997 (unless they have subsequently changed facilities).
Of course, considerations other than equity are relevant. As noted by Gregory
(1993), it is important that efforts to promote equity in charging do not discourage
residents from earning investment income. Also, there is the question of whether the
returns from an extension of income and asset tested charges would justify the
administrative costs of collecting them.
Residents on low income, many with low levels of assets, will almost certainly
continue to account for the large majority of new entrants to facilities. The capacity
of this group of residents to pay more for their care is generally very limited. For
this reason, the Government expects that, over the next few years, revenue from
income tested charges will comprise only a very small proportion of the total
income available to homes.
Nevertheless, the inequities in present charging arrangements identified above
should not be allowed to persist indefinitely.
8.2 Alternative funding models
At present, funding is based on the care needs of each individual resident under the
RCS scale, paid per bed day. Some participants suggested there would be merit in
basing funding at a more ‘macro’ level.
The Manor Homes and Mt St Vincent Nursing Home Inc (sub. 4) proposed that
funding could be calculated on a Care Based Model (CBM) appropriate to the
facility. Facilities would be funded for either High Care or Low Care depending on
their resident mix. Under this model a High Care CBM, for instance, would be one
with a resident mix close to the state average for high care facilities. The CBMs
would be costed on a state-by-state basis, and an average per bed day cost
determined for each CBM. Facilities would then be funded on the basis of their
utilised bed days per annum.
Under this proposal, facilities would be reviewed every three years with regard to
their mix of residents, as part of the accreditation process. Where there was aSOME LONGER TERM
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change, the facility would be reclassified as a different CBM and funded
accordingly.
TriCare commented on the difficulty in managing staff which arose from variations
in funding from changes in resident composition:
In such an environment, it is harder to attract and retain highly trained, motivated staff
and to introduce workplace change aimed at continuous quality improvement.
(Sub. D78, p. 2, emphasis in the original)
It commented that a system could be considered which would allocate funding to
facilities annually, based on a projected resident mix. Where the resident mix
diverges more than an established tolerance from the projected mix, adjustments to
funding would be possible. In order to minimise administrative costs the funds so
allocated should not require acquittal. TriCare said such a system would encourage
more permanent staffing arrangements, minimising the need to utilise casual staff.
Aged Care Organisations’ Association (SA & NT) (ACOA), together with other
participants, noted that in different jurisdictions different proportions of residents
fell into each RCS category. It commented that it was unlikely that such a ‘skewing’
was expected:
We had assumed that with a ‘normal population curve’ distribution the percentage of the
RCS population in each State appearing in each level of the RCS [would] be in close
proximity. (Sub. 31, p. 8)
The ACOA was concerned at the compounding effect of the higher RCS subsidy
levels in Victoria and New South Wales, coupled with the higher proportions of
residents in those States falling into RCS classifications 1 and 2.
ACOA suggested that an option would be to consider ‘block funding States’, based
on equal subsidy rates (per RCS classification) across Australia, with equal
proportions of residents in each jurisdiction within each RCS classification,
allocated according to the proportion of the population above the age of 80 (rather
than 70). Each jurisdiction would then be responsible for resolving ‘cost issues’
within that jurisdiction.
Lucan Care (Subs 1 and D83) considered that current funding arrangements
generate conflict between the providers of care and the department. Further, it
considered they do not provide an incentive to improve the environment in which
care is provided, or to increase care quality.
It suggested that funding could be based on the average mix of residents in the
home, reviewed on a 12-monthly basis. Funding rates would be related to whether
care is provided in single rooms, two to four bed rooms, or five to ten bed rooms.138 NURSING HOME
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Funding would be based on average regional costs, with cost increases due to award
increases or state government requirements promptly taken into account. Lucan
commented that as care providers currently had to assess residents with regard to the
means tested fee payable, there was tension created between residents and care
staff, and between residents paying different fees for the same care. Lucan Care
suggested that these difficulties could be overcome if a new government agency was
created to assess the financial status of residents and fees were collected by the
Australian Taxation Office.
In response to the request for comment in the position paper, participants generally
supported continuation of existing arrangements. NANHPH, for instance,
considered that the alternative of moving away from a per resident per bed day basis
of funding ‘has the potential to be more inequitable’ given factors such as the
increasing rate of resident turnover, and wide swings in dependency (sub. D70,
p. 7). Aged Care Australia also commented on equity, further stating that an
alternative may involve additional administration, be less transparent, and not
interface well with income testing (sub. D77, p. 17). While the ACHCA considered
that ‘in the longer term there may be more efficient alternatives’ these would:
need to be developed in conjunction with how the residential aged care sector is to be
better linked to the acute and community care sectors in order to achieve a seamless
continuity of care for people with growing dependency and complex care needs.
(Sub. D81, p. 3)
In the Commission’s view, a move away from the current basis of subsidy does
raise some equity issues. Nevertheless, the existing funding mechanism (and that
recommended by the Commission in chapter 7) is complex, bringing with it
significant problems in terms of efficiency incentives, administration and
transparency. Alternative mechanisms, such as those described above, deserve
further consideration to see whether they give a better balance between relevant
funding assessment criteria.
8.3 Facilitating access, choice and quality care
A number of participants considered that the residential aged care sector should be
better linked and integrated with the acute and community care sectors. As the
ACHCA commented (see above) this could help to achieve ‘a seamless continuity
of care’. Further, although encouragement has been given in recent years to non-
residential aged care where this is more appropriate, there is still concern that the
choices faced by older people are too rigid. The following section describes the
broad details of a model proposed by the Victorian Department of Human Services
which could help address these issues. It also sets out Aged Care Australia’sSOME LONGER TERM
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comments with regard to the options available to older people. It subsequently
describes a ‘self care’ residential model proposed by Catholic Care of the Aged.
In a submission on behalf of the Victorian Government, the Victorian Department
of Human Services (subs 60, D117) said it was concerned that the Commonwealth
reforms of the aged care arrangements have been unable to remove funding
rigidities and program boundaries to provide access, choice and quality care for
older Victorians. The department emphasised that older people should be able to
exercise choice in the kind of care they receive and in what kind of setting that care
is to be provided.
The department proposed an aged care system whereby funding is provided on the
basis of eligibility and care needs according to a classification scale perhaps similar
to the current Resident Classification Scale. The care classification would link the
individual to a care package with a maximum dollar value, and access to defined
services. Individuals would then be able to purchase care in accordance with their
preference for either home-based care, care in a residential care setting, or in
another form of accommodation. The department suggested that the subsidy levels
should be determined on a state-by-state basis to reflect cost differences. Income
testing arrangements could be used to determine the amount to be contributed by an
individual at each dependency level.
If an individual chose a residential care setting, the subsidy could be paid direct to
the service provider selected. The department suggested a separate payment stream
would be required for capital upgrades and building quality maintenance, either
contributed by an individual (eg by means of an accommodation bond or charge) or
provided by the Commonwealth, or a mixture.
If an individual chose to remain at home, the funding could be used to purchase the
appropriate package of services through a ‘brokerage service’. The department said
that given the preference of people to remain at home, there would be likely to be a
shift in service provision from residential care to community care. This would
necessitate a increase in the availability of respite care, making respite care an
integral component of the department’s proposal.
The department saw the advantages of its proposed system as being a significant
improvement in consumer choice, as well as providing an integrated system of
service, more responsive to consumer needs. Furthermore, it saw its proposal as
neutral in terms of funding requirements, as increased expenditure in community
care and respite care services would be offset by reduced expenditure on residential
care. It recognised some disadvantages, for instance, less ‘certainty’ for residential
care providers in terms of a supply of residents, and increased pressure on carers.140 NURSING HOME
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Some of these themes also emerge from Aged Care Australia’s submissions
(especially sub. 26, p. 21). It considered that a primary objective of funding policy
in aged care must be to enhance the care and accommodation options available to
older people to ensure that wherever possible they receive the care they need in the
place they would most prefer to receive it.
Aged Care Australia commented that this does not necessarily require common
funding approaches or integrated management. However, it considered it would be
desirable to facilitate greater flexibility and transparency in regard to funding
arrangements so that the choices and options become more apparent to both
consumers and providers. It considered that the application of common principles
(such as funding linked to assessed care needs and accreditation; access to quality
care services based on need not capacity to pay) and greater clarity regarding
components of funding (such as the component for care as distinct from board and
lodging) may facilitate greater synergy between residential and community care
services and improved flexibility and choice.
Catholic Care described the concept it called ‘self care plus’ (sub. D75, p. 4). This
is an expansion of the self care/independent living accommodation model. Under
the arrangement, self care accommodation units would be located, designed,
managed and supported in a manner which aims, as far as possible, to maintain aged
persons in their self care accommodation for life. Services such as community care
packages, nursing home packages, HACC services etc, could be provided when
required. The units would be designed prior to construction to expedite the
provision of community type care and support while not destroying their appeal as a
self care option. Catholic Care commented that such an approach has the advantage
of removing the need to find capital funds and also would be appealing to the aged,
who would be less likely to have to relocate to hostels or nursing homes.
Chapter 2 notes that health care for older people is provided in a number of ways.
These range from non-institutional care provided by relatives or friends, through
community programs such as HACC and the community aged care packages, to
institutional care in hostels, nursing homes and acute hospitals. The Commission
has heard evidence about multipurpose services, and has visited one such service in
a rural location.
There is some evidence of ‘discontinuity’ in the boundaries between the various
forms of care. Possible indicators of this include: early discharge from acute
hospitals into nursing homes (see submissions from Sundale Garden Village (D104,
p. 6) and the New South Wales College of Nursing (D109, pp. 3–4)); lack of
monetary incentive for nursing home providers to achieve greater rehabilitation ofSOME LONGER TERM
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residents; and inadequate and disjointed funding for services provided in a
community setting.
Possible solutions to these problems not only include service models which can pool
a range of funds and provide flexible services according to the needs of the aged,
but also mechanisms which give consumers greater ‘sovereignty’ in choosing the
most appropriate range of services for their own particular needs. The Commission
considers that the models proposed by a number of participants are worthy of
further study, with a view to improving the longer term outcomes for the aged and
the community generally.TERMS OF REFERENCE 143
A Terms of reference
I, Peter Costello, Treasurer, under Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act
1998, refer the current and alternative funding methodologies for nursing home
subsidy rates for inquiry and report within six months of receipt of this reference.
The Commission is to hold hearings for the purposes of the inquiry.
Background
Nursing home subsidy rates currently differ across States and Territories, with a
large component based on historical variations in wage rates for nursing and
personal care staff.
The Aged Care Structural Reform Package, announced in the August 1996 Budget,
included a process of ‘coalescence’, under which the different nursing home subsidy
rates in States and Territories would gradually move to national rates over a period
of seven years, commencing from 1 July 1998.
The Government has decided to delay the implementation of the coalescence
process, pending a review by the Productivity Commission into differential subsidy
rates.
Scope of the inquiry
The Commission is to:
(1) report whether the proposed coalescence should proceed or whether it should
be replaced by an alternative structure;
(2) examine issues including the current and alternative funding methodology
and report on:
(a) relative costs between the States and Territories of providing nursing
home care, with emphasis on the relative wage costs of nursing and
personal care staff;
(b) trends in wage costs and likely future directions;144 NURSING HOME
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(c) the extent to which, if any, subsidies for nursing home care should
vary by State and Territory; and
(d) if differential subsidies are considered appropriate, possible
methodologies for maintaining appropriate relativities over time.
(3) make recommendations on the appropriate funding methodology and take
account of the views of the sector.
PETER COSTELLO
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B Participation in the inquiry
Submissions
Submissions designated ‘D’ were received after the Commission’s position paper
was finalised.
Participant Submission No.
Aged Care Australia 26, 57, D77, D94, D95, D96
Aged Care Organisations’ Association (SA & NT) Inc. 31, D82
Aged Care Queensland Inc. 33, D69
Aged Care Tasmania Inc. 40, D65, D114
Aged Care Victoria Inc. 23, D79
Aged Care Western Australia 30, D68
Aged Services Association of NSW & ACT Inc. 35, D67
Agmaroy Nursing Home D89
Ainslie House Association Inc. 12, D73, D98
Allied Health and Community Consulting Services D90
Anita Villa Nursing Home D115
Ashfield Baptist Homes Ltd D106
Australian Bureau of Statistics D91
Australian Catholic Health Care Association 7, D81, D110
Australian Medical Association Limited 43
Australian Nursing Federation (Federal Office) 48, D74, D108
Australian Nursing Federation (SA Branch) 11, D102
Australian Nursing Federation (Vic Branch) 54, D86, D105
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association Limited 24, D84
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association - SA Inc 21, D111
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association (Tasmania) D63
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association - Victoria 61
Ballarat Health Services 39
Baptist Care - WA 5, D64
Baptist Community Service Queensland 29
Carramar (Stanthorpe) Home For Senior Citizens Association 14
Catholic Care of the Aged D75
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Western Australia 49
Coorparoo Nursing Centre 56, D66
Department of Finance and Administration (Commonwealth) 50
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Department of Health and Family Services (Commonwealth) 52
Department of Health and Human Services Tasmania 53, D100
Eldercare Inc. 15, D112
Ethnic Communities Council of Queensland D113
Frontier Services 8
Geriaction Inc. 36, D99
Health Department of Western Australia 51, D121
Laurina Lodge Heyfield 38
Lerwin Nursing Home 37
Lucan Care 1, D83
Maranoa Retirement Village 20
Maroba Nursing Home Incorporated 6
May Shaw Nursing Centre 41
Melbourne Citymission 42
Mid North Coast Aged Care Discussion Group 9
Minister for Families, Youth and Community Care; Minister for Disability D122
     Services (Queensland)
National Association of Nursing Homes and Private  25, 55, D70, D103
     Hospitals Inc.
Northern Territory Government 17, D101
New South Wales College of Nursing D109
New South Wales College of Nursing and New South Wales Nurses’ Association 46
New South Wales Nurses’ Association D107
NT Carers Association Inc 13
Our Lady of Consolation Home 27
Paradise  Lakes Nursing Centre and Paradise Lakes Hostel 19
PJ Pusey D97
Queensland Government 10, D87
Queensland Nurses’ Union 45, D76
Residential Care Rights Advocacy Service D93
Resthaven Inc. 32, D72
South Australian Government 58, D120
Southern Cross Homes for the Aged Incorporated 18
Sundale Garden Village 16, D104
The Manor Homes and Mt. St. Vincent Nursing Home Inc. 4
TriCare Limited 34, 59, D78
Umina Park 44
Uniting Church Division of Aged Care and Domiciliary Services (Queensland) 62
Uniting Church in Australia Synod of Victoria D80
Uniting Community Services Australia 47, D118
Valencia Nursing Home D88
Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry D71
Victorian Government 60, D92, D117
Participant Submission No.
Victorian Healthcare Association 22, D85PARTICIPATION 147
Warrina Innisfail 3
Wesley Uniting Mission Inc 28
Western Health Care Group 2, D116, D119
Public hearings
To receive comment on the position paper, public hearings were held in Hobart
(13 November 1998), Brisbane (16 November), Melbourne (18–19 November) and
Tamworth (27 November). A public hearing by video conference was held with
participants in Perth on 20 November. The following participated in these hearings:
Aegis Health Group
Aged Care Australia




Aged Care Western Australia




Anita Villa Nursing Home, Katoomba
Australian Catholic Heath Care Association
Australian Medical Association
Australian Nursing Federation (Federal Office)
Australian Nursing Federation (SA Branch)
Australian Nursing Federation (Victorian Branch)
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association (Western Australia)
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association - Victoria
Catholic Care of the Aged
Columbia Quality Care Group
Council on the Ageing
Geriaction
Hilton Nursing Home, Armidale
Nambucca Valley Care
National Association of Nursing Homes and Private Hospitals
National Association of Nursing Homes and Private Hospitals (Western Australia)
Nazareth House, Tamworth
New South Wales College of Nursing
New South Wales Nurses’ Association
Queensland Health148 NURSING HOME
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Queensland Nurses’ Union
Residential Care Rights Advocacy Service
Resthaven Inc.
The Manor Homes and Mt. St. Vincent Nursing Home
TriCare Limited
Uniting Church in Australia Synod of Victoria
Valencia Nursing Home
Victorian Department of Human Services
Victorian Healthcare Association
HN McLean Retirement Village
Informal discussions and visits
New South Wales
Aged Services Association of NSW & ACT
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association
Banksia Village
Braidwood Multipurpose Service
Edgewood Park Assisted Living Apartments and Nursing Centre
Hammond Care Group
National Association of Nursing Homes and Private Hospitals
NSW Ageing and Disabilities Department




Aged Care Division, Victorian Department of Human Services
Aged Care Management Services Pty Ltd
Australian Nursing Federation
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association















Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association
National Association of Nursing Homes and Private Hospitals
Health Department of Western Australia
South Australia
Aged Care Organisations Association (SA & NT)
Alzheimer’s Association
Australian Nursing Homes and Extended Care Association




New Norfolk District Hospital
Tasmanian Department of Community Services
Tasmanian State Government
The Gardens Nursing Home
Northern Territory
Aged Care Assessment Team, Katherine
Juninga Aged Care Facility
Kalarno Facility
Katherine Hospital
Northern Territory Health Services
Red Cross Nursing Home Facility, Katherine
Rocky Ridge Nursing Home
Salvation Army Nursing Home
Australian Capital Territory
Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency
Australian Catholic Health Care Association
Department of Health and Family Services
Uniting Community Services Australia




The material in this appendix is based on material from a 1996 report by the OECD
on ‘Caring for frail elderly people’ (refer to the reference list).
Governments in various countries have adopted different ways of dealing with the
growing demand for long term care and rising expectations of elderly people and
their families.
Originally, long term care for the elderly was provided primarily in hospitals for
those needing long term nursing care, or in public or charitable old people’s homes
for those disadvantaged persons who had no family support and who needed shelter
and social support.
In a number of countries, long stay sections in hospitals have continued to provide
most long term care for the elderly (eg Ireland and Japan) while in a number of
other countries (such as Canada, France and New Zealand) hospitals continue to
play a major role. However, in many other OECD countries the provision of long
term care for elderly people in hospitals has been progressively reduced and
replaced by other forms of institutional and community care.
Methods of financing
A number of OECD countries fund hospitals and other institutional health services
from general taxation. In the Nordic countries, Local Governments are funded by a
combination of central and local taxes to provide social services as citizenship
rights, similar to rights to social security and health care. Long term institutional
care is funded by this mechanism. Some countries, including Spain and the Nordic
countries, now supply long term care for the elderly on a universal basis, with no
user charge other than a proportion of the public retirement pension.
Some other countries have health insurance systems which provide considerable
coverage of long term institutional care in hospitals and elsewhere. The French
insurance system provides coverage for the health care component of care in long-
stay sections in hospitals or in retirement homes with a ‘medical section.’ However,
the user is responsible for the social or board or lodging component in full. The152 NURSING HOME
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Japanese health system has found itself funding considerable long term hospital care
by default, as other forms of care have been slow to develop.
A number of insurance-based systems are developing new forms of social insurance
to provide cover for institutional long term care. Germany has passed a new law to
extend social insurance to long term care and to raise new contributions to fund
these services.
The financing of long term care for the elderly has retained a strong private
component in many other OECD countries, where a significant part of the cost is
met by the user, with only the low-income elderly receiving long term care without
charge, on social assistance terms. In the United Kingdom and the United States it
has been estimated that about half of the cost of long term care in nursing homes is
met by private payments. The United States provides cover for the nursing home
costs of low-income elderly people through the Medicaid system, which is funded
from both federal and local taxation. Elderly people with assets above a minimum
level are required to ‘spend down’ their savings in meeting nursing home fees
before they qualify for assistance.
Residential versus community care
Several other OECD countries with a relatively high provision of institutional care
for the aged in the early 1980s have either capped the growth in places or begun to
reduce their number. Denmark, France and Sweden all had a significant reduction in
the proportion of elderly people in institutional care together with a strong emphasis
on expanding home care services. In Denmark and Sweden this was supported with
benchmarks for the reduction of beds in those types of institutions which were felt
to be overprovided at the expense of more appropriate forms of service. Canada, the
Netherlands and Norway have adopted a similar policy stance and have begun to see
a significant downward trend in the overall level of institutional provision since the
later 1980s. Most OECD countries have for some time been pursuing policies
intended to maintain as many elderly people as possible in their own homes.
The Nordic countries are ‘high service’ countries with the extent of home care
services provided to the elderly higher than in any other OECD country, except for
the Netherlands. Home help services developed in many countries as a gradual
adaptation to demographic changes, more in parallel with, than as a substitute for,
institutions.
The OECD estimates that provision of home help is almost non-existent or at best
negligible (with 1 per cent or less receiving home help) in Greece, Italy, New
Zealand, Portugal and Spain. With the exception of New Zealand, these countriesOVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENTS
153
also provide low levels of institutional care. Countries with very modest levels of
home help (2–3 per cent) are Austria, Canada, Germany, Ireland and Japan. Many
areas of the United States would also fall into this category, although the extent of
coverage varies across States from 0 to 8 per cent. Countries with a significant level
of provision include Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
The countries with a very high level of provision of home help (over 10 per cent)
are the Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark and Finland.
In the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) and the United Kingdom,
Local Governments now have global budgets from which to fund institutional and
home care, rather than multiple subsidies for specific services. This has been
introduced with the aim of encouraging a more flexible approach to arranging
services and greater responsiveness to various needs.
Alternatives in residential care
Some countries have been pursing alternatives to institutional care through other
forms of specialised or adapted housing which can offer a similar level of support
for elderly people with disabilities and high care needs. For example, Denmark
halted the building of traditional nursing homes from 1988 and modified existing
nursing homes into self-contained apartments. Similarly, in Sweden where there was
a reduction in the proportion of the elderly living in institutions during the 1980s,
over 3 per cent live in specialised service apartments.
In some countries these developments have taken the form of specialised housing
with wardens and services on call, sometimes by conversion of communal old-age
homes into apartment blocks and supported accommodation for people with
dementia, who require small living units and some help on call, but have no
physical disabilities.
‘Assisted living’ has come to be used in the United States for housing arrangements
where care services are also provided. The development of assisted living blurs
distinctions between home care and residential services. Some assisted living
programs are made up of separate housekeeping units with full baths and
kitchenettes. In such cases, they are more like small private apartments than rooms
in institutional settings. Some assisted living settings provide housekeeping, laundry
and meals through an internal staff and rely on outside agencies for personal care
and nursing services.
For example, the State of Oregon has encouraged assisted living as a major reform
and a replacement for nursing homes. Thus, while it imposes no admission and
retention criteria based on disability levels of the clients, the State will pay for the154 NURSING HOME
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care of low-income persons in assisted living only if they are also disabled enough
to qualify for subsidy in a nursing home. Any Oregon program licensed as ‘assisted
living’ must meet a minimum standard that includes single occupancy unless by
choice, doors with locks, full baths, kitchenettes, voice-to-voice inter-
communication systems and individual temperature controls. In addition, Oregon’s
licensing standards are flexible about the types and numbers of staff needed but
require at least one staff member be awake at all times, that individualised care





The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate differences between some possible
coalescence paths. The paths use as starting points the basic subsidy rates as they
applied during the 1997-98 financial year. However, they should be seen as
notional, illustrative, examples only, as many different possible coalescence paths
exist.
Achieving coalescence without a real increase in base funding
The alternatives discussed in this section involve no real increases in base funding.
The only additional money available is through indexation.
Option 1: DHFS coalescence proposal
Under the DHFS coalescence model, rates would be indexed and subsequently
coalesced up or down by reducing the difference between individual state rates and
the national average by 2, 4, 8, 14, 24, 24 and 24 per cent in successive years (see
box 3.4 in chapter 3 for a notional example of how the Queensland RCS1 rates
change under the DHFS model). Rates in the low rate States would increase and
rates in the high rate States would decrease. At the end of the seven year process the
rates would have become uniform in all States.
States originally with rates below the national average would receive increases in
both real and nominal funding. States with rates above the national average at the
beginning of the process would receive reduced funding in real terms. An exercise
carried out by the Commission (using an indexation factor of 1.4 per cent, and
ignoring any superannuation adjustments) shows that, in some cases, funding for
States currently above the national average could fall in nominal terms also. For
both Victoria and Tasmania (the two highest rate States) in years 5, 6 and 7 the
RCS1, 2 and 3 rates would fall in nominal terms. For Tasmania the RCS4 rate
would also fall in nominal terms in years 5, 6 and 7. Figure D.1 below depicts the
changes in RCS1 rates over the seven years.156 NURSING HOME
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a Year ending 30 June. b Using an indexation rate of 1.4 per cent for the entire period.
Data source: PC estimates.
Option 2: Use funds available through indexation to bring lowest rates up first.
There are any number of ways to use the funds available through indexation to
increase subsidies in the lowest rate States. For instance, all the indexation funds
could be used to bring the lowest rates up to the highest as quickly as possible,
giving nothing to the States with the highest rates (Option 2a). Or some of the
indexation funds could be used to bring the lowest States up leaving a proportion to
increase funding for the other States (similar to the Aged Care Queensland
proposal — Option 2b).
Option 2a: Use all indexation funds to bring lowest rates up successively until all
rates are the same as the highest (Tasmanian) rate.
This would mean Tasmania would receive no additional funding for the duration of
the process, and Victoria would not receive an increase until the last adjustment.
Queensland rates would increase over the whole period. As in the year 0 (1997-98)
Tasmanian rates are roughly equal to the average national rate achieved under the
coalescence proposal in year 6, it would take 6 years (at 1.4 per cent indexation) to
achieve nationally uniform rates equal to the Tasmanian rates. Indexation in year 7




This would be the quickest way to achieve uniform rates while avoiding nominal
reductions. However, Tasmania’s funding would decrease in real terms until the
seventh year, when it would benefit from indexation. Victoria’s funding would also
decrease in real terms during the initial years.
Option 2b: Aged Care Queensland option
Aged Care Queensland proposed that funds available from annual indexation be
allocated to bringing all States to a national rate of funding not less than the present
rate of funding in Tasmania. In order to do this each year around 90 per cent of the
indexation funding would be used to bring the lowest rates up and the remaining 10
per cent would be allocated on a flat rate per bed/day to the remaining States. This
would maintain an upward nominal trend in all the States (but still be a reduction in
real terms for the highest rate States for some years).
For instance, in the first year the proposal would move Queensland rates up to
South Australian rates and then move both a small way towards Western Australian
rates. It would also allocate 19 cents per bed/day across the other States. In the
second year Queensland and South Australian rates would continue to rise. As they
passed Western Australian and ACT rates, these would also begin to move towards
New South Wales rates. The other States would receive an increase of 25 cents per
bed/day. The process would continue until in year six full equalisation had been
achieved and normal indexing of all rates could resume. Aged Care Queensland
used an indexation rate of 1.8 per cent in its proposal. If a lower rate applied, the
process would take longer. Figure D.2 depicts graphically the movement of the
RCS1 rates under Option 2b.
Comparison
Key points to note about the DHFS coalescence model versus Option 2b are:
• With DHFS coalescence, funding for the high rate States might at some stage of
the process decrease in nominal as well as real terms, while with Option 2b all
the States would receive an increase in nominal terms at all stages of the process.
• Whether funding for the high rate States would fall at any stage during the DHFS
process of coalescence would depend on the indexation rate (and allowances for
superannuation etc). The higher the indexation rate, the less chance of a decrease
in funding.158 NURSING HOME
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a Queensland Aged Care used an indexation rate of 1.8 per cent.
Data source: Aged Care Queensland (Sub. 33).
• The DHFS coalescence model as proposed (with coalescence of 2, 4, 8, 14, 24,
24 and 24 per cent in successive years) would always take seven years to achieve
uniform rates. (It could be slower or faster with different percentages coalesced
each year.)
• The time taken to achieve uniform rates with Option 2b would depend on the
rate of indexation. The lower the rate of indexation, the longer the process. This
is because fewer dollars would be available to raise the lowest rates each year.
• Tasmania and Victoria, as the highest rate States, would receive (at least
initially) larger increases under the DHFS coalescence model than under
Option 2b.
• Queensland and South Australia, as the lowest rate States, would receive larger
increases in the early years under Option 2b than under DHFS coalescence.
• The DHFS coalescence model would largely postpone the start of the adjustment
process until year 4, whereas it would commence in year 1 under Aged Care
Queensland’s proposal.
Achieving coalescence with a real increase in base funding
A real increase in funding would enable uniform rates to be achieved more quickly.
For instance, an addition to base funding of around $200 million would permit all
basic subsidy rates to be brought up to the highest (Tasmania’s) level in one step.ILLUSTRATING
COALESCENCE
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Indexation of the new base funding would allow all the rates to be maintained at
that level. To bring Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the ACT up
to New South Wales rates would require an increase to base funding of around $80
million. Again, indexation thereafter would allow those increased rates to be
maintained. Similarly, bringing Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, the
ACT, New South Wales and the Northern Territory up to Victoria’s rates would
involve an increase in base funding of around $160 million.
A number of participants considered that the change to COPO indexation in the
1995-96 Commonwealth Budget had resulted in reduced funding to nursing homes
of $128 million over three years. An addition of $128 million to the funding base,
together with funds available from indexing existing funding (around $34 million
for the first year under the existing arrangement) would make available sufficient
funds to bring Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, the ACT, New
South Wales and the Northern Territory up to Victoria’s rates in one year.
Indexation of the new base would almost enable full coalescence of all rates in the
subsequent year, with all jurisdictions receiving virtually full indexation in the third
year.REFERENCES 161
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